The Jarring Road to Democratic Inclusion

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In both Israel and Turkey, women's movements have been challenging the prevailing gender order which prevents women from exercising their citizenship rights fully despite the official legal framework for gender equality. In particular, starting with their second-wave of feminist activism, different strands of activist women's associations have constituted, in Turkey, Israel and other places throughout the world, significant forces for democratization which impacted state policies, and provided an "institutional route to influence state policymaking."[1] In the Israeli and the Turkish cases, socio-political and ideological cleavages have also politicized women's groups to mobilize, at times with other social movements, in search for a transformation of patriarchal institutions and political agendas as well as for the democratization of the private sphere.

The objective of this chapter is to provide a comparative analysis of the evolution and accomplishments of the Israeli and Turkish women's movements. It contextualizes their emergence and their attempts at transcending the narrow confines of identity politics to embrace demands for justice and equality for other marginalized groups in the society. It focuses on both organized and grassroots women's activism, which demanded an end to women's oppression and confronted dominant sys-

tems of power which disregarded women's voices in socio-political conflicts.

In Turkey, republican modernization instrumentalized women's legal equality with men. It viewed women's emancipation from their traditional roles as an indispensable step towards Westernization and the development of the nation. Turkish women were the object of the revolution, but not allowed to be the subject of it. Despite the introduction of legal equality for male and female citizens in a secular framework, patriarchal norms with sexual double-standards, and traditional gender roles prioritizing women's domesticity remained untouched; the Civil Code of 1926 and the Criminal Code embodied the prevailing patriarchal mentality until the reform process of the early 2000s.[2] Since the transition to multiparty democracy, the resurgence of political Islam, the predominance of conservative right-wing politics and the persistence of paternalism over women's public and political roles contributed to the subordination of women. In Israel, the Zionist conception of the socialist Labor Movement initially required women to work side by side with men towards "building a Jewish entity."[3] However, in later decades, as the early egalitarian character of the movement was considerably weakened, motherhood became the major domain and role for Jewish women.[4] The militarization of the society through national conscription means women are drafted along with men into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).[5] This served the idea of equality; yet the gendered military division of labor contributed to women's secondary status within the army and the society.[6] In 1951, the Women's Equal Rights Law granted married women custody and inheritance rights; however, it did not affect the jurisdictional monopoly of the Orthodox religious institutions over marriage and divorce. As a result, Orthodox personal status law "which is intertwined with the production and reproduction of the Israeli family" has served as the major mechanism of gender discrimination and women's subordination.[7]

Despite these differences between Israel's and Turkey's political and social structures, the dynamics of both political systems made a significant impact on the evolution of new societal challenges to existing structures of gender-based exclusion. In Israel, diverging positions towards peace with the Palestinians has become a major political cleavage along with the prevaling secular-religious divide. The politicization of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey increased the saliency of the ethnic cleavage across the political divide along with an already polarized secular-Islamic conflict. These cleavages paved the way for Islamic and Kurdish feminists. Likewise, ethnic-national exclusion and the plight of religious women brought about the political engagements of the Mizrahi women, women's peace activism and religious feminism in Israel. A recent third-wave of feminist activism in both countries ushered in a fragmentation and decentralization of the women's movement; this was in keeping with

the political trend for greater pluralism away from the conventional collectivist consensus in both countries.

The issue of accomodating diversity under societal polarization emerged as another challenge for feminism. In this context, women's roles and contributions in new forms of active advocacy for social inclusion along with other marginalized groups need to be put into perspective against the backdrop of women's accumulated experiences of emancipatory struggles in both countries.

This comparative analysis is organized around two specific factors which seem highly relevant for assessing the socio-political impact of the women's movement in both countries: First, the historical legacy of state and nation-building and second, the nature of social cleavages and political polarization. The first determines the social context of women's inclusion in, and also their exclusion from, the polity. The second constitutes the political terrain where women's critiques of the dominant gendered order and discourses reverbates, allies or clashes with other societal oppositions. In the last section, the chapter also looks at the nature and the implications of women's participation in the recent social mobilizations in Israel's social justice protests of 2011 and Turkey's Gezi Resistance of 2013 to explore the possibilities and the limits to gendering popular resistance movements and to underscore the role of women's activism as a powerful societal force for increased civic participation.

THE EQUALITY MYTHS SHATTERED: THE CHALLENGES OF ORGANIZED FEMINISM

In both Israel and Turkey, the equality myths endorsed by the collectivist and nationalist ethos of state-building were also promoted by the discourses of Westernization and democratization. The illusion of equality was, however, challenged during the rise of the second-wave feminist movements (in Israel corresponding to the 1970s to 1980s; in Turkey the late 1980s and the 1990s),[8] which included both radical and liberal strands. Radical feminist perspective predominantly shaped the discourses and the objectives of the women's movements. This meant a shift from a legal focus on "color-blind" gender equality, to a critique of the male-dominated social structures.[9]

The advent of suffrage rights for Jewish women in Yishuv in 1920 and in Turkey in 1934 was a turning point in that there was a temporary lull in women's pressure for greater equality. As Yishai (1997) contended, a major legacy of Zionism for Israeli women was a dilemma for their public and private roles; simultaneous adherence to the nationalist vision—the flag—and the feminist banner seemed irreconciable.[10] National goals unequivocally shaped by security needs dominated the political agenda, maintaining primacy over gender equality. Both the Defense Service Law

(1949) which mandated women's conscription into the army—except for married women and mothers—and the Equal Rights for Women Law (1951) which retained the religious court's monopoly over marriage and divorce, reaffirmed the role of motherhood "as an alternative path for women."[11] Meanwhile in Turkey, political movements challenging the Kemalist consensus up to the 1980s did not specifically address "the women question." Just as in the Israeli feminist movement, which emanated from the women's studies seminars at University of Haifa in 1971, the pioneers of the new feminist awakening in Turkey in the 1980s were middle-class women, mostly with academic and (leftist) social movement background. In Israel, the influence of new female immigrants from the United States and Western Europe was also important for diffusing feminist concepts and ideas.[12]

