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Gender Structuring of Contemporary Slovenia

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Gender and Social Structure

1 The Structuring of Slovenian Society and Gender as the Structured and the Structuring Structure

Milica Antić Gaber

Readdressing the question of how (contemporary) societies are structured (producing and reproducing the existing relations) and how they change, we cannot but reflect on the almost eternal sociological questions and dilemmas, such as: Which is more important, structure or action, supra-individual complex units or agents? Who conditions whom? Do structures establish the conditions for individuals' actions or do individuals create structures through their actions? Those who have addressed these issues have tended to place themselves on one or the other side of these dilemmas. Amongst those who have attempted to overcome these "apparent dilemmas" is Anthony Giddens, who says: "structure is 'subject-less'. […] structuration, as the reproduction of practices, refers abstractly to the dynamic process whereby structures come into being. By the duality of structure I mean that social structure is both constituted by human agency and yet is at the same time the very medium of this constitution" (1993, 128-129.).

We could, therefore, say that structures have been formed throughout history and are accordingly constructed and persistent, representing the framework of their agents; on the other hand, they are, as Marx would put it, created by individuals and groups acting in specific situations and circumstances that they have not themselves chosen. As such, structures are subjected to change and are changing; or, in the words of Pierre Bourdieu: "Through the economic and social necessity that they bring to bear on the relatively autonomous world of the domestic economy and family relations, or more precisely, through the specifically familial manifestations of this external necessity (forms of the division of labour between the sexes, household objects, modes of consumption, parent-child relations, etc.), the structures characterizing a determinate class of conditions of existence produce the structures of the habitus, which in their turn are the basis of the perception and appreciation of all subsequent experiences" (1990, 54). As structured structures, they are strong, resistant and rigid, while at the same time being vulnerable and prone to change. They are diverse in the different moments of history, and vary in their susceptibility to persistence and change. This applies not only to class structures coming into being and changing throughout history, but

also to other important structures, such as economic, racial, gender-related, national, political, etc.

Referring to social structures, Bourdieu states, amongst other things, “on the one hand, the objective structures that the sociologist constructs, in the objectivist moment, by setting aside the subjective representations of the agents, form the basis for these representations and constitute the structural constraints that bear upon interactions; but, on the other hand, these representations must also be taken into consideration, particularly if one wants to account for the daily struggles, individual and collective, which purport to transform or to preserve these structures. This means that the two moments, the objectivist and the subjectivist, stand in a dialectical relationship” (1989, 15).

For a proper understanding of the structuring of society, Bourdieu’s conception of the social world, which he defines as consisting of numerous microcosmoses or fields (religious, educational, sporting, political, academic, etc.), is also significant. Each field is positioned in relation to the other fields. In the present discussion, we focus on the following fields: education, work, the private sphere (family) and politics. We will attempt to answer the question as to how women (and men) position themselves in these fields and what happens in the process of passing between them. The fields are relatively delineated and autonomous, with the individuals and groups in them acting as agents who compete for positions in these fields (cf. Bourdieu, 2004b: 73-77; Bourdieu, 1984/2002: 226; Warde, 2004). This struggle and its results are affected by differences in the form and quantity of the capitals (economic, cultural, social, symbolic) that these agents possess.

Thus, if each person occupies a specific position in the social structure and/or in a given field, it could be useful to adopt the view that this position is historically generated. It is of utmost significance that we partake in enabling a diverse range of impulses to form various capitals as early as in the family. We are each born into a particular social setting, with precisely determined amounts of various capitals that either encourage or restrict our possibilities to obtain and transmit different types of capital. For the purposes of the present discussion, it is important that “to be born into the female gender” brings different possibilities to increase the amounts of the various capitals and greater restrictions in augmenting the most desired capitals compared to being born as a male (Skeggs, 2002, 9).

In fact, it is the positioning in the fields and the possibilities of obtaining and transmitting capitals from one field to another that will be the object of our investigation. The formations

and conversions, transformations and transmissions of various types of capital do not occur without remainders nor without blockages. Amongst other things, our focus of interest will be on where and why these losses (especially amongst women) take place and what affects them.

According to Bourdieu, fields require a relational mode of thinking (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 96). In this sense, we can define them as a network, a flexible configuration of objective relations between positions. Positions, in turn, are defined by the existing or potential situations in the structure of the distribution of the various types of capital. Access to the special profits available in the field determines the possession of capitals as well as the relationship to other positions (dominant, subordinate, similar) in the field (ibid.: 97). The distribution of power between the agents of the field determines the structure of the field, while this is also determined by the structure of the distribution of capitals, i.e., the relations between the agents in the field (Bourdieu, 2004b, 75). The quantity and structure of capitals change in time, as a result of life trajectories and the dispositions (habitus) of the agents. There is a dominant agent in the field "that occupies a position in the structure such that the structure works to its advantage" (Bourdieu, 2004b, 75).

As previously indicated, a field is always a stage for the struggles taking place to preserve, reconfigure or even radically change the power within it. As a structure of objective relations between the positions of power, a field supports and directs the strategies adopted by those who hold positions and seek (individually or collectively) to protect or improve the principles of hierarchical organisation that suit them, and to impose these principles on others. The strategies adopted and performed by the agents depend on their position in the field, on the distribution of specific capitals and on perceptions of the specific field as well as its relation to other fields. The agents shape their own perspective with regard to their position in the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, 101).

Discussing the social structure, the structuring of the social world and the power relations in given fields, we cannot, of course, ignore gender as an important structuring and structural element of the social world (Risman, 2004). Gender has turned out to be one of the strongest and most persistent and consistent structuring structures, and is consequently perceived and accepted as natural (Bourdieu, 2002,8). As a result, as Bourdieu put it: "The strength of the masculine order is seen in the fact that it dispenses with justification: the androcentric vision imposes itself as neutral and has no need to spell itself out in discourses aimed at legitimating it" (ibid., 9).

Gender as a structure of social practice is also thematised by Raewyn Connell, who conceptualises gender "as a way in which social practice is ordered" (2005, 71) that is creative and inventive, that responds to particular situations and that is generated within definite structures of social relations (ibid.,72). Gender relations, claims Connell, form one of the major structures in this process. The structure generated as individuals and groups grapple with their historical situations relates to a social practice that does not consist of isolated acts. Actions are configured in larger units, and when we speak of "masculinity" and "femininity" we are actually speaking of "configuration of gender practice", whereby the process of configuring practice has to be seen as a dynamic process and masculinities and femininities as a gender project. "These are processes of configuring practice through time, which transform their starting-points in gender structures" (ibid.).

Connell also determines that this gender shaping of practice is found at every level of social reality, but is most clearly seen in the individual's life course (see also Berger and Luckmann, 1988), the basis of common-sense notions of masculinity and femininity. The configuration of practice, however, is also implemented at the level of the state and its institutions (the spheres of work, family, school, etc.). The latter are, therefore, decisively gendered (Connell, 2005, 73). Reading Bourdieu in parallel, one can add that the family, the Church and the school are the key authorities that have been objectively harmonised and whose common denominator has been the exertion of influence on the subconscious structures that have assisted in the reproduction of gender inequality (2002, 85).

In order to understand gender as structure, there are, to summarise Connell (2005, 73-75), three important fields: a) power relations in which women's subordination and men's dominance over women persist in spite of numerous cases of inverse situations in individual localities and despite many forms of resistance, including the feminist one; b) production relations, which are important precisely due to the gendered division of labour and men's "dividend" deriving from it; this, however, not only concerns unequal pay but also the gendered process of capital accumulation, and it is therefore necessary to understand that large corporations or banks are run by men not as a consequence of a "fault in the system" but of socially constructed masculinity; and c) emotional relations, which are an equally important aspect of gender order, containing important practices affecting the shaping of desire, with regard to which questions arise as to whether these relations are "consensual or coercive, whether pleasure is equally given and received" (ibid,74). In the feminist analyses

of sexuality, these questions are associated with the relation between heterosexuality and male domination, while, at the same time, we cannot overlook symbolism, culture and discourse. There is nothing outside discourse: society is a world of meanings, and that holds for gender as well. As it is, language is phallocentric (Lacan), which means that we are dealing with a symbolic order in which language is determined with a phallic emphasis, in a culture that has embodied "the law of the father" (Connell, 2009, 84). In order to surpass this, it is necessary to "escape known forms of language" (ibid.) and create new ones.

Connell is aware that gender is not the only structuring element, that "gender 'intersects' – better interacts – with race and class" and "it constantly interacts with nationality or position in the world order" (2005, 75). Gender order, as she understands it, is something continuously in the making and subject to change under the influence of various types of agency of individuals and groups; it is the result of their acceptance, on the one hand, and their resistance, negotiation and change, on the other.

Regardless of whether we understand social structure in the sense of fields (Bourdieu) or institutions (Connell), we have to conclude that fields/institutions comprise visible structures and a certain fixed (gender) order that is manifest in the sense that, as a rule, secretaries are women, most managers are men; most construction workers are men, most cleaning personnel are women; most primary school teaching staff are women, most scientists are men; most politicians are men, most social work staff are women, etc. Despite some changes within certain fields, these firmly rooted structures persist in other fields (institutions) and especially globally.

Important for the present discussion is Connell's finding that "[R]esearch on a very wide range of organisations has mapped their gender regimes" (Connell, 2009, 72). Gender regimes are thus formed by the organisational patterns in organisations such as schools, offices, armies, churches, hospitals, factories and politics. The gender regimes of these institutions are, in turn, part of wider patterns, which she calls "the gender order of a society" (ibid., 72-73). In the following chapters of the present book, we will, therefore, investigate what happens in school, in the field of paid work and in the family, what the distribution of roles is within them, and who is understood as suitable to perform specific roles and duties in these fields (institutions). The specific gender regime of each of these institutions produces very real consequences for the distribution of roles in the others. If, in fact, it is assumed that women are supposed to do most of the unpaid, reproductive work in the family and engage in

child care, or if it is taken for granted that it is better for women (no matter how highly educated, competent and successful) to stay in the background and not occupy the highest positions, this most likely results in obstacles to women on their path to politics, as entering politics runs counter to the social construction of femininity and the place assigned to it in the social structure.

This is confirmed by Connell, who claims that the gender regimes of institutions usually correspond to the overall gender order of a society. Although changes in one institution can destabilise the gender regime of another, and that it is therefore about the relationships both within institutions (fields) and between them, these changes take place slowly and with "small steps" because they affect the ways in which people, groups and organisations are connected, apposed, juxtaposed and divided; gender relations are continuously formed and reformed in daily life (cf. ibid., 74).

Each social structure determines the possibilities and consequences of the individual's actions. In this sense, social structure conditions the practices not only of individuals but also of entire systems, institutions and fields. Rules are manifest in advancement criteria, in the ways (male and female) bodies are controlled, in power relations over certain groups of men and women (such as gays and lesbians, single women, etc.), in who does more productive (and therefore paid) or reproductive (and therefore unpaid) work; which gender is oriented towards care professions and who is offered a wider range of choices; who is expected to be obedient and "good" and with regard to whom is daring behaviour, even aggression, tolerated; how conditions for entering and engaging in a field are determined (e.g., in science, sport, politics, etc.).

1.1 From where does gender draw the power to structure society?

The question is inevitably raised as to whether gender is, in fact, such as strong structuring factor; from where does gender draw this power? Joan W. Scott claims that gender has become "… a way of denoting 'cultural construction' – the entirely social creation of ideas about appropriate roles of women and men. It is a way of referring to exclusively social origins of subjective identities of men and women. Gender is, in this definition, a social category imposed on a sexed body" (Scott, 1986, 1056).

Barbara J. Risman goes even further in this regard, arguing that gender difference is primarily a means to justify social stratification and that it is first socially constructed and then universally adopted to justify stratification (Risman, 2004, 430). According to Risman, the creation of this difference is the very foundation of the inequality that can be found in many institutions, materialised in the corresponding social structure (ibid. 431.). This conception, she believes, separates structure from individual motives, making it exist outside these motives (ibid.). As a consequence, not only are men and women coerced into different social roles, but they often choose their gendered paths themselves. According to Risman, a social structural analysis can help us to answer the question as to how and why this happens (cf. ibid.).

Individuals' choices are not made in an empty space but in a determined social context in which people – men and women – are surrounded by structural barriers or structural opportunities. Individuals are active, but active in determined circumstances that differ from one situation to another and affect their choices and "choices". In doing gender, we are influenced by both vast and remote social systems and institutions (macro level), groups and organisations (family, friends) that are close to us (mezzo level), as well as by completely individualised factors, such as the types of rationality (Weber, Foucault) that we embrace in making these choices (micro level). All of the levels are interlinked, interwoven and interdependent in problematic (conflicting) relationships, relationships of (non)cooperation and opposition. Changes in one level can initiate changes in another; this is not, however, necessary, simple or unambiguous.

In short, changes do occur. At times, it seems that they are minimal, but an insight into a somewhat longer time period reveals them as empirically measurable, as well as being analytically mapped and explicable (more on this in the following chapters). It is precisely this insight into stalled change and persistence that is the purpose of the present study: we seek to demonstrate the changes, shifts and alternations in the structuring of Slovenian society and the role and place of gender in these processes. In order to better understand the gendered structure of contemporary Slovenia, we will draw on empirical data and explorations carried out in education, employment and politics, and, beyond that, in the transformation of the value system(s) and the position(ing) of women and men in them, through them.

A typical example in the change of the institutional gender regime within an institution that we have all had an opportunity to experience for a prolonged period of time during our lives is

a primary school. It holds for primary school that teachers are predominantly women. Yet, this has not always been the case. Prior to 1869, there were no women teachers in Slovenian schools (insofar as public schools existed at all), which made school a strongly gendered, male-dominated institution. When the school doors opened for women, they gradually started filling teaching positions themselves. Just prior to the Second World War, 65% of all teachers were women, and by 1950 their presence had risen to 78.5%. Two decades later, in 1969, 77.9% of teachers were women, and in the 1990s their share fluctuated around 85%. Today, primary school is one of the most feminised sectors of the education system, with the proportion of women ranging between 95% and 98% in recent years.[1] These are the figures for Slovenia. If we consider school in some other places in the world, we see that these changes have not yet taken place and that education is not yet a basic human right whose implementation is guaranteed by the state. In some environments, we even observe that the majority of women are still illiterate, that there are almost no female teachers, and that the lives of women and girls who fight for their right to education are endangered, as has been demonstrated recently by the case of the Pakistani girl Malala Jusafzaj.[2]

Moreover, the changes described above have failed to bring about significant shifts in the entire field of education (from kindergarten to university), which continues to be very clearly gendered. While preschool teachers and first-cycle primary school teachers are predominantly women, the highest positions at the university level are still occupied by men: in 2011, only 39.9% of all positions in higher education institutions were occupied by women. We can therefore conclude that, although the gender structure in the field is undergoing change, the gender regime of male domination is still at work. Women prevail at the lower levels of education, whereas higher, more prestigious and economically stronger decision-making positions are still predominantly reserved for men (this will be examined in more detail in the following chapters). Furthermore, the aforementioned shifts and alternations in this field have failed to bring about a major change in global gender order; they have, nonetheless, enabled certain shifts in other fields, such as the field of the labour market, including certain value shifts, which will be discussed in the continuation. While the gender regimes of some institutions and systems have been subject to more rapid change, others have undergone very slow change or have barely experienced change at all, which indicates that institutions and gender regimes are not equally subject to change.

[1] Source: Statistical Yearbook: https://www.stat.si/letopis/LetopisVsebina.aspx?poglavje=6&lang=si&leto=2012
[2] See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malala_Yousafzai

One of the institutions that is very slow in changing its gender regime, and that is at the foreground of our interest, is the field of (institutionalised) politics. In the following chapters, we will seek to investigate why the indicated shifts in the gender regimes of, for example, education and (paid) work have not brought about any major changes in the gender regimes of political institutions: Why does politics persevere as a still predominantly "male field"? Why have the accumulated cultural and social capitals of women in these fields not been transferred/transferrable to the field of politics? Where are they lost, or is their transmission blocked? Which (structural) barriers and "barriers" do these capitals encounter on their transmission from various fields to the field of politics? Who are the "agents" of these barriers?

1.2 Producing and reproducing gender and gender relations within institutions ...

Producing and reproducing gender is possible because gender is not a given but is created, constructed. This presupposes our awareness that, as Judith Butler pointed out, gender is performative.

"Hence within the inherited discourse of the metaphysics of substance, gender proves to be performative – that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be. In this sense, gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to preexist the deed." [...] "There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said to be its result" (Butler, 1999, 33).

In other words, we do not do (perform) what we do because we are of female or male sex; on the contrary, by doing certain things we repeat certain actions, we are engaged in a certain field, we act and look one way rather than another, we perform gender and produce a series of effects that strengthen the impression that we are either men or women. Thus femininity and masculinity are entities that produce and reproduce themselves through the practices of repetition and performative acts. By failing to perform one's gender through one's actions, by straying from the established workings of one's gender, the individual risks submitting him/herself to the effects of formal institutions or forms of informal pressures, whose goal is to keep us in the right place (in the right gender).

Accordingly, we do (produce and reproduce) gender, perform it, although we do not do it in social isolation. On the contrary, we are located in various social realities, social and cultural

contexts, everyday material and discursive practices. We are surrounded both by other individuals and by groups and institutions, fields displaying a preformed attitude to gender and therefore viewing themselves and others in accordance with their (individual and collective) expectations and particular types of rationalities, which justify their personal expectations in doing gender as well as doing gender by others.

The shaping, the establishing, the doing of gender creates differences between girls and boys, between men and women, that are not biological, essential or natural. However, once the differences have been constructed, they are used to reinforce the "essentialness" of gender (West and Zimmermann, 1987, 137).

Thus gender – as the structured structure that further structures, produces and reproduces itself as the gender structure – persists over a longer period of time. In this way, the current arrangements for the domestic division of labour support two production processes: the goods and services needed in the everyday lives of men and women, children and the elderly, and, at the same time, gender. This is the mechanism by which both the material and symbolic products of the household are realised (Berk in West and Zimmermann, 144).

Through production, doing gender establishes both male dominance and female subordination. Both are established relationally: it is impossible to speak about the subordination of women without speaking about the dominant position of men. Moreover, both are reinforced in individual as well as in collective practices of submission and privilege, acceptance and justification of one or the other position; at the same time, they both change while actively resisting and abandoning either of the practices, again at the individual and collective levels.

Here, the aforementioned institutions studied in the context of the present project play a particularly important role. Gender structure is produced, reproduced, justified, legitimised, preserved and, in part but still too slowly, undergoes change. Institutions (educational, religious, political, etc.) are, by their nature, vast and inert systems; in order to change them, focused long-term efforts are required, and even these are not always sufficient to lead to more comprehensive shifts, at least when it comes to the gender structure of societies. Seen in this light, the above conclusions are not surprising.

1.3 ... and especially in politics

Politics has a special place amongst the listed institutions because it is traditionally understood as a male field, a field that is dominated by men. It is not particularly difficult to find evidence to support this claim. A brief survey of the statistical data on the gender ratio in politics around the globe shows that only 12.3% of members of parliament are women; the ratio is even more disproportionately in favour of men in the upper houses of parliaments (19.3%): in those of Arab countries 15.9% are women, in those of European countries (excluding Nordic countries) 23%, and in those of Nordic countries 42.3%.[3] In January 2014, there were only 19 women premiers and presidents of state in the world, and only 7 of these were in Europe.

At the same time, this is a field that for a long time was not even discussed or researched in connection with gender, as if gender and politics had no common ground. Until feminist theory entered the field, the prevailing conviction was that the perspective of political theory was gender neutral (cf. Squires, 1999). In fact, by raising the issue and taking the aspect of gender into account in politics it is not a case of marking previously gender-neutral terrain with gender; quite the opposite: it is a case of revealing the power of gender as a structuring factor in this field (as well). Just like other fields, politics is not, and cannot be, gender unmarked; it is (again quite the opposite) strongly gendered, but until recently it was a field that had remained unproblematised.