The military regime in Turkey which silenced all other societal oppositions was the catalyst behind the emergence of the feminist activity. Women's groups organized protests, petition campaigns, meetings and other public events, as well as home-based gatherings, recruiting a growing number of women. With their demands for autonomy and subsequent criticisms, feminists of the 1980s and 1990s came forward "as women for women."[13] Their campaigns exerted pressures on the government to ratify the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and to recognize domestic violence and women's right to control their own bodies as political issues. The Women's Library and the Purple Roof Women's Shelter Foundation (1990) in Istanbul were followed by a multitude of women's organizations, foundations and informal civic platforms. In 1990, the Ministry of Labour and the Office of Prime Ministry (The General Directorate of Women's Status and Problems) began to devise and coordinate equality policies in the government. A State Ministry in Charge of Women and the Family was established in 1991. Both cooperated with women's NGOs on legal reforms to promote gender equality. This led to the Domestic Violence Act of 1998 and substantial revisions in the Civil Code in 2000 and the Criminal Code in 2004.[14] In contrast to the liberal Kemalist feminists who felt threatened by the public visibility of headscarved women and kept their distance from the claims and demands of Islamic women, most of the radical feminists respected the struggle of devout women without allying with them for the feminist cause.[15]

A decade earlier, in Israel, the Yom Kippur War of 1973 was a turning point for the rise of a feminist consciousness which led to a break with the liberal equality approach. It did this by "exposing the ways in which Zionism and Israeli nationalism are gendered."[16] The atmosphere of widespread social dissent raised the issue of women's integration into the labor force and into the IDF on the public agenda.[17] In this era of feminist awakening, the American experience of consciousness-raising groups, dominated by English-speaking Israelis, became widespread. Feminists

followed confrontational radical strategies (demonstrations, sit-ins, and disruptions of academic or parliamentary sessions) to draw media attention.[18] In 1976, the feminist groups supported the Citizens Right Movement's (CRM) advocacy of electoral and religious reforms. In 1976 feminist groups and organizations in Haifa and Jerusalem organized a campaign demanding free abortion and contraception. The abortion debate, spearheaded by the feminist movement, attested to the significance of the close alliance between the state and religious orthodoxy on issues related to women's roles and sexuality. The law on abortion was passed in 1977 with conditions attached to it. In the 1977 Knesset elections, the newly established Women's Party (WP), which advocated a radical discourse against the oppression of women in Israeli society, ran for legislative seats; however, it did not reach the necessary threshold to send a representative to the Knesset.[19]

The longtime pursuit of recognition and legislation of gender-based issues by these women's groups led to legal amendments for criminalization of rape within marriage, protection of victim's rights, and the introduction of preventive orders against a violent spouse.[20] In 1998, under pressure from women's groups, the Knesset passed the Sexual Harassment Prevention Law which introduced a broad framework for defining sexual harasment as a criminal act. Hence, it was quite revolutionary at the time, particularly in the context of widespread sexual assault against women within the military.[21] Similar to the Turkish case, this stage of the feminist movement was characterized by a proliferation of service-providing organizations for women, such as shelters and crisis centers.[22] The Equal Opportunity in Employment Law (1988) prohibited gender discrimination at the workplace and affirmed the equal pay for equal work principle. It extended paid maternity leave and allowed women to retire from work at the same age with that of men. The recognition of women as heads of single parent families, government payment for alimony, widows' inheritance of half of the marital property, and equal division of marital property upon divorce also followed.[23] The Israel Women's Network (IWN) (1984), a broad-based hierarchical and formal organization, was a major actor engaging with the state on equality issues as well as raising feminist consciousness in society. It became a major channel of electoral recruitment for many feminists. Other progressive amendments included the introduction of measures to pressure a man who refuses to grant his wife a divorce and allowing a woman to represent a woman demanding divorce in the Rabbinical courts.[24] In 1995, for the first time, thanks to the efforts of the IWN and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, women were admittted into combating courses in the military, incuding to the lucrative Air-Force Academy. The latter was made possible through a Supreme Court decision allowing women to participate in the pilot course following the application of Alice Miller in 1994. Miller was a trained aeronautical engineer and had a civil pilot's license, but she

was not accepted into the course due to women's exclusion from serving in combat units. As this event also epitomized, court decisions were precedent-setting in eliminating gender-based discrimination.[25]

The growing political impact of radical feminist discourse in the agendas of feminist groups and NGOs in the 1990s in both Turkey and Israel were the most important features of feminist activism. Successful lobbying by liberal and radical feminists in the political system and effective engagements with policy-makers were crucial in the legal achievements for equality. In both cases, however, feminist movements were not entirely inclusive and open to women of all backgrounds. Rather, they were dominated by elite women, i.e., the Ashkenazi middle-class women in Israel and the secular, urbanized middle-class women in Turkey.

THE "SUBVERSIVE" TURN IN THE POLARIZED POLITY: JEWISH WOMEN'S FEMINIST POLITICS OF PEACE AND RELIGIOUS WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY AND ISRAEL

In the 1990s, politicization of excluded identities and the empowerment of civil society injected new dynamism into women's activism. The peace issue in Israel and the secular-Islamist cleavage in Turkey produced grassroots feminist opposition to male-dominated state policies. The Israeli women's peace movement which corresponded to a left-right cleavage in national politics posed a major challenge to policies promoted by the security apparatus. As will be dwelled upon briefly in the ensuing discussion, a case in point was the activities and the extensive lobbying of the Four Mothers Movement which took issue with the protracted occupation in Lebanon.[26] In Turkey, the power struggle between the secular elite and the Islamist counter-elites culminated in the military-led February 28 Process of 1997. This led to the ousting of the Islamist Welfare Party from power and to its closure, and constituted a milestone in the rise of the Islamic women's (pro-)feminist awakening. This process had been preceded by religious women's protests against the headscarf ban in the cities as in the case of the campus sit-ins and the notorious protests of covered women students in the "türban chain" protests in Istanbul and other cities in October 1998.[27] In the Israeli women's peace movement some Jewish and Arab women activists came from the ranks of feminist campaigns and NGOs such as Jerusalem Link, Bat Shalom and Palestinian-based the Jerusalem Center for Women.[28] Both in the Orthodox Jewish women's activism within in the Israeli women's peace movement and in Turkish Islamic women's movement, not all activists did openly identify themselves with feminism, but they organized in their defiance of the dominant ideological and policy paradigms; in that sense they challenged the patriarchal state's gender-blind policies.

The Women's Peace Movement in Israel: Feminizing the Peace Issue or Challenging the Masculinist Paradigm?