Women were excluded from politics (its institutionalised part, in particular) for long periods of time (in numerous cases with legislation that explicitly prohibited their participation). Only following the acknowledgement of their political rights and the implementation of gender-neutral legislative diction did their participation become possible; however, due to the differentiated positioning of men and women in other fields, and, consequently, their different starting points, women had to settle for much less favourable conditions upon their engagement in politics. The situation improved somewhat for women who aspired to enter (institutional) politics only when it became clear that legislated non-exclusion did not in itself bring inclusion and that additional mechanisms were required (special measures, quotas, etc.) enabling those who were previously excluded easier entry into the field.

[3] See: http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm

When gender and politics arrived on the public agenda, the issue of women and their exclusion from the field was problematised, their absence or under-representation in the field was thematised. The impression was created that it was only a question of women. As numerous authors have pointed out, for a long time feminist theory primarily addressed the issue of including women in politics, whether as equal to or completely different from men; only much later did they engage with the problem of deconstructing and reshaping this field (Squires, 1999).

Importantly, we must remember that the absence of a critique of gender positioning in politics made it possible, in the first place, for there to be no discussion about the gender-power relationship; that power and political power were only perceived in the negative sense as "power over" rather than "power to"; and that there was a lack of understanding that the power of men in public and in politics does not mean that men dominate the public sphere while women dominate the private sphere. In fact, by engaging in the public domains and being the sole holders of political power, men can pass legislation, make decisions regarding public finances, direct development, determine preferences, and assume the right to control the actions of all of those who operate (only) in the private domains (cf. Hearn, 1992, 103).

Speaking of politics, we need to be aware that it is about a specific internal structure, about the institutions in which politics takes place and the organisations that take part in it, about their organisation, their interconnectedness and their mutual exclusion, as well as about immaterial factors, such as ideas regarding for whom this domain is more appropriate (men or women), which entry conditions apply to either men or women, how the operation and achievements of the former and the latter are assessed and evaluated, and similar. As long as only one gender was involved, it was impossible to expect the norms of this world to be shaped on the basis of gender-neutral principles. On the contrary, the shaping of the political field must have been affected by the fact that women did not participate in its structuring. The structures and practices of this space were shaped according to the experience and needs of the representatives of one gender. Concealed all along was the fact that these practices consisted of the experience accumulated by men in male-dominated fields, whereas insights into the experience of those operating in other fields were missing. In pointing out the overlooked accumulated experience, we are aware that this was not the only missing perspective, and that, in addition to there being a failure to include all men in the process of political decision-making, the experience of the different groups of men was taken into account to a varying extent; we are also aware that it is a case of hegemonic masculinity that

could only thrive on the basis of the support to all of those men who did not themselves participate directly but only indirectly, drawing certain benefits from it (Connell, 2005). On the other hand, as Jeff Hearn points out, social, economic, symbolic and political structures lead to gender imbalance (Hearn, 1992). The difference in power between men and women means that men, collectively and individually, albeit differently, gain the most from the social organisation of genders that, as Hearn puts it, reflects the patriarchal social order (ibid.). Although most advantageous for white, upper-class, heterosexual men, and less favourable for those groups of men whose identity is determined in the intersection of non-white races, alternative forms of sexuality and minority nationality, it is men who, in this gender order and regardless of their position in the social structure, benefit more than women due to their male identity. From this, Hearn draws the conclusion that men are members of a powerful social category that brings them power purely through being associated with it (ibid.). Their power is further supported and enabled by the economic, political, institutional and discursive structures through which the material aspects of male power are reproduced.

Despite all of the above, political masculinity remains, for the most part, beyond the reach of critical reflection. It seems that the structure of the political field is – at least in Slovenia – not entirely the result of the power relations in other fields from which women were traditionally excluded but later given admission to (education, paid work and economics, language, etc.). It would seem that gender relations in certain other fields change faster than in the field of politics, and that politics remains a male stronghold defended and preserved partly by reinforcing the stereotyped images of women who are not interested in politics because it is too rough, too dirty and takes too much time. This is a way of keeping women in the background, where they are seen to support men in politics; if they move into the foreground, they are immediately targeted with the question of “who is behind them”.

Due to the current state of affairs, we will focus, amongst other things, on how institutions and institutional changes can participate in the endeavours to surpass this state, and how the dominant cultural patterns affect the change and persistence of the established patterns.

All of this is even more interesting and demanding for reflected examination due to the fact that the political field is itself changing, in Slovenia and elsewhere. The way the field is structured is changing, political institutions and organisations (parties and other agents) are changing, the rules of organisation and agency as well as the gender structure of the field are changing. While only two centuries ago the field was completely dominated by one gender,

the male gender, and women were explicitly prohibited to enter, with some women paying for their “interference” in the field of politics with their lives, and while more than a century ago the first women obtained the right to vote on a par with men, women today, seen globally, still constitute the minority; yet the shifts, so it seems, are prominent and irreversible. It is no longer possible to ban women from politics, to forbid them to be politically active.

If we view the changes in the temporal dimension, it can be confirmed, as many have assessed, that these changes occur very slowly and that special measures, legislation and policies need to be introduced to accelerate change: politics remains a gendered field of operation.

This conclusion is, of course, also valid for Slovenia. The fact is that Slovenia was recognised as the most advanced, economically developed country within the context of the previous state formation (Yugoslavia), and one where, comparatively, the greatest progress had been achieved in terms of gender relations. These conceptions of Slovenia persisted in the transition period, in the decade of the construction of the new state; the first decade, in particular, saw the emergence of institutions and the promotion of legislative acts whose goal was to gain gender equality in society at various levels and in various fields.

All of this calls for additional reflection, given that the aforementioned processes have failed to produce the desired results, with politics clearly remaining a gendered field. The questions we will address in the following chapters are: Why are shifts in certain fields not followed by shifts in the field of politics? Which factors have significantly influenced this process and caused it to stall? Where have shifts occurred in the structure of Slovenian society and where have they not? Which of the dominant values have contributed to this situation? All of these questions require answers if we are to take a significant step forward in understanding the causes for the conspicuous absence and the modest, disproportionate inclusion of women in politics. We will seek to provide answers to at least some of these questions, especially to the question of their structural conditionality.

2 Contemporary Slovenian society and its rationalities

Slavko Gaber

Consideration of the inclusion of women in politics in Slovenia gains clarity when it becomes part of the socially embedded reflection of space and time, of the formation, shifts and persistence of their rationalities (Weber 1978; Bourdieu 1986, 1992; Foucault 2009). On this background, we will, in the present text, first survey the essential characteristics of the restructuring of Slovenian society within the processes of the structuring of Western societies. In the second part of the text, we will discuss the place of politics in Slovenian society, concluding with an outline of the fundamental structural questions that, on the backgrounds treated, concern the decision of women to enter politics.

2.1 Fractures and shifts in rationality

When considering the position of women in politics in Slovenia, the numerous fundamental structural changes experienced by the nation over the last three decades are of great significance. In addition to the changes that have taken place simultaneously in other contemporary societies, Slovenia, as a social and political whole, has constituted itself into an independent state for the first time in its history. It has opted for a change of political system and, in connection with the emergence of the state and the introduction of representative democracy, has undertaken changes in the fundamental principles and practices of the economy, in the narrow sense of the word. From the previous self-managed, largely planned and only partly market-oriented economy, with social ownership as the central fulcrum of the structuring of material interests, Slovenia has shifted to a market economy and has yielded to the international market.

If we remain focused on the changes in the organisation of the state – the changed axes, principles and rationality of the structure of society – in the transition from socialist self-management to representative democracy and from social ownership to private ownership, we are dealing with an extraordinary shift – not only conceptual, but also political and practical – in the operation of society. Also relevant to our discussion is the fact that a shift of this magnitude, a massive change in the rationality of the operation of society, also represents an

extremely demanding project in the area of structuring politics as the skills of managing the common good of a particular social entity, and the fact that the countless shifts coincided with one of the greatest changes of the 20th century. The newly formed state found itself between socialist and capitalist rationalities at the time of the enthusiastic and optimistic neoliberal attempt to confirm the eternity, the finality, of the capitalist paradigm of operating and managing society.

This was a time in which the old rationalities disappeared and new ones emerged before our eyes. We had to deal with – and continue to deal with today – the disappearance and formation of perceptions, understandings, classifications and conceptualisations of the present, past and future that is rarely witnessed. The new rationalities – which, as changed cognitive structures, shift before us and structure themselves around disappearing, changing and emerging principles, meanings and senses – determine the numerous practices, feelings, hopes and fears of Slovenian citizens, which even today remain unclear and are far from having achieved their final form. By all indications, we have arrived at a time of transition, in which "Mankind have outgrown old institutions and old doctrines, and have not yet acquired new ones" (Mill, 1976, 170).

2.2 National changes in context

In a society that was, some years before the emergence of Slovenia, labelled as a "risk society" (Beck, 1986/2009 and 2009a)[4] or "liquid modern" (Bauman, 2002), there arose a characteristic and, at the same time, surprising combination of high expectations, on the one hand, and a high level of uncertainty, on the other. Although it may seem incredible on first view, the same time slot was simultaneously marked by a liquid world (Bauman, 2002) – a world with a small number of handholds and havens – a high risk world and a world of expectation, in which only the best, only the most, is good enough for the individual and the nation. This combination arose as a social fact, and continues to gain strength today, in a small country without a genuine tradition of representative democracy and without professional politicians.

[4] Beck first labelled the society as a risk society in his 1986 work: *Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weges einem andere Moderne*. Frankfurt: Suhrkampf. However, as Elliot points out, "From his highly influential 1986 volume *Risk Society* through to *Democracy without Enemies* (1998) and *World Risk Society* (1999b), Beck has consistently argued that the notion of risk is becoming increasingly central to our global society" (Elliot 2002, 294).

After the period of socialism, which, as one of its fundamental structuring principles, emphasised community and solidarity, even brotherhood and unity, and did not support the private – not only in terms of private ownership but also with regard to particular private exposure – a time arrived in which the vast majority of people believed that justice could be equated with meritocracy. The motto of the time was therefore: those with more talent and who are more industrious should gain opportunities, should have priority. This became the measure of success and the determinant of the position of the individual in society.

Individuals and families should finally have an opportunity to prove themselves, or, in common parlance, to achieve something. We therefore believed that, in addition to strengthening national subjectivity, it was necessary to emancipate private initiative and to protect freedom, especially freedom of the media (cf. Appendix 1, Table 1 – Constitutional Changes, and Appendix 1, Table 2 – Freedom of the Media).

At the same time, Slovenia was fortunate enough not to fall completely into a negation of equality and social justice. This was due to the structural embeddedness of the principles of equality, which had been present for decades and had become a relatively persistent trait of the national habitus (Bourdieu,1992), probably representing the positive side of the corporatist inclination of the space, which, despite late modernism, had still not departed from collectivity and ruralism, and still had problems with urbanism. In the decades from independence to the present day, the period of socialism, as a structured structure, left its mark in the high level of expectation regarding the fundamental egalitarian structure of society, on the one (positive) hand, and – as a deviation from, or rejection of the socialist limitation of freedom and the right to individualism – in the high level of support for individualism, on the other.

Despite these expectations regarding the necessity of fundamental egalitarianism, differences in income increased in society, as did the level of social inequality and, above all, the feeling of inequality. However, if we attempt to express inequality with differences in incomes, we find that, in the European context, Slovenia is still amongst the countries with relatively low

differences and a low level of poverty, and that differences between regions, in spite of the local perception, are not particularly marked.[5]

Thus a significant portion of society shifted from egalitarianism and certainty accompanied by a lower standard, to life with a higher standard but with greater social inequality and increased uncertainty. Today, some twenty years later, much less remains of the great expectations of opportunity for everyone than the majority of citizens expected. Alongside the general and quite significant rise in the standard of living, and even the rather successful retention of a relatively less unequal standard (cf. Vrabič-Kek 2012), it is the question of the equality, justice and certainty of the position of the individual that stands out as a problem in the new society.

2.2.1 The crisis and the increase in uncertainty

1. In the time of crisis, which began in 2008 and does not want to loosen its grip, questions of equality and security have come to the fore even more. The havens that have remained include public health, which, in relative terms, is still generally accessible and high quality; social welfare, which brings with it the majority of characteristics of the common good and an important reduction in the level of poverty and radical inequality (cf. Appendix 2, Figure 1: The Poverty Line, Slovenia in Comparison); and (for now) the school system. The latter is still generally accessible, and data shows (see Chapters 3 and 4) that, at the turn of the century, a large number of citizens were in fact being conveyed upwards in the education elevator (Beck, 2009), and that the elevator of citizens continues its upward path, with the new generation being significantly more educated than their parents (cf. Gaber, 2006). Thus, society is significantly more educated as a whole. On the other hand, the high level of unemployment has appeared as a growing source of uncertainty in Slovenia, especially for young people (cf. Appendix 1, Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).

[5] The differences between regions at the level SCTU 3 (12 statistical regions) in Slovenia are amongst the lowest in the EU. Differences in GDP in Slovenia are at 22.9%, which means that the GDP per capita in regions differs from the average GDP per capita of the country by an average of 22.9%. Only four countries in the EU have lower differences (from 17.7% in the Netherlands to 21.2% in Finland), while 19 countries have greater differences (from 23.6% in Italy to 46.7% in Bulgaria; in Austria the differences are at the same level as in Slovenia). In other words, the inequalities between regions in Slovenia are, in comparison with other EU states, tolerable (SORS, July 2012).

2. It increasingly seems that contemporary Slovenia – Slovenia of the last two or three decades – first experienced well what it is to "become embedded in", and now the difficulty of "being embedded in" one of the last – if not the very last – attempts to establish a "brave new world" on principles that at their core adhere to free competition ensuring maximum profit through waged work. This is the experience of being embedded in a society that increasingly enhances individualisation and flirts with personalisation (Hartley 2012), while at the same time committing itself to lithe modernism, which, on the other side of both, increases the uncertainty of personal and communal existence.

3. On the transition to a representative democracy and a market economy – a transition that occurred in the time of the celebrated "end of history" (Fukuyama, 1992) and the emphatic emergence of neoliberalism – Slovenia, with a new social system and independence, also developed an elaborate belief regarding its own future. Certain convictions or principles served, and to some extent continue to serve, as the fulcrum of the new self-image and expectations. The first was that we were finally on our own, that no one would determine how we should behave and live. The second was that no one would take that which we had earned with our work. The third and probably central expectation was that "given our industriousness and intelligence, we will finally live well – we will enjoy a high standard of living – and Slovenia will be the new Switzerland or a small Germany". The fourth expectation, that we would finally be free (no one would supervise us, eavesdrop on us, spy on us), was related to an enduring desire for freedom, and is represented by the fulcrum of liberalism. The fifth lauded our proverbial diligence: resourceful and dependent only on our own intelligence and efforts, we would create a just society based on enterprise and hard work. With a belief in meritocracy, in its justice, we thus surrendered ourselves to the stormy end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century.

Within the social changes described above, the positioning of women also took place, on the background of the aforementioned principles and as part of the described structure. Partly due to the extensive scope of the changes, this was accompanied by a denial of women's distinctiveness and the treatment of women's issues as a low priority (Antić 2000). What is more, many people, often including women themselves (presumably due to the "decisiveness of the moment"), accepted this approach as legitimate. In the time directly following independence, women shared the common belief that with democracy, with political pluralism, with the competition of ideologies and political parties, the time had arrived to

understand the struggle for new rights and the preservation of old rights as an essential part of political life. Together with men, women experienced and contributed to forming the structural shifts in Slovenian society. In these shifts, everything changed: not only the political system and state structures, but also the structure of employment, social security, childcare, healthcare, education and the pension system, to list just the most salient areas (more in the subsequent chapters). The factors sketched above contributed to the creation of a social space that, on the one hand, gave rise to numerous opportunities, while, on the other hand, brought an equal number of traps.

2.3 Global changes?

It seems that an extremely important factor in the current structuring and stagnation of Slovenian society – even more pronounced than the fact that the new period brought an internally differentiated and conflictive life – is that the period of neoliberal prosperity and differentiation in Slovenia came to an end too fast. The period of accelerated development – the so-called "success story" period or the Drnovšek period – appears to have drawn to a close with the onset of the crisis in 2008.

Putting aside a more detailed discussion of the reasons for its expiration, they can be schematically divided into:

a) internal – Slovenian, and,
b) external, which are more significant in the long term and concern structural shifts linked with the end of the type of society associated with the swansong of the redeeming nature of capitalism, a swansong that resounded, and to some extent still resounds, in the form of the neoliberal glorification of the power of competition, the market, individual initiative and a weak state, as well as the sacredness of the market economy. Just as it triumphantly and pompously began by welcoming a rationality that speaks of the end of history, today it expires in a combination of so-called austerity measures, on the one hand, and warnings about the necessity of finding an exit from a rationality that is obviously no longer capable of controlling the machine that it set in motion, on the other hand.[6]

[6] For an in-depth discussion of the dilemmas associated with the farewell from capitalism, see Wallerstein et al. 2013.

In recent decades, the promised "new world" has finally become a world of high risk, not only for those in the West, as we in Slovenia believed for some time, but, especially since 2008, for us as well. "Incalculable risks and manufactured uncertainties resulting from the triumphs of modernity mark the *conditio humana* at the beginning of the twenty-first century" (Beck 2009, 6). Ulrich Beck describes the world of 2009 as ambivalent, just like the category of risk itself, and points out that we like to "underestimate the subtlety of the sociological category of risk" (ibid., 3).

In its multilayeredness, its pervasiveness, this social category "consumes and transforms everything. It obeys the law of all or nothing. If a group represents a risk, its other features disappear and it becomes defined by this 'risk'" (ibid.). Risk is thus a real example of a *regulative transcendental idea* (cf. Foucault 2009, 286-287 and 307), which structures the regime of truth: the rationality of the world in which we live.

An increasing number of our deliberations, feelings, hopes, fears and behaviours are linked to risk. We internalise it. Sooner or later we collide with the perception, or we became entangled in the logic, of one of three essential forms of risk: "first, *environmental risk conflicts*, which spontaneously generate a global dynamic; second, *global financial risks*, which are at first individualized and nationalized; and, third, the *threat posed by terrorist networks*, which are both empowered and disempowered by the states" (Beck 2009, 13).

The paradox of high expectations, individualisation and risks is not at work only in Slovenia; however, it seems that within this paradox is located a significant part of the clarification of our development and, even more, of our current deadlocks, fears, hopes and searching. Particularly significant in this regard is the fact that in post-socialist states – just when we had shaken off the rigidity, the perpetuity of the structures of the socialist regime, its predictability, etc. – we (too) quickly, and with too much acceleration relative to our ability to manage the newly emerging world, found ourselves in the radically different reality of new modernism, especially because "modernity, as we understand it today, (…) began to mean an inability to stop ourselves, and even less to be still" (Bauman 2009, 28); the demand to augment capital, the necessity to rapidly seek new areas that yield profit, shifts conceptions of life, ravenously consuming and discarding them. When Robert and Edward Skidelsky (2012) today asks *How much is enough?*, his question, despite its relevance, sounds rhetorical; in the existing rationalities, *everything is too little*. With the speed, the "creativity", with all of the

innovations, everything is in fact *still too slow*, and is already past even when it is still emerging.[7] Thus any attempt to satisfy (all) needs is destined to failure; it has to fail because "(…) the horizon of satisfaction, the finish line of endeavours and the moment of quiet self-satisfaction is shifting faster than the fastest runner" (Bauman 2009, 28). Satisfaction always remains "in the future, while achievements lose their attractiveness and the potential to satisfy at the moment of achieving the goal, if not before" (ibid.). Post-socialist states are unable to keep up with this rhythm; their previous inflexibility is almost overnight exchanged for a fluidity that has built-in motors of the rationality of the necessity of progress, its dangers and powerlessness. This rationality seems to have been very clearly described by Walter Benjamin decades ago on the verge of the Second World War in his reactions to *Angelus Novus*, when he described Klee's angel of history: "A Klee painting named 'Angelus Novus' shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing in from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such a violence that the angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress" (Benjamin 1940 – 9th Thesis).[8]

2.4 On top of everything, the problem of employment as a special problem and one of the key issues in entering politics

In the process of rushing and striving for the new, the better, the best, citizens, on the one hand, and their elites, on the other, also lose their grip on the final longstanding handhold – the fulcrum, the centre – of the structuring of our lives: work.