The Lebanon War (1982–1985) and later the first Palestinian *Intifada* (1987–1991) paved the way for the rise of a feminist politics of peace, which made the connection between the Israeli–Palestinan conflict and women's subordination in Israeli society. By the 1980s, the Israeli political scene had already been polarized between the supporters of the "end the occupation" and the "Greater land of Israel" camps. Women's separate organizing in all-women's groups was, to a large extent, born out of their frustrations from their marginalization in the mixed-gender Peace Now movement, which had become a mass movement after the Yom Kippur War by promoting "the idea of peace as a way to security."[29] The Women in Black movement (1988–1994) which never self-identified as a feminist movement, with the slogan of "End the Occupation" to protest the ongoing Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza. The Women in Black's solemn and persistent acts of protest challenged not only the male monopoly over the public realm on a vital issue to national well-being, but also took issue with the social identities of Jewish and Palestinan women as citizens.[30] In the same period, Women Against the Invasion of Lebanon (which—after the outbreak of the Intifada—was renamed as Women Against the Occupation), the Parents Against Silence, Women for Political Prisoners and the Peace Quilt followed.[31] As in the case of the Jerusalem Link (1993), women's grassroots peace activism transcended the national divide by promoting a culture of cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians. Mixed Jewish and Israeli Palestinian groups also embraced an anti-militarist feminist stance criticizing the peace process for being a male-dominated project and promoting the idea of peace as social justice.[32] As women peace activists opposed nationalist militarism, they were often stigmatized as "traitors" by men for endangering national solidarity. However, in the 1980s and the 1990s, the women's peace movement's mobilizing capacity remained limited due to the predominence of the Ashkenazi middle classes in its constituencies. Organizations such as Women and Mothers for Peace and Religious Women for Peace emerged in the mid-1990s. The latter attempted "an alternative reading of the religious texts" and took issue with the religiously ordained exclusive rights of Jews over the biblical Land of Israel. Women's peace activism following *the Intifada* embraced the image of womanhood in order to question the link between militarism and gender.[33] Overall, through the struggles of the Women in Black to the Four Mothers movement, the Israeli feminist peace movement exposed the connection between war and gender oppression.[34]

On the surface, the war in Lebanon contributed to the feminization of the peace movement in all-women associations. By the late 1980s, the reaction from the general public to the discourse of security to legitimize

an "unjust war" had mobilized anti-militaristic mass protests and demonstrations throughout the country.[35] Women's peace activism in this period also saw the subversion of the meaning of motherhood in the national imagination beyond emotional appeals to the general public by protesting the defense policy in general.[36] In this context, the Four Mothers movement (1997–2000) became one of the most succesful grass-roots movements in Israel by pressuring the state to withdraw from Lebanon in May 2000. The traumatic death of seventy-three soldiers in a collision of two military helicopters carrying Israeli soldiers to South Lebanon triggered a group of women, mothers of combat soldiers, residents of Northern Israel, to organize a campaign for the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Southern Lebanon. According to the founder and the leading activist of the movement, Rachel Ben Dor, being, first and foremost, residents of the North as well as being mothers of the soldiers accorded them a legitimate voice to speak against the government's security policy.[37] The leaders of the movement were careful not to overuse the word "mother," and refrained from making references to "feminism." Four Mothers also accepted male activists and members, and men (including retired army generals) were given important roles in their interaction with the authorities. The fact that they "did not openly carry the flag of feminism" alienated some feminist organizations from their activities. Most feminists, however, credited their struggle as being essentially feminist because they, as women, succeeded in making the male-dominated security establishment "hear their voice." In contrast, male detractors of the movement criticized their reference to motherhood by calling them "emotional hysterics," and the security establishment perceived them as a threat to national security.[38] Four Mothers were aware, from the very beginning, that they needed to convince the public about their claims. As Ben Dor explained, "We were regular people, not extremists; but we were also mothers, women. Hence, we had to constantly prove that we were knowledgeable about national security." As a professor of biblical studies, the movement's leader also tried to appeal to the right-wing as well as Orthodox Jews by referring to the power possessed by mothers in the bible. The strongest aspects of the movement were the use of multiple strategies, and the activists' relentless efforts in contacting and convincing Knesset members, especially right-wing members, of their "strong fresh and unique voice" in society.[39]

Going beyond the typical image of the passive and helpless mothers worrying for their sons fighting at war, Four Mothers challenged the masculine monopoly of the military establishment in Israel over national security and articulated alternative approaches on peace and war through intensive learning and data gathering.[40] While a conscious effort was present in the Israeli media's gender-biased discourses which downplayed the civil aspect of the movement, Four Mothers was able to draw attention to their cause and gather support across all social groups

through protests, demonstrations, participation in TV programs, writing articles to newspapers, organizing meetings, art events, lobbying politicians, and informing people.[41]

Islamic Women's Feminist Organizing in Turkey and the Rise of Orthodox Women's Feminism in Israel

Islamic women's growing public visibility in Turkey, which alarmed the secularist establishment and the secular sectors, arose in the headscarf movement which was the main manifestation of Islamist identity politics in the 1980s and the 1990s.[42] However, they remained at the margins of the predominantly masculine Islamist Welfare Party despite the fact that women's activities for neighbourhood mobilization was crucial to the political rise of the party in the 1994 local and the 1995 parliamentary elections. Devout women's political involvement at the grassroots level thus served the feminization of Islamic party politics.[43] Politicization of headscarved university students who demanded the right to dress in accordance with their belief initially lacked a distinct feminist consciousness. Until the 1990s, covered women were the leading actors in the urban protests movements against the secular bans on public visibility of Islamic symbols. They were asserting their feminity in the Islamist movement and reclaimed the public sphere denied to them by the secular establishment, consisting of the secular parties, judiciary, academia and the Turkish military. The assault of the February 28 Process on Islamist actors imposed stricter bans on the headscarf and further restrictions on Islamist sectors. This was a turning point for Islamic women's autonomous organization on the basis of a self-reflection of their exclusion from the public sphere. Their sense of victimization, having to leave their schools and public sector jobs due to their religious conviction, was accompanied by "a sense of defeat" through their disproportionate burdens as women compared to Islamist men.[44] Thereafter, the Islamic women's feminist voices came to be a significant aspect of Turkish civil society. Theirs was a struggle for the expansion of citizenship rights to pious covered women by redressing the immediate deprivations caused by the bans and by promoting a sense of empowerment out of their deprivations.[45]