[7] An example of this kind of logic in Slovenia is conveyed by the advertisement "A bad habit from Mercator" (a chain of supermarkets), particularly in the version where a man comes to his female boss to present a new idea. When the latter finds out that the idea is three days old the story ends, because the idea is unfortunately already "obsolete".

[8] In 1940, the German (ethnic Jewish) literary critic and philosopher Walter Benjamin wrote that, for him, the notion of "historical progress" was a cruel illusion. At that time, Benjamin was 48 years old and had already survived the First World War and the period following it. The year 1940 was also the second year of the Second World War, connected with the course of history directed by fascism, "a catastrophe that piles ruins upon ruins" (http://www.barglow.com/angel_of_history.htm).

When Robert Castel points out that we must in times "of uncertainty, when the past has escaped us and the future is indeterminate, (…) marshal our memory in order to try to understand the present" (2003, xiii), his thoughts certainly bring to mind, amongst other things, "contemporary circumstances (…) marked by a recent upheaval threatening the system of wage labor: massive unemployment and the insecurity of many jobs, the failure of traditional networks of social protections to deal with these conditions, the proliferation of individuals who occupy the position in society of "supernumeraries," either "unemployable," unemployed or employed only precariously and intermittently" (ibid.).

Whereas in the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s it was considered that the position of the older generation was improving and that the position of their children would be even better, this optimism dissipated long ago. For thirty years, we have been moving in the opposite direction, and it now seems "possible that we will lose the future" (Castel 2009, 11). What is more, Castel is not alone in his predictions; in fact, he can be described as being part of a substantial group of thinkers who have drawn attention to and foreseen the growing risk associated with the years of the individualisation of contemporary society, including Beck (2001), Bauman (2000), Bourdieu (1993), Boltanski (2007), Rifkin (2007) and Sennett (2006, 2008), to mention just the best known amongst them. Of course, there is no doubt that they have diverse approaches to the question of metamorphoses, the new spirit of capitalism, social risk, growing danger, the burden (misery) of the world, etc.[9] Their analyses diverge significantly when they speak both of the reasons for and the diagnosis of the state of "things". They do, however, share a common belief that changes in the area of work are amongst the central – if not the essential – elements of transformation and progress. More precisely: decisive changes in the area of work are, in their opinion, well underway. A quarter of a century ago, another interesting thinker on events in society, Claus Offe, pointed out that "the decisive power of waged work as the rationality of the factory and society is under question" (Offe 1986, 1547, cf. also Gorz 1999 and Gaber 1985).[10]

[9] Of course, there are also theoreticians who reject the hypothesis about the growing uncertainty concerning the ways and quality of life in contemporary society. One of the most recognised of these theoreticians is Boudon (2005). In his opinion, Beck derives his thesis from the fact that people today "on average change their employment and life partners more frequently and with greater ease than in the past" (2005, 23), and, based on the fact that his biographies seem less orderly, arrives at the incorrect conclusion that contemporary societies witness a greater level of risk. Boudon claims the opposite: "it is in fact possible to assert that we have never known a society as safe as contemporary society" (ibid.).

[10] Offe (1986, 1545) points out that "it is precisely waged work, or the model of profit societies that is imbued with work for profit, the model that is determined by its rationality and is shaken by conflicts in the field of work, (…) that is at the centre of the research of Marx, Weber and Durkheim – it is that which they have in common, irrespective of all of the differences in methodological approach and the differences in theories".

In the time of the new economic crisis, the question of the centrality of waged work has returned with full force. What is more, there is every indication that it will not be possible to simply shrug it off, and that even the previously privileged middle class will be sucked into the whirlpool of its farewell (cf. Collins in Wallerstein et al. 2013).

2.5 The need for efficient management and politics, and discouragement from entering politics

There can be no doubt that everything we have sketched above is crying out for a new political rationality, even for a new social reality and a politics appropriate to it. In order to achieve something of this nature it will be necessary to bring together not only the forces of sociology, as pointed out by Beck, who states that "the main problem of sociology of our time (…) is that it sets itself the wrong questions" (Beck 2009, 7), but also to form a political structure that will be capable of directing society towards reducing the existing and foreseen risks. In Beck's opinion, sociology currently deals too much with the existing (the same could be said of politics), whereas it should engage with "epochal discontinuities. Social changes in the globalised modern West and the rest of the world" (Beck 2009, 7; cf. also Wallerstein et al. 2013).

In fact, at least for Slovenia today, it holds that the relationship between politics and society is at one of the lowest points in the history of our own state (cf. Appendix 1, Tables 8, 9, 10, 11, 12). In Slovenian society, the truth is that, for historical and thus structural reasons, we have never established a considered and structured relationship towards politics. For Slovenians, politics has always been a dominating factor that limits a person, takes from him/her, and with regard to him/her is repressive, negative, etc. Despite offering some hope of finding a common exit from the pathlessness of the contemporary world, the increased politicisation of society in the form of so-called revolts, with their establishment and structuring around the principle that "all politics is the same and worthless" and "they all have to go", exposes a weak ability to discriminate and to form alternatives rather than providing genuine hope.

Alongside this is the established political space, structured through the opposition left-right and around leaders of political parties who are assumed to be irreplaceable. Together, they demonstrate a limited ability to think through and politically articulate the position in which Slovenia, and the European Union as well, finds itself. This does not speak in favour of an imminent increase in the reputation and legitimacy of state politics.

On the background sketched above, which is not promising structurally and politically, attempts are underway to expand opportunities and broaden the inclusion of women in politics. In the first decade of independence, the question of the inclusion of women in politics was pushed to the background. There was broad acceptance – also amongst women – that the question of women's inclusion in decision making was less important than independence, establishing the new state, gaining entry to the European Union, etc. In the second decade, when the question of gender equality, even in the field of politics, gained right of domicile on the list of important questions, endeavours gradually gained momentum for the actual inclusion of women in politics, primarily in parliament and the government. In the third decade, it seems that the partial movements that have taken place with the aid of quotas – first in European parliamentary elections, then in local elections and finally in state parliamentary elections – have brought about a relatively important shift in the representation of women in these representative bodies, and it is in this decade that we will see the extent to which women are interested in entering the field of politics.

In view of the aforementioned decline in the legitimacy of politics, the significant increase in uncertainty in the field of employment, and the desire of the female population in Slovenia to ensure fundamental security for themselves and their families, as well as the fact that today politics does not stand out as a profession with prestige and/or abundant opportunities for professional satisfaction, this will certainly not be a task that could be realised in a short time and without special efforts.

Part II
Education and the Position of Women in Slovenian Society

3 The Influence of Changes in the Field of Education on the Position of Women in Slovenian Society and Politics

Veronika Tašner and Sara Rožman

In Slovenia, as in the majority of European Union countries, the last decades have witnessed a breakthrough with regard to girls and women in the field of education. This is an important achievement in securing an equal position for girls and women, and it is not a coincidental or isolated process. It can be examined within the context of broader social and cultural changes that are in part the result of the successful and persistent endeavours of feminist movements in the last few decades to achieve equality for girls and women in society (Bourdieu, 2010; Francis and Skelton, 2009; Arnot and Mac An Ghaill, 2006; Mencin Čeplak and Tašner, 2009). In the continuation, we therefore emphasise those systemic measures that have changed the rules in the field of education in Slovenia, enabling girls and women to adopt a different position both in education and in society in general.

The significance of education for the equality of women in society was emphasised by the first women's rights activists. The public promotion of such rights was evident even before the demands of O. de Gouges. Marquis de Condorcet[11] had already promoted women's rights, and around the same time the German public was disquieted by the anonymously published book *Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Weiber* (1792), whose author later turned out to be T. G. von Hippel.[12] Demands for women to have similar opportunities to men in at least some aspects emerged primarily in the form of demands for access to education and study. In this context, it is also worth mentioning the Englishwoman M. Astell, who as early as 1694 published an essay entitled *A Serious Proposal to Ladies, for the Advancement of Their True and Greatest Interest*, in which she demanded the establishment of higher education institutions for women. In the 18th century, educated women known as *bluestockings* promoted women's intellectual equality and demanded equal educational opportunities (cf. Jalušič, 2004, 39).

[11] Condorcet pointed out the need to provide education for everyone if the rights of citizens were to be transferred from the formal level to actual society.

[12] Historical investigations have shown that endeavours to assert women's rights commenced no later than the beginning of the 15th century, with the publication of C. de Pizan's *The Book of the City of Ladies* (*Le Livre de la Cité des Dames*), which gave rise to the so-called *querelle des femmes*, a debate that centred on and protested against the traditional degradation of women (Jalušič, 2004, 37). Some authors regard C. de Pizan as the founder of feminism (Kelly, 1984), while others speak of her as representing the beginning of discussion about women's rights.

As early as in the 18th century, M. Wollstonecraft (1993, 11) and O. de Gouges (1997, 66) emphasised that the two sexes are by nature equal, that women and men are born equal, but this did not have consequences for the equal rights of women and men. Both writers believed that different upbringing would prepare women for cooperation with men (Antić Gaber, 1993, XVI–XVII), emphasising that without education women would be neither free nor enlightened citizens.

Western feminism continued with similar demands in the 19th and 20th centuries. The so-called first wave of feminism advocated opening the spaces of political, economic and social life, into which woman were not admitted. In the Slovenian territories, organisations and individuals demanded similar rights with similar argumentation as their colleagues elsewhere in Europe (see Antić Gaber, Rožman, Selišnik, 2009). They did not relent in the promotion of voting rights and placed their faith in the significance of education (especially in schools and universities) as cultural capital that could enable individuals to break through. Obviously justifiably. Their belief in the power and significance of education was, as is confirmed today, important for the new positioning of women in society. One must not forget, however, that education is not and cannot be a mechanism for removing all inequality, a fact that we will return to later.