Single-issue organizations within the Turkish Islamic women's movement, such as AKDER (The Association for Women's Rights Against Discrimination), focused on documenting the adverse impact of the headscarf ban on students and on professional women and carrying the issue to national and international stages.[46] Other organizations were involved in the empowerment of women through educational activities and the promotion of solidarity among pious women. While many of these associations refrained from openly declaring themselves as feminist, others, including some Islamic women intellectuals, took issue with the double-

standard embedded in the Islamist men's approach towards women's rights. For example, the Ankara-based Capital City Women's Platform Association which came into being in 1996, set out to criticize the distorted images of women in the religious texts, the discourses of the State Directorate of Piety Affairs on gender relations as well as its discriminatory employment policies against women.[47] In their internal discussions women made ample room for individual differences of opinion on controversial issues such as the Kurdish conflict and the LGBT rights. Criticizing the dominant role of men in Islam, the Islamic women intellectuals in this Association reviewed the religious texts to pave the way for the liberation of Muslim women from patriarchal constraints. Women in other organizations worked on educating conservative women and fought against oppression of women in the private sphere as well. Examples include HAZAR Association of Education, Culture and Solidarity in Istanbul, and the Ankara-based İLK-DER (Association of İlke, Knowledge, Culture, and Solidarity). As the İLK-DER chair put it, "the main enemy of the pious women is first the state and then the husband."[48] In their opinion, men benefited from pious women's unpaid labor at home, praised their educational achievement but did not make any effort to facilitate their career developments. On the contrary, Islamic men, especially those who were upwardly mobile through the Islamist party politics, freely interacted with secular uncovered women in the public sphere while confining their women to the home.[49]

Islamic women were also critical of the male-dominated political system, and demanded their right to be elected to public office as autonomous individuals, as in the case of No Vote without a Headscarved Candidate Campaign during the June 2011 elections. Overall, however, they were too timid to criticize the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) government on other issues of gender discrimination. Hence, their critical engagement with the gendered regime of Islamic patriarchy turned out to be far from complete since they often agreed with the Islamic notions of modesty while rejecting pious women's submission to men. Islamic women did not present assertive feminist demands, such as the inclusion of women in the mosques on an equal footing with men. They considered veiling as the most important element of their identity, and as such they could not question the construction of their feminity veil through covering. In addition, the constituency of Islamic feminist critique and activism mirrored the middle-class domination within the secular feminist movement.[50]

Likewise, Orthodox women's organizations in Israel emerged in the 1980s to challenge the religious establishment from within, without openly embracing the feminist cause. The Orthodox Jewish women's campaigns have made an impact on the political debate by challenging the existing gendered distribution of power. Their engagement with their own religious communities and with the political parties and the Israeli

parliament has broadened the scope of the feminist movement. Thanks to an increased level of education and exposure to a feminist agenda among religious Jewish women and the influence of the U.S. orthodoxy, these women challenged their exclusion in all areas of religious communal life (e.g., women's position in Rabbincal courts). In this context, *Kolech*, Israel's first Orthodox feminist group, founded in 1998, identified itself as a bi-partisan feminist formation, and worked for "the advancement of women in the Orthodox religious community and in the Israeli society in general."[51] *Kolech* also took interest in the more specific needs of religious women, such as the establishment of the Jerusalem Crisis Center for Religious Women that provided emotional support for Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox women. Its cooperation with organizations on more specific feminist demands was also striking. For example, the International Coalition for Agunah Rights (ICAR) was formed in 1991 to seek solutions for the problematic situation of the *agunot*.[52] Through ICAR's campaigns, demonstrations, and lobbying work, an amendment to the Spousal (Property Relations) Law of 1973 was passed in 2008 allowing for the distribution of marital property before the *get* (divorce authorization) is awarded.[53]

Secular and modern-Orthodox resentment of Haredim has recently risen in Israel due to their rapid demographic growth and the concessions given to ultra-Orthodox parties in government in exchange for political support on secular issues, such as foreign policy and security. In this atmosphere, Orthodox women's organizations resisted discriminatory ultra-Orthodox practices, such as the exclusion of women broadcasters in radio stations, segregetation in public cemeteries, segregated bus lines, and harassment of secular and Orthodox women by Haredi men in public spaces. Public campaigns, demonstrations and social media campaigns by women activists to overturn Haredi practices imposed on women in public spaces were supported by women from a variety of religious and non-religious backgrounds.[54] The *Kolech*, for example, petitioned the Supreme Court on the bus segregation case.[55] In a similar vein, the Women of the Wall (WoW) initiative has been organizing women's prayer services on the first day of every Jewish month at the Western Wall for twenty-five years.[56] Its activities targeted the religious sector, the rabbinical establishment and religious parties.

DIVERSITY AND FURTHER FRAGMENTATION: THE MIZRAHI CHALLENGE IN ISRAEL AND THE KURDISH WOMEN'S FEMINIST AWAKENING IN TURKEY

Women of ethnic minorities confronted more acute gendered discrimination than those who were, by virtue of their relatively privileged position in the society, more responsive to the feminist message. During the 1990s

in Israel, the ethnic cleavage between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews made a divisive impact on the Askenazi-dominated feminist scene and on Mizrahi women's separate organizations. The Mizrahi women's organization was a blow to feminism's "illusion of sisterhood."[57] In Turkey, the protracted Kurdish conflict provided a boost to the Kurdish women's movement which was fueled by a sense of deprivation arising from ethnic, gender and class discrimination. The power of globalization and the EU accession process provided further opportunity for Kurdish women's groups to push forward the new agendas of identity movements. In Turkey, it has been radical feminist organizations which have been genuinely interested in the intersections of gender with class, ethnicity, religiosity and sexual orientation in the context of ongoing polarization around the Kurdish issue. A case in point was the Amargi Women's Cooperative which was established in Istanbul in 2001 articulating critical stances in their periodical *Amargi* regarding the headscarf issue, LGBT rights, and the plight of Kurdish and Turkish women during the militarization of the Kurdish conflict. Amargi women defined themselves as a multicultural group and they attracted many second and third generation radical feminists into a lively platform of discussion through a new feminist political vision united around women's diversity in the patriarchal system.[58] Their activism and discussions also brought about alliances among the feminists and anti-militarist women.

Thus, in both Israel and Turkey, albeit under somewhat different societal dynamics, the universalist and homogenizing agenda of the mainstream-liberal strand of the feminist movement came under challenge. The diversification and decentralization in the Israeli feminist movement over the past decade was also accompanied by a genuine engagement with the question of intersectionality, emphasizing the intersections of gender with ethnicity, nationality, religiosity, sexual orientation, and minority rights.

Kurdish women in the militarized Southeast of Turkey were also oppressed by economic marginalization and patriarchal tribal and feudal-communal restrictions. During the 1980s and 1990s, they suffered under the armed campaign of the guerillas and state security forces. Under the political liberalization process in the 1990s, educated and politicized Kurdish women and the wives and daughters of the Kurdish nationalist males started to join human rights organizations and Kurdish parties. The Kurdish women's movement in Turkey gradually evolved to assert feminist claims and criticism vis-à-vis the state and the political organizations within the Kurdish nationalist movement. In the 1990s, some educated Kurdish women started to assert their voices in journals published by feminist groups and within foundations or cultural associations. This new feminist engagement raised criticism against the male-dominated Kurdish political movement and against the universalizing vision of the feminist movement in general, which remained indifferent to the specific

problems of Kurdish women. Women writing in Kurdish women's magazines also acknowledged the role of Turkish feminists in making them aware of gender opression.[59] Women's involvement in Kurdish political parties gradually transformed its male-dominated structures and internal dynamics. Women developed an instrumental approach to political parties in the sense that the Kurdish people's struggle against the state was always seen as the most important route to politicizing women's issues and making more room for women in politics, as in the case of the People's Democracy Party which raised the female candidate quota from 40 percent to 50 percent in the June 2015 parliamentary elections.[60] However, Kurdish women in NGOs and political parties refrained from putting forward an explicit feminist anti-militarist agenda. Hence, while the promotion of Kurdish women's political representation has feminized pro-Kurdish party politics, the extent to which it exposed the interconnections of gender oppression, ethnicity and class in Turkey to critical scrutiny is still open to debate.

It was the grassroots activism of Kurdish women which openly exposed the intimate connections between militarism and gender oppression during the protracted armed struggle between the state security forces and the Kurdish guerillas. A group of Kurdish women, the Saturday Mothers (*Cumartesi Anneleri*) in May 1995, suggested that the state was accountable for their losses. Mothers protested against state violence that had caused deaths or disappearances under police custody and executions during the high-tide of armed Kurdish separatism and militarist state response. The weekly gatherings and the mothers' sit-ins attracted considerable publicity. These were often disrupted by police intervention.[61] Another civil initiative born out of women's activism against the militarism of the state's national security paradigm was the Peace Mothers (*Barış Anneleri*) gatherings in Istanbul and Diyarbakir, which began in 1999. Describing the war against the Kurdish guerillas as dirty, they demanded the promotion of non-violence during the ethnic conflict and raised the issue of conscientious abstention from military service. The mothers of the soldiers who died in the clashes and the mothers of the Kurds who lost their lives in "suspicious deaths" in the region during state operations displayed solidarity across ethnic and political identities.[62]

The late 1990s provided a relatively open atmosphere for associational activism under the decreasing tide of the armed conflict. It was in this period that a feminist Kurdish women's organization, KAMER Foundation (est. 1997), became the leading feminist NGO in the region with its twenty-three women's centers as its branches in the eastern and southeastern provinces. It focused on violence against women and women's lack of economic and social empowerment due to ethnic exclusion and patriarchal order fed by tribal and communal identities.[63] KAMER became a success story in terms of building bridges among women from the

Kurdish and Turkish ethnicites and from different political strands. Its feminist consciousness-raising activities and the extension of support to women in the poverty and violence-struck southeast, around a framework of "human rights-based feminist values" and "cosmopolitan norms" have contributed to the development of gender awareness, especially among the the specifically oppressed Kurdish women.[64]

In Israel, ethnic cleavages also became relevant to feminist organizing in civil society, with the rise of the feminist awareness among Mizrahi women. Their challenge to the dominant Ashkenazi agenda in the feminist movement stemmed from Mizrahi women's deprivations of status, socio-economic security and power which positioned them as outsiders along with Palestininan women in the ethno-nationalist structure of the Israeli polity. Until the 1970s, intellectual Ashkenazi feminists' approach to Mizrahi women had shifted from a concern with "modernizing" them to simply excluding them from academic interest.[65] Mizrahi feminism emerged first in the tenth feminist conference in 1992. This made Askhenazi women confront the reality of Mizrahi lower-class women. In its early period, Mizrahi women's activism prioritized the class divisions between Askenazi and Mizrahi women.[66] In 1996 the first feminist Mizrahi conference was held in Givat Haviva. Some organizations within the women's peace movement also addressed the ethnicity issue. For example, the activists of *Bat Shalom* worked with Mizrahi women on a project of empowerment for Mizrahi women. This was another attempt to "broaden the definition of peace" by linking it to the fight against disrimination and inequality within the nation.[67] Mizrahi-feminist organizations addressed many issues of ethnic oppression faced by women (economic, cultural, and political). For example, *Ahoti* (My Sister), formed in 2000 and inspired by Afro-American feminism and Arab feminism emphasized relations of power, class divisions and the notion of sisterhood. Women in grassroots Mizrahi organizations such as HILA forced mainstream Israeli feminism to consider the interactions of religion, ethnicity and class and to face the "tension between universalistm and particularism."[68] This ushered in the onset of feminist politics of intersectionality by recognizing the sources of diversity among Israeli women in a culturally and ethnically divided society.[69] As a result, the Mizrahi feminist agenda was different from that of the Ashkenazi-dominated feminist agenda in terms of its content and priorities, with a focus on social policy and economic discrimination fed by racism. The 14th feminist conference in 1999 reflected the success of Mizrahi feminists by integrating their issues into the discussion platform. Although Mizrahi feminists still faced the challenge of reaching out to the grassroots activists, the intellectual Mizrahi discourse had a revolutionary impact on mainstream Israeli feminist discourse by bringing Mizrahi women on board the expanding feminist struggle and by also addressing the concerns of Palestinian, immigrant and Ethiopian women.[70]

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE THIRD WAVE?