3.1 The establishment of public education in the Slovenian territories as a step towards equal opportunities

Although the present text focuses on the education of women after the Second World War, we will begin by providing a short genesis of the development of education in the Slovenian territories prior to that. The foundations for the increased, but still rather discriminatory and segregated, access of women to education were established significantly before the selected milestone.[13] The establishment of public education in the Slovenian territories can be attributed to one enlightened woman of the 18th century: Empress Maria Theresa. The development of capitalist relationships in Austria during this period dictated that the greatest possible proportion of the population should receive at least a minimal education, or, in other words, "the social need for primary schools emerged" (Schmidt, 1988a, 165). With the

[13] Nonetheless, it was precisely the Second World War and the subsequent period that brought a radical upwards shift in the education of the overall population, and especially of women, which is why it has been selected as a historical period for more thorough examination in the continuation.

Theresian school reforms, the state seriously encroached upon the area of schooling for the first time, as, amongst other things, it sought to increase its political and ideological influence on the masses. With the primary school legislation known as the *General School Decree*, confirmed on 6 December 1774 by Maria Theresa, general compulsory schooling was introduced in the Slovenian territories for the first time, bringing primary school obligations to all children, boys and girls, up to the age of twelve years.[14] During the period of the Illyrian Provinces, the unified primary school (*écoles primaire*) was introduced, while the role of the Slovenian language was also reinforced, as it was recognised as a language of instruction in primary schools and *gimnazija* schools (grammar schools). In the Slovenian region of the Illyrian Provinces, eight *gimnazija* schools and three lycées operated. The most important acquisition of the French school reform was undoubtedly the founding of the University of Ljubljana, which was, however, short lived, as it was abolished after the Austrian reoccupation. The most important measures of the Austrian authorities prior to 1848 related to the development of a network of regular and Sunday primary schools and the organisation of their attendance, as well as the education and maintenance of teaching staff. During this period, regular primary schools were attended by fewer girls than boys, with the proportion of girls in the classroom being directly linked to the level of development of the individual region (Schmidt, 1988b, 125).[15] Church school authorities concurred with the stereotype that schooling was not as necessary for girls as for boys, "except when they learn religious studies in school, which is equally necessary for both boys and girls" (ibid.), and therefore did not endeavour to improve the attendance of girls. Nonetheless, it is an interesting fact that, in the Pre-March period, the attendance of girls in school rose more rapidly than that of boys. In the Illyrian (Ljubljana) Gubernia, the attendance of girls was 39% in 1825 and 42% in 1840, while in the Archdiocese of Ljubljana it was 28% in 1820 and 39% in 1847 (ibid.). Schmidt (ibid.) attributes this to the progress of literacy, and, in view of the fact that the attendance of girls increased primarily in the Carniola region, to the strengthened position of the Slovenian language in schools. With the development of the Slovenian primary school, instruction for girls who had not been able to study gained more purpose. Due to the fact girls were normally not able to attend so-called *normalke* ("model schools" in regional centres of the Austrian Monarchy) or *glavne šole* (*Hauptschule* or general secondary schools), girls from wealthier

[14] In the argumentations for the legislation, it is written that "the education of young people of both sexes is the most important basis for the genuine prosperity of nations" (Schmidt, 1988, 178).

[15] The attendance of girls in the Diocese of Trieste was 22% in 1818, in the Archdiocese of Gorizia 25% in 1818, in the Archdiocese of Ljubljana 28% in 1820, in the Illyrian Gubernia 39% in 1825, and in the Diocese of Gurk 44% in 1825 (Schmidt, 1988b, 125).

families could gain an education in girls' schools in Ursuline monasteries in Ljubljana, Škofja Loka, Klagenfurt and Gorizia (ibid. 141). Thus, in the first half of the 19th century, girls' schooling developed most successfully in the Slovenian Primorska Region. The General School Decree of 1774, which stipulated that girls' schools should be established wherever possible, was taken seriously in the Slovenian South Primorska or Littoral Region and in particular Trieste (cf. Milharčič Hladnik, 1995, 19). Thus, in 1851, there were five girls' schools in Trieste, and due to the well-developed public girls' schooling, monastery schools had less importance and fewer students in the Slovenian Primorska Region than in Carniola, Carinthia and Styria, which cannot be said of other Slovenian regions (Hojan, 1970, 11).[16]

In 1849, there was a reform of *gimnazija* schools, which saw the discontinuation of lycées or high schools. This was accompanied by calls for a Slovenian university in Ljubljana, but it was not until 16 July 1918 that legislation was finally passed establishing the university. It began its work with complete faculties of law, the arts, technical studies and theology, and an incomplete medical faculty with a two-year programme. University study remained inaccessible to women long after primary school education enabled the further education of girls (Milharčič Hladnik, 1995, 30). The traditional division of gender roles remained a constant obstacle to endeavours for women's rights to higher levels of education, while the most frequent arguments against the further education of girls were biologistic.[17] In all European countries – whether Catholic or Protestant, liberal or conservative – there was a fierce and long-lasting battle for higher education for girls, which was not won until the 20th century (ibid. 32).[18]

3.2 An overview of the most important changes in the field of education in the Slovenian territories after the Second World War

[16] The number of girls' monastery schools only began to increase after the introduction of the Primary Schools Act in 1869. Ljubljana gained its first public girls' school, the St Jacobs Girls' School, in 1875, which initially had four grades but expanded to eight grades in 1890 (Hojan, 1970, 12).

[17] Education was thought to weaken women's future motherhood; the overuse of their brains was supposed to degenerate their physical fragility; and, not least, by nature woman required subordination (Anderson and Zinsser; Stock in Milharčič Hladnik, 1995, 32).

[18] The first university to allow the enrolment of women was the University of Zurich, in 1865. The University of London bestowed its first degrees on women in 1878, while it was not until the 1920s that this was allowed by Oxford and Cambridge (cf. Milharčič Hladnik, 1995, 32).

By focusing on the most important systemic measures in the sphere of education that enabled a modified structure of integrating both sexes in the area of education, we will, on the one hand, highlight the importance of the systemic change that, in combination with other factors, is necessary for a radical change in the roles, relations, positioning, etc. in a particular social subsystem. On the other hand, we will try to answer the question of the extent to which representation in politics is linked with the difference between the sexes and their inclusion in achieving a particular level of education (the proportion of degrees, etc.). To what extent is representation in politics actually dependent on the educational paths chosen – certain disciplines (humanities, social sciences) are regarded as "more interesting" for recruiting politicians – and to what extent is it linked with the prestige of certain academic disciplines (e.g., law, medicine)?

In Slovenia in the period after the Second World War, as in the other republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, we can determine in the outlines of the general value framework and the prevailing type of rationality (Weber, 1978, 1988; Foucault, 2009) that the rights of the individual, as promoted by the Liberation Front during the Second World War, remained at the fore: free schooling, social rights and the right to work. Alongside these, of particular importance for the present discussion is the conceptualisation and implementation of the new role and position of women in society. Women gained the right to vote and the right to equal pay for equal work, while concessions were also made in traditional male strongholds (Gabrič, 2009; Antić Gaber, 2011), such as the academic and political fields, in which women began to occupy leading positions. It is possible to conclude that socialism was very predisposed to the idea of education for everybody. The mass education that can be observed in Slovenia as well as in other countries of the European Union actually has its roots in the period prior to the Second World War, but it was only after the war that a turning point was reached. Although this was facilitated by economic nationalism (Gaber, 2006), it was also a direct reflection of a new type of rationality, which we know under the name meritocracy. This is a rationality that helped to shape the new social order, as it enabled the equal treatment of everyone, irrespective of gender and social origin. The concept of merititocracy, of repayment for the past efforts and achievements of the individual, functioned as one of the greatest promoters of inclusion in education, as, through new views, conceptions and criteria for social mobility, it encouraged a different perspective on socialisation (more in Tašner, 2007). The demand for the development of human abilities brought a requirement for

greater equality for everyone and a more just social order, thus opening the doors of schools and other institutions to new generations of girls and women.

The participation of women in political activities after the Second World War and subsequent to their gaining general voting rights was significantly lower than it should have been in view of the constitutionally determined equality between the sexes (Jogan, 2001, 57). In contrast, the presence of women in educational institutions was much greater. The constitution of 1946[19] ensured women an equal position in the education system (Article 38). The idea of equality was present in all fields of education. Its realisation began immediately after the war, even before the extensive school reform in the 1950s. Amongst the first measures for achieving greater equality for everyone was the extension of the number of years of general primary school and the consequent abolition of the so-called *meščanske šole* (*Bürgerschule* or vocational schools). This organisational change enabled the majority of school pupils to continue their schooling, as well as later facilitating their transition to high schools and colleges, many of which were established after the war. The result was an increased proportion of both male and female school pupils and students in the very first decade after the war (more in Gabrič, 2009).

The so-called great reform of the school system, which the Yugoslav authorities prepared in the mid 1950s and whose principal document was the *General Act on Schooling* (1958), followed from the idea of equality for everyone. This reform was supposed to be introduced with unified eight-year primary school as the only form of obligatory schooling, enabling all students equal opportunity to enrol in any secondary school. From the perspective of pedagogical approaches, this change shifted the positioning of the first external differentiation upwards, to the age of 15 years. At the same time, the unification of secondary schooling was intended to enable enrolment in colleges. On surveying the development of schooling during this period, mention should also be made of the rapid development of vocational schooling with new kinds of schools, while *gimnazija* schools, due to their perceived "elite" nature, were deemphasised. Higher education thus became accessible to everyone, and no longer just to students who had completed *gimnazija*. Most faculties introduced a system of two-tier study: two-year short-cycle higher education and four-year long-cycle higher education.

It is evident from statistics regarding the educational structure and the number of students enrolled in educational institutions that these measures did in fact contribute to creating a

[19] Official Gazette of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, No. 10/1946.

more highly educated population, with girls and women in particular taking advantage of the new educational opportunities.