Since the 1990s, several scholars have identified a third wave of feminism in Israel and in Turkey. The distinctive feature of this wave in Israel is a new feminist understanding ushered by practice and theory going beyond the politics of identity. In the Turkish case, the third wave is linked to the diversification within the feminist movement which is shaped by the demands of the Islamist and Kurdish women's movements. Israeli and Turkish feminist activism in their third waves were also oriented towards greater fragmentation and a renewed tendency towards formally structured and professionalized NGOs making feminism a "specialized profession."[71]

The fragmentation of NGO activism in the feminist realm was often criticized by feminist scholars as leading to atomization and competition for resources and professionalization in the sense of adopting masculine and hierarchical norms and working rules.[72] The hegemonic presence of neoliberalism already turned women's NGOs into market oriented firms.[73] On the other hand, seeking funding and projects became a primary concern for most women's groups in both Israel and Turkey, and this process resulted in more effective work which maximized its public impact.[74] Women's welfare-oriented NGOs (some of which are composed of lower-class women feeling the effect of economic distress) and grassroots organizations have been concerned with the impact of neoliberal policies on women and the family. Organizations such as Single Mothers' Movement in Israel continue to draw considerable media attention. Dealing with women's conventional concerns as mothers, they, nevertheless, link women's issues to broader issues of social justice and social responsibility.[75] Since the 2000s in Turkey, during the EU accession process, even lower-profile women's organizations with less expertise in project development and management went through a learning process.[76] While promoting project feminism, *NGOization* in the Turkish case substantially endorsed the inclusion of feminists in the policy process on gender equality.The state started to approach them as colloborative partners in equality policies and NGOs gained greater public legitimacy.

The growing number of Jewish and Jewish-Palestinian feminist organizations in Israeli civil society also attests to the strength of feminist criticism and demands relevant to diverse realms of life. In this process, state institutions—such as the Equal Opportunity Commission (2005), the National Commission for the Advancement of Women and the Knesset Commitee on the Status of Women—closely cooperated with women's organizations. Feminist groups and organizations continued to influence the public discourse and government policies. For example, since the 1970s, women had been campaigning vigorously for inclusion in combat duty, this was made possible with the amendment to the Defense Service Law in 2000, initiated by Member of Knesset (MK) Naomi Chazan from

Meretz Party. The long-term and short-term coalitions with public campaigns have been noteworthy in changing the political agenda. Campaigns intiated by short-term coalitions attracted considerable media and public attention, and were indicative of the committment of women's organizations to cooperate for common goals. Cases in point were the Campaign for the Election of a Woman as President of Israel,f bringing together thirteen organizations in 2006, and the coalition of twenty organizations which campaigned for the removal of sex offenders from government in 2007.[77] Women's organizations have also been active in other ad hoc campaigns dealing with causes outside the range of gender issues. For example, feminist groups have been active in the controversial issues endangering democratic rights and freedoms, such as the campaign against the Boycott Prohibition bill in 2011.

In Turkey, in the last decade, feminist organizations have provided their input into the gender equality reform process, by maintaining a sense of urgency. More recently, women's organizations across the political spectrum came together in other ad hoc coalitions; cases in point are the Women's Constitution Platform, coalitions on the right to wear headcarves for headscarved women and the coalitions on the prevention of violence against women. Leading Islamic women's organizations succeeded in becoming part of the feminist movement in Turkey by engaging with transnational activism as well. However, their relations with the Kemalist secularist women and their organizations[78] have always been strained without generating any substantive collaborations.

REFLECTIONS ON ISRAELI AND TURKISH WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN RECENT POPULAR MOBILIZATIONS: GENDERING CIVILIAN RESISTANCES

Globally, women's activism has also been central to social movements and popular mobilizations upholding broader social justice and democratization goals, which are indeed highly relevant to gender equality. Although many mixed-gender movements do not hold women's rights at the core of their activism, it has also been the case that women participants in social movements take on the challenge of integrating gender issues and women into the movement structures and agendas.[79] Nevertheless, gendering social mobilizations in terms of forging an explicit link with gender discrimination and broader justice and equality objectives, as well as fostering feminist awareness and alliances among women, are likely to be complicated by many factors. In this context, a brief overview of the roles and the experiences of women in the most recent popular mobilizations in Turkey and Israel is important in highlighting women's capacity to reach out to collective resistance movements. The implications of women's visibility for the recognition of their political significance as well as for the constraints to raising a distinctly feminist voice in patriarchal society are also important.

In Turkey, the Gezi Park protests in the summer of 2013 attested to the significance of women as a critical constituency of a social movement resisting the neo-liberal authoritarianism of the ruling AKP. In May 2013, what started as localized protests by predominantly young and middle-class urban sectors and environmentalist groups against the government's unilateral decision to turn Gezi Park, located at Taksim Square in Istanbul, into a mall quickly turned into a widespread and heterogenous resistence movement.[80] The protests from the campments in the park reflected the accumulated grievances of the urban middle classes against the growing intolerance of the government to opposition voices.[81] In hindsight, this resistance was oriented towards a "new citizenship conception" which reflected "the rise of a new cosmopolitan mentality" bringing together the environmentalists, women, feminists, LGBT activists, Kurdish and Turkish nationalists, anti-capitalist Muslims, in search of a new political voice and in a spirit of solidarity.[82] Women's presence within the core Gezi constituency, joined by leftists and anarchists, also meant a confrontation with the male-dominated political establishment on a platform of anti-authoritarianism and civil rights. Most of these women were attracted to the protests due to their frustrations with discriminatory state policies against women. According to women's rights activist and lawyer Nazan Moroglu, Turkish women "were opposing the government's pressure on them to make three children and to the new policies on abortion and casearian births. It was directly related to their rejection of the interventions on their life-styles."[83]

In both the initial protests in the Park and the subsequent mobilizations in other cities, women were present in the Gezi resistance movement across the generational divide and across social class, ethnic, ideological, and sectarian differences. In line with the spirit of solidarity within the movement, women, particularly young students in the Gezi Park, took up various roles in support of the fellow protestors. Some of the older women were the protestors' mothers. The "mother" identity turned into a politicized identity ultimately leading to the formation of "a chain of mothers" to protect their children from the police. Overall, different sectors of the women's movement joined the protestors transcending the specific identity claims as women.[84]