While a great deal of attention was given to education in general, particular care was devoted to the education of women. This was because, on the one hand, women were thought to be more susceptible to counter-revolutionary ideas, while, on the other hand, it was due to their role as mothers, as a woman was regarded as "the first educator of the child" (Jeraj, 2005, 130). Women entered the education system in great numbers, and gradually even exceeded men in number. Thus, both prior to and after the Second World War, half of primary school pupils in Slovenia were girls, which is only logical. Of more interest is the fact that whereas in the 1939/40 academic year female secondary school students represented only 43.8% of the entire secondary school population, this figure had grown to 51.9% by the 1946/47 academic year. In the 1953/54 academic year, there was a total of 56,040 students enrolled in Slovenian *gimnazija* schools, of which 29,377, or 52.4%, were girls (ibid. 229). This percentage continued to rise over the years (Table 1), reaching 53.8% in the 1959/60 academic year, and 65.2% in 1969/70. In the 1999/2000 academic year, girls represented 59.4% of the secondary school population (Table 2).

Table 1: ***The number of students enrolled in gimnazija schools in Slovenia between 1939 and 2000***

	1939/40	**1959/60**	**1969/70**	**1978/79**	**1989/90**	**1999/00**
Male	3,002	3,454	4,673	6,585	/	12,765
Female	1,347	4,030	8,743	12,562	/	18,661
Total	4,349	7,484	13,416	19,147	/	31,426

Source: Statistical Yearbooks, 1965, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.

Table 2: ***The number of students enrolled in gimnazija schools in Slovenia in the second half of the 20th century***

	Total	**Female Students**	**Proportion of Female Students (%)**
1959/60 Academic Year	7,484	4,030	53.8
1969/70 Academic Year	13,416	8,743	65.2
1999/2000 Academic Year	31,426	18,661	59.4

Source: Gabrič, Aleš, 2009: *Sledi šolskega razvoja na Slovenskem* [Traces of School Development in the Slovenian Territories]

This development occurred in parallel with the fact that there were increasingly "fewer /…/ young people who concluded school and schooling after the obligatory eight years of primary school. The opening up of the school system was facilitated by the general improvement in social and personal standards, the opening of new secondary schools and higher education institutes, the more accessible school system and the broad support for schooling under socialism, in which, with rare exceptions, it was not necessary to pay school fees" (Gabrič, 2009, 26).

Turning from a general outline of the state of society to a general outline of the state of the school system, it is clear that the field of education after 1945 was marked by the abandonment of old pedagogical practices and the implementation of new ones based on the educational models of the Soviet Union, with particular efforts being focused on literacy as well as on abolishing gender segregation. It should be noted that the level of illiteracy in Slovenia was significantly lower than elsewhere, and the goals of educational work were therefore somewhat different from those in other regions of Yugoslavia. Whereas, in other republics, the priority was to teach women to read and write, in Slovenia, the first task was to eliminate superstition (Jeraj, 2005, 222). However, as M. Jeraj (ibid. 224) points out, due to the constant warnings about the need for different goals of educational work in Slovenia, the fact was overlooked that in some regions of Slovenia the level of illiteracy was not as

negligible as political leaders had foreseen. Data gathered in the 1953 census showed that there were still 32,000 illiterates in Slovenia, of which 18,000, or approximately 56%, were women.[20] It is interesting that the political elites of the time were not particularly concerned with the differences between the nations and nationalities of the various republics. Thus, when it came to learning to read and write, which was one of the priorities of school policy, little attention was paid to the fact that in Yugoslavia at that time "25% of the population was illiterate (15% of men, and as many as 34% of women, which to a large extent held true for the Muslim regions of the country) /…/" but "only 2% of the population of Slovenia was illiterate" (Gabrič, 2001, 244).[21]

It is nonetheless necessary to add that the emphasis on teaching reading and writing at the federal level was undoubtedly one of the measures that benefitted women the most, as they represented a greater share of the illiterate population than men. With the constitution of 1963, the new socialist self-management relationships began to emerge in schooling as well. After the material problems of education had been solved, the focus shifted to the implementation of the school system and the introduction of new educational methods and content (Internet source: Šolstvo na Slovenskem skozi stoletja (do 1991) [Schooling in the Slovenian Territories through the Centuries (until 1991)]).

If we attempt to conclude this short and truncated survey of the measures in the field of education with an overview of the most resounding measures in the last three decades of the 20th century, we can observe that the 1970s were rather dynamic in schooling. In 1971, the ideological aspect of education in schools was strengthened, in an attempt to end educational neutrality, which was not to the liking of the authorities. From 1975, all-day school was introduced in primary schooling, and the higher education sphere was enriched with a new

[20] The greatest number of illiterate women were older than 65 years, followed by the age group 10–19 years, with the lowest number being in the range 20–34 years. In Yugoslavia as a whole, there was a total of 3,404,000 illiterates, of which 2,506,000 were women (Jeraj, 2005, 224-225).

[21] The fact that, compared to the other regions of Yugoslavia, there was a lower level of literacy in Slovenia, both in terms of the overall number and the number of women, can be attributed to a number of historical factors in the area of education. Amongst the most important of these is undoubtedly the fact that, after the implementation of the new school legislation in 1774, the level of literacy began to increase, with Slovenians only being surpassed in this respect by two nations in the most developed regions of the monarchy, the Germans and the Czechs. A century after the introduction of compulsory schooling, in 1880, there was approximately 39% illiteracy amongst the inhabitants of the regions with a majority Slovenian population. A decade later, this had fallen to approximately 25%, and at the turn of the century, in 1900, approximately 15% of Slovenians were illiterate. At the last census in Austria, in 1910, the figure was approximately 12%. The greatest share of illiterates were, of course, older people, while only 3% of the younger generation was illiterate (Gabrič, 2009, 21).

university centre in Maribor. The 1980s were most radically (negatively) marked by the project of career-oriented education, which, as Gaber demonstrates, was a result of, amongst other things, an erroneous "conception of the development of the European school sphere" (2006, 47). Instead of increasing the number of active students, which was the orientation in the majority of developed countries, the reform led to "the limitation of study in general, and the forced redirection to the fields of natural sciences and technical studies. Along with the recession in the country at the time, these two measures deprived Slovenia of approximately 20,000 graduates in the period until 1991" (ibid.).

Independence in 1991 brought the acceptance of a new constitution, the establishment of a multiparty political system and the implementation of a European dimension in the Slovenian space, to mention just a few changes. Consequently, important changes came about in the sphere of education, as well. Favourable social conditions also arose for changes in the area of gender equality and justice in education. In 1995, the *White Paper on Education in the Republic of Slovenia* was prepared. This document was aimed at facilitating the establishment of a high quality and competitive education system that would ensure the greatest possible proportion of citizens the opportunity to realise their right to education. Relevant to the present discussion is a section that directly addresses gender equality. In the *Introduction*, it is written:

"With regard to gender differences, it is necessary to shift the emphasis from formal rights of non-discrimination to substantial rights and to ensuring equal opportunities on all levels of the education system. When we speak of children's rights, we must therefore also speak of the rights of girls, and of the discrepancy between the idea of equal opportunities in an unequal education system that one way or another still privileges the members of one gender. With the introduction of coeducation for girls and boys, externally visible discrimination on the level of the school system was removed; however, we retain more subtle mechanisms of authority as the 'hidden curriculum' that is characteristic of school as an institution in the modern era (the organisation of everyday life in school, specific practices and methods of teaching, communication between pupils and teachers, etc.), which teach girls 'how to lose'" (1997, 23).

This demonstrates that the authors of the *White Paper* were aware of the problem of hidden mechanisms of gender differentiation in educational institutions. The clear and decisive opening of the question of the rights of girls in education facilitated the serious treatment of

this topic, which until then had more or less been a “non-topic”. With the above text, the issue of equal opportunity for both genders gained a place amongst the principles guiding the systemic and curricular renewal of education in Slovenia. It was also necessary to deal seriously with gender equality in other areas, and this was one of the topics of discussion during the process of entering the European Union.

3.3 An overview of the statistical data and research in Slovenia in the area of the education of girls

Research on the level of trust in institutions in Eastern European countries, conducted in 1990/92 (Inglehart, Basanez and Moreno, 1998), showed that it was the education system that enjoyed the greatest level of trust of all of the institutions surveyed. A comparative study for Slovenia, undertaken in 1992 by a Slovenian Public Opinion (SPO) survey, revealed that the level of trust in the education system in Slovenia was on the European level, and that it was the highest of all of the observed institutions surveyed in Slovenia. SPO measurements from 1995 and 1999 yielded similar results. Trust in the education system increased from year to year, reaching as much as 80% in 1999. On the basis of the statistical data, we assume that the high level of trust in the institution of the education system was influenced by the fact that a greater portion of the population invests in education, including an increasing number of women. In the continuation, we will demonstrate the immediately evident fact that the level of education of women in Slovenia is increasing more rapidly than that of men, and that women in Slovenia are better educated than men.

The focus will primarily be on shifts in the educational structure of the population according to gender and levels, shifts in the educational structure of the population according to gender and areas of study, and the gender structure in the area of education at the level of postgraduate and doctoral study.

3.3.1 The educational structure of the population according to gender and levels

It has already been noted above that there has been a breakthrough with regard to women in the field of education in Slovenia in the last two decades. The proportion of the population included in tertiary education (short- and long-cycle higher education) in Slovenia has

increased significantly in recent years, and this is particularly true with regard to the female part of the population. Even more marked has been the increase in the proportion of women amongst graduates of tertiary education. The scale tipped towards the side of women around 1980, and since that time the proportion of women has grown with increasing rapidity. Data show that the proportion of women amongst graduates of university, higher vocational education and short-cycle study was 42% in 1970, 49% in 1980, 58% in 1985, 59% in 1990 and 2000, and 64% in 2009 (Statistical Yearbook, 2005; 2010).

In Slovenia, both the number of educated women and the level of education they achieve has increased significantly in the last three decades. Some 35 years ago, every fiftieth woman had completed short- or long-cycle higher education, whereas today one in every five women has achieved this level. Furthermore, 39 years ago, only one fifth of women had achieved a level of education higher than primary school, and 30% of all women either lacked education completely or had failed to complete primary school, while only 2% of women had achieved a level of education higher than secondary school (Statistical Yearbook, 2010). The proportion of women without education or with incomplete primary school education has fallen consistently since 1971 (from 30.2% in 1971 to 28.2% in 1981, 18.7% in 1991, 8.0% in 2002, and 5.3% in 2008). During the same period, the proportion of women who have completed secondary school and short- and long-cycle higher education has increased. Whereas the proportion of women who had completed secondary education was only 18.7% in 1971, it had increased to 36.6% by 1991, and just over 10 years later had risen to 47.9%, reaching 49.9% in 2008. In 2008, 93.6% of women in Slovenia aged 20–24 had completed at least secondary school (EU-27: 81.48%), while the figure for men of the same age was 87.4% (EU-27: 75.7%) (Statistical Yearbook, 2010). Similarly, the percentage of women with short- and long-cycle higher education rose from 2.2% in 1971 to 4.7% in 1981, 8.2% in 1991, 13.3% in 2002, and 19.1% in 2008 (Statistical Yearbook, 2009).