Nebahat Akkoç from Diyarbakır-based KAMER foundation also reflected on women's participation at Gezi as a civilian resistance which fostered a feminist awareness out of the collective resistance experiences of women and which led to greater societal awareness of women's oppression, most notaby from male violence.[85] As the photograph, the Woman in Red (a young protestor in red dress standing in front of a policeman spraying pepper spray at her from close range), became the symbol—domestically and internationally—of women's resistance to

masculinist state violence, women were also turned into the public face of the resistance. In fact, the "Gezi revolt" epitomized women's tragic encounter with the facets of masculine state violence and strategies of disciplining citizens. Male and female protestors united by putting aside their differences, protesting the violation of their rights and resisting the disproportionate use of police violence against them.[86] However, female protestors were often exposed to sexist insults by policemen. Those who were taken into police custody also suffered from physical and sexual harassment. This led to women organizing under the banner of "No to Sexual Harassment in Custody."[87] Women also attended the public forums established after the forced evacuation of Gezi Park. Feminist groups, such as the Istanbul Women Solidarity Platform, continued their activism in the public protests of government's policies on women and rising incidences of physical and sexual violence against women.[88] Women also confronted the sexism of their fellow protesters through challenging sexist slogans and erasing sexist graffiti on the streets. Headscarved women protestors also reacted against and condemned the government's efforts to instrumentalize pious women through a narrative (but unproven) about a headscarved woman allegedly attacked by "angry secular protesters" during the events. This claim was never proven and, in fact, later on turned out to be a strategy by government representatives and supporters to portray the Gezi protests as a culturally motivated fight against the government. In the face of this, a group of covered women protestors at Gezi drew attention to the need for women's solidarity across specific identities in order to challenge government's strategy of igniting ideological polarization by instrumentalizing women's victimhood.[89]

It is important to note that towards the June 2015 general elections the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democracy Party (HDP) was the only party which could make use of the political energies unleashed by the opposition united around the Gezi movement. Its politicians could pursue the message of the Gezi resistance by effectively appealing to the concerns of the opposition against the growing authoritarianism of the existing government. The HDP's project of fostering a more inclusive citizenship, which was also motivated by a concern to increase its votes across the constituencies, struck a responsive chord among the Gezi constituency. Women's support for the party in the parliamentary elections, in order to enable it to overcome the 10 percent national election threshold and to enter the parliament, was critical. In the period leading up to the elections, a broad coalition of feminists declared their support for the party, and they called on women to vote for HDP, since it was the only party in recognition of the oppressed identities and women's struggles, in order to expand the political space restricted by the current government.[90] The party successfuly appealed to women voters through a liberatory discourse by addressing the multi-layered nature of women's oppression and by putting

forward a solid electoral platform including women's social rights, Kurdish women's cultural rights and a new constitution upholding women's equal citizenship.[91] A total of twenty-nine women entered the Turkish parliament from the HDP lists (including women from the Kurdish nationalist movement, feminists and headscarved women) which led to the recruitment of the highest presence of women MPs in the parliament with 17.6 percent.

The Gezi movement in Turkey has a striking commonality with the "global revolts against commodification and authoritarianism" unfolding through the occupation of public spaces elsewhere;[92] it was in this sense also comparable to the Israeli social justice protests. The summer of 2011 in Israel saw the outbreak of massive protest activism which turned into an unprecented collective mobilization, with hundred thousands of people protesting against the rising costs of living and the indifference of the authorities to their grievances. It was a young woman, Daphni Leef, who became the initiator and icon of the movement by starting a public-tent protest. The popular protests were sparked by young people, mostly students, and they quickly gathered impressive momentum to activate people across different socio-economic groups, calling for "social justice." Protestors from diverse organizations and platforms joined the movement in challenging the economic policies of the Netanyahu government by setting up encampments and organizing mass rallies and demonstrations in other cities, demanding improvements in Israel's social welfare state and challenging the existing power structure in Israel.[93] The protests spread to different groups suffering from common grievances, as in the case of the "strollers march" by thousands parents protesting against the high cost of raising children in Israel.[94] As the protestors stormed and occupied buildings, took to the streets and encamped the public spaces, they encountered police violence which ultimately led to an "Occupy Tel Aviv" protest in October 2011.

The Israeli protest movements gained support from many civil society organizations and parties (in particular, Meretz and Hadash), Knesset members, mayors and social groups across the ideological divide, turning the movement into a heteregenous front without a formal leadership. Just like the Gezi Resistance in Turkey, the Israeli social justice movement was unprecented in terms of bringing together a broad profile of people who had not been side by side previously in any movement.[95] The government also criticized the protests on political ground as motivated by a subversive aim of toppling the existing government. In similarity with the predominantly middle-class aspect of the Gezi revolt in Turkey, Ashkenazi middle-classes in the urban centers of Israel far outnumbered protestors from other social strata despite their political heterogeneity. The central encampments in Tel Aviv also led to the emergence of a radical participatory-democracy approach through daily assemblies. The spirit of solidarity generated by the mass mobilization enabled the people

to cooperate across political divides, as in the case of the Social Peripheries Block demonstrations, a Jewish-Arab alliance speaking on behalf of the marginalized strata.[96]

Similar to the Turkish case, Israeli women were also visible in the social protests from the very beginning, symbolizing the resistance. For female citizens from diverse social and political identities, the major message of the movement "justice and power" was highly relevant for their experiences of economic and social exclusion. While the mobilizations, in general, lacked a distinct feminist color and voice, many feminists and women's organizations supported and participated in the protests. Women's groups (most notably *WIZO* and *Naamat*) joined the protests from the early days of the movement.[97] They also came up with specific demands during demonstrations as offshoots of the larger movement, as in the case of the working mothers demanding the expansion of maternity leave and subsidized daycare for young children.

However, frustrations arose on the part of some women activists who claimed that women were overshadowed in the protests due to marginalization in the organizing committees. Women also complained about sexual harassment incidents in the encampments which were covered up in order to maintain a positive public image.[98] While women were the major actors in initiating the movement, in time they were confined to "behind the scenes, doing the dirty work" as opposed to men who took central roles. The outcry, "suddenly most of the speakers at the press conferences and protest rallies were men,"[99] indicated a gendered power structure permeating the protests. A year later, in 2012, the violent reaction of the authorities to new attempts to rejevunate the movement (epitomized by Daphni Leef's brutal arrest) also revealed the instrumental role of male-violence in disciplining and subjegating women. Women also found the media coverage of women protestors to be biased because men were always in the spotlight whereas women's portrayal was instrumentalized in a sexist manner.[100]

Despite the male-dominated gender dynamics in the movement where specific feminist claims and gender issues were overshadowed, the social protests generated a sense of empowerment for greater involvement in political and social activism for women and for citizens fustrated with the existing social and economic stucture.[101] It also has had direct repercussions on Israeli politics by altering the political discourse from conventional security issues to social problems, as was the case during the January 2013 elections. The protests advocated "a redefinition of the most basic values in Israeli society" making it "a social revolution" by transforming the public discourse.[102] Just like the Gezi protests in Turkey which fostered the politicization of women and increased the responsiveness of the liberal opposition—if not the government—to include women in the polity with renewed vigor, the social justice protests in Israel forced existing parties and political actors to re-

invent the political potential of women and young people. This led to an increase in the political representation of the groups that mobilized during the protests. The involvement of women in the popular mobilizations attested to the significance of their social capital as agents of change in social and political agenda and also in appealing to a wider audience among Israel's disadvantaged sectors. The 2013 local elections in Israel saw a significant rise in the numbers of women running for mayoral posts and memberships in city councils, traditionally dominated by men. In fact, the atmosphere in the aftermath of the movement had already led to the recruitment of new female political figures, identified by the protests, into the Knesset.[103] In 2013, for the first time women—Shelly Yehimovich, Zehava Galon, and Tzipi Livni—led three major parties (Labor, Mertez and Ha'tnua, respectively), and female representation in the Knesset reached a peak of 23 percent.[104] The trend to make more room for women in politics was all the more visible in 2015; women, especially young candidates, were located in top places on party lists on the left and the right (in particular, Labor, Yesh Atid and Habayit Yehudi parties), attesting to the strength of the relationship between women in politics and female voters.[105]

In sum, the Gezi Movement provided a new platform for Turkish women to emerge as political subjects and politicized their social identities into a politics of intersectionality. This was undoubtedly related to their heightened (pro-)feminist awareness throughout their social mobilization experiences in previous decades. In the Israeli case, as Herzog reflected, despite the challenges of fractionalization and de-politicization to the women's movement, Israeli women have retained the political capacity to challenge the dominant paradigms of politics and citizenship.[106] Women's central roles in the social justice protests and their relentless search for inclusion in the male-dominated polity by reclaiming their rights as citizens has once again demonstrated this potential of a powerful civic voice for transforming political agendas.

CONCLUSION

In both Israel and Turkey, women's movements throughout the second and third waves have not been monolithic. Particular political contexts and cleavage structures which polarized their respective political systems significantly impacted women's challenges to existing patriarchal structures, institutional frameworks and hegemonic discourses. The complex intertwining of state and religious forces has also been crucial, having far-reaching implications for the social roles and political experiences of women. The instrumentalization of women's equal citizenship rights in the Kemalist and Zionist paradigms was legitimized through masculinist collectivist–nationalist agendas and militarized cultures, and ultimately

engendered an illusion of gender equality which delayed the emergence of feminist consciousness.

In the 1970s and 1980s, feminism was a newcomer to the social movement arena in both countries largely through the import of Western themes and discourses. It was, however, the immediate political context of the era which facilitated the rise of feminist consciousness and women's organization. In Turkey, the radicalization of politics in the 1970s enabled feminists to come forward with distinct claims a decade later. In Israel, societal consensus was shattered under the mounting security threat during the traumatic expriences of the Yom Kippur War, the Occupation of Lebanon and the first Intifada, leading women to question the liberal and militarized notions of equality. Early feminists of the second-wave in Israel and Turkey, albeit dominated by middle-class women from relatively affluent sectors of the society, attained important legal victories in their battles against the state on gender equality and played a pioneering role in the tranformation of the public debate. In subsequent decades, social tensions stemming from ethnic, religious and ideological diversity made inroads in feminist civil society. The growing awareness and responsiveness of women to the multilayered nature of gender oppression also resulted in fragmentation within feminism. In Israel, various strands and actors of the women's peace movement exposed the link between Israeli securiy policy and ethnic marginalization and the oppression of women. After the 1980s, the Mizrahi women, women in the peace movement across social divisions, and Orthodox-religious women put forward alternative discourses and visions on both gender issues and national politics. Their activism facilitated the transformation of the state and political parties towards more inclusionary agendas. Perhaps, the corollary of the Israeli feminist challenge emerging from the peace movement was, in the Turkish case, the Islamic women's movement, which developed critical stances against secular policies and patriarchy within the Islamic movement. The Kurdish women's feminist awakening also gradually emerged to articulate a feminist outlook on the subordination of the Kurdish women in the context of the intersection of ethnic and gender oppression. Although Kurdish women's feminist activism has been constrained in terms of constituting a force autonomous from the larger Kurdish nationalist movement, it provided a significant momentum for the emergence of new grassroots movements and institutional openings to integrate women and their concerns into politics. Overall, however, in both Israel and Turkey, diversity among women along ethnic/racial, religious, class and ideological identities has not prevented the formation of alliances in critical junctures of the political system.

Since the 1990s, the pressures emanating from the rise of identity politics, globalization and neo-liberal policies have highlighted the urgency for the creation of a new societal consensus and a decisive political agenda for enduring social peace in both Israel and Turkey. Women's

groups—whether they have been acting on the basis of a specific feminist agenda or refraining from using the term for fear of stigmatization or out of political choice—are standing at a critical juncture, where they need to hold onto the banner of gender equality by accomodating diversity and to join forces with other progressive social and political forces. Beside organizational fragmentation and competition for limited resources, women's movements still need to form enduring engagements with other social movements that challenge the undemocratic and exclusionary nature of state policies. In this context, Israel's social justice protests and the Gezi Resistance in Turkey were turning points in the ways by which the state and society perceive and interact with each other. Women's existing frustrations with state policies as citizens, and their mobilization along with other groups underscored the viability of popular resistance. Gendering these resistance movements was no easy task; making a strong case for integrating gender issues to calls for social justice, attention to quality of life issues and the demand for democratic accountability was not the obvious end product. This was due to the broadness of these movements' agendas, their internal tensions, the heteregenous nature of the protestors' coalitions, and also the male bias embedded in the cultural and social context. Nevertheless, as the Israeli and Turkish movements revitalized societal opposition, they integrated women as critical actors into the collective and civic quest for deepening democracy and reaching to the masses. By uniting women across diverse identities around novel themes, they have also fostered the social legitimacy of women's social activism and their critiques of the political order.

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48. Author's personal interview with the chair of İLK-DER, Ankara, July 2011.

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