3.3.2 The educational structure of the population according to gender and area of study

In the majority of empirical studies, education proves to be one of the most powerful factors of political participation, even taking into account other socioeconomic factors (Shields and Goidel, 1997; Verba, Scholzman and Brady, 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). Due to the fact that education includes, amongst other things, verbal, organisational and bureaucratic competences, which are not negligible in the process of political activity, it is considered

easier for better educated individuals to enter and function within politics (Burns, Scholzman and Verba, 2001, 142). Similarly, more highly educated individuals apparently occupy better employment positions, enabling them to further develop social skills. People with a higher level of education are also supposedly more "integrated" into politics, more politically inquisitive, better informed, more effective and more successful (ibid.). As Adam (1992, 13) states, with the professionalisation of politics "the rule increasingly holds that an academic education (that is, a university degree) in whatever area of study is a precondition for a political career." This is confirmed by research undertaken in the parliaments of 110 countries in the period 2006–2008 by the Inter-Parliamentary Union: only 5% of the parliamentarians surveyed had only completed secondary school, with no differences being evident between the sexes (Rožman and Mencin Čeplak, 2012, 364).

In the years 1945–1977, as many as 36.5% of graduates of university programmes were women (Ramet, 1999, 96). Throughout the entire period, there is a noticeable increasing trend in the proportion of women at higher education institutions: in the 1953/54 academic year, the proportion of women enrolled amounted to 29.4%, by 1969/70 this had risen to 42.4%, and in 2000/01 it was 57.3% (Gabrič, 2009, 220) (Table 3). In the 2009/10 academic year, 59.5% of the students enrolled in university were women (Statistical Yearbook, 2010).

Table 3: Number of enrolments in higher education institutions in Slovenia in the second half of the 20th century

	1953/54	**1969/70**	**2000/01**
TOTAL	5,992	21,632	82,812
Number of women	1,763	9,163	47,460
Proportion of women (%)	29.4%	42.4%	57.3%

Source: Gabrič, Aleš, 2009: *Sledi šolskega razvoja na Slovenskem* [Traces of School Development in the Slovenian Territories].

The professions that enter politics with the greatest ease are from the areas of law and economics (Dolan, Deckamn and Swers, 2007; Palmer and Simon, 2006). Data from the aforementioned research by the Inter-Parliamentary Union show that, in addition to these professions, politicians also frequently have a background in teaching professions and the

civil service on the local level. On the basis of these findings, we can conclude that social sciences and the humanities prevail in the education of politicians. This also means that education can in no way satisfactorily account for the lower participation of women in politics in Slovenia, in terms of neither the level nor the area of education (Rožman and Mencin Čeplak, 2012, 364). The level of education of women in Slovenia has increased faster than that of men. The number of graduates (Figure 1) in the last 30 years has increased by 135%, while the number of female graduates has increased by 300% (Statistical Yearbook, 2012). In 2010, almost two thirds of graduates were women. According to data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, women have prevailed in enrolments in university study since the 1980/81 academic year (Statistical Yearbook, 1981). Although the selection of areas of study is still gender-specific, it is precisely in the areas that prevail amongst politicians that women are more prominent: since the 1970/7 academic year (Statistical Yearbook, 1971), women have dominated in enrolments in law and economics (Appendix 1, Table 13). According to data from 1979, 50% of all graduates were women, including 45% of graduates from the Faculty of Arts, 59% from the Faculty of Economics, 53% from the Faculty of Law, 53% from the Faculty of Sociology, Political Studies and Journalism (of which 38% were journalism graduates), and 50% from the Faculty of Medicine (Statistical Yearbook, 1980). Just like data from the 1980s (Appendix 1, Table 14), data about graduates from the 1990s show that women prevail significantly in faculties educating for the area of health and social work, as well as for pedagogical work. The proportion of female students also considerably exceeded the proportion of male students at the Faculty of Economics, the Faculty of Sociology, Political Studies and Journalism, the Faculty of Pharmacy and the Faculty of Medicine, as well as at certain departments of the Faculty of Natural Sciences and Engineering and the Faculty of Biotechnology (Statistical Yearbook, 2000). In 2009, female students represented the greatest share of graduates in the areas of education (87%), social sciences, business studies and law (68%), of which 86% of female graduates studied journalism and 70% studied law, while women also accounted for 82% of graduates of medicine and social work (Statistical Yearbook, 2012).

“Education in the areas of social sciences and the humanities is not, of course, either essential or adequate for successful work in politics, nor for self-confident entry into politics. However, education in social sciences and the humanities mediates knowledge about society, which is the object of political reflection and political management, as well as knowledge about the strategies and techniques of communication, negotiation, persuasion, etc.” (Rožman and

Mencin Čeplak, 2012, 365). All of this can serve as a source of the knowledge and competences relevant to political work.

Figure 1: ***Graduates of tertiary education in the Republic of Slovenia.***



Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.

3.3.3 The gender structure in the area of education at the postgraduate level

In comparison with the 1980s and 1990s, differences between the sexes in postgraduate study are decreasing (Table 6); however, male students still prevail at the level of doctoral study.

The proportion of women completing postgraduate study is nonetheless slowly but surely growing. In the period 1945–1995, a total of 3,159 PhDs were awarded, with 698, or 22.1%, being awarded to women. In 1969, the proportion of female doctoral graduates was 10.2%, in 1979 it was 26%, in 1989 32%, in 1999 36.6%, and in 2009[22] 44.8%. The proportion of women amongst master's and specialisation graduates has also increased significantly. In the period 1962–1995, 33.8% of all master's and specialisation graduates were women, whereas in 1979 women accounted for 19.5%, in 1989 39.9%, in 1999 48.5% and in 2009 56.7% (Statistical Yearbooks, 1970; 1980; 1990; 2000; 2010).

[22] This figure includes both PhDs awarded according to the previous system and those awarded according to the third Bologna cycle.

Amongst recipients of PhDs in the decades after the Second World War, men have dominated comprehensively. However, the proportion of female doctoral graduates has grown gradually, and in 2012 was approximately equal to men. As in the lower levels of higher education, the representation of both sexes in the various areas of education is also unequal at the doctoral level: female PhD graduates dominate in the areas of the fine arts, the humanities, social sciences, business studies, administrative studies and law, as well as in agriculture, forestry, fishery and veterinary studies, where women represent as many as two thirds of PhD graduates; however, in the areas of natural sciences, mathematics, computing and technical studies, production technology and construction, women represent less than 40% of PhD graduates (Statistical Yearbook, 2013).

Table 6: ***PhD graduates***

	1945-1964	**1966**	**1967**	**1968**	**1696**	**1977**	**1978**	**1979**	**1987**	**1988**	**1989**	**1999**	**2009**
Men	233	23	18	13	35	75	69	54	77	94	78	157	257*
Women	39	5	2	2	4	19	11	19	23	24	38	103	209**
TOTAL	272	28	20	15	39	94	80	73	100	118	116	260	466***

* Includes 1 PhD from the 3rd Bologna cycle.
** Includes 10 PhDs from the 3rd Bologna cycle.
*** Includes 11 PhDs from the 3rd Bologna cycle.
Source: Statistical Yearbooks, 1970; 1980; 1990; 2000; 2010, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.

3.4 Structural changes as a necessary but insufficient condition for eliminating gender inequality

One of the most important measures for the elimination of inequality between the sexes in the area of education was the abolition of gender-segregated schools and school departments just after the Second World War. With the 1947 decree that prohibited the separation of girls and boys and demanded the renaming of schools, the first Minister of Education of the People's Republic of Slovenia, Lidija Šentjurc, put an end to a century of gender segregation, thus removing the last formal gender segregation obstacle for girls and women in the Slovenian school system. The prohibition applied to primary and secondary schools, but not to higher

education, and, until 1992, women were not admitted to study at the Faculty of Theology. When the last systemic limitations were removed, women began to conquer the former male fortresses, commencing with *gimnazija* schools.

It is therefore possible to conclude that the statistical data show that girls and women are more successful in completing both secondary and tertiary education. The data also confirm the thesis concerning the infiltration of women into prestigious academic disciplines such as medicine and law. At the same time, a more detailed examination of the data confirms the old thesis regarding the gender-specific educational paths of both male and female students. Women still largely dominate the "typically female" areas of study, such as education, the humanities, social sciences, social work and medicine, while men prevail in "traditionally male" programmes, such as computing, mathematics, natural sciences, technical studies, construction, and production and processing technology. Gender-specific educational paths, as well as professional and career choices, can be partly explained with the aid of Bourdieu (2010), who believes that these inequalities persist due to the gender-specific organisation of girls and boys into various kinds of schools and later faculties, thus also determining the various careers of both genders. The various choices of both sexes, which do not depart radically from conventional images of femininity and masculinity, can be attributed to their habitus and to social practices (Bourdieu, 2002a; 2010), which, despite shifts and changes in individual fields, still powerfully dominate processes of identification and subjectivisation. Non-discrimination legislation, the struggle for genuine, fair educational opportunities for girls and women, and their personal engagement in the newly conquered fields have, after centuries of male domination, led to results that are, on first view, very favourable for women. Education, in spite of its massification and its consequent devaluation, still enables better employment and career opportunities, and it is therefore no wonder that girls and women place their faith in it. It is a case of acquiring the cultural capital (Bourdieu, 2004a) to which, after the elimination of the final systemic barriers, girls and women gained access. Personal effort and ability, as well as an investment of time, were once again required, but results are forthcoming. It is a process in which, at least on first view, each individual woman can achieve the maximum possible for herself. Statistical data lead us to the conclusion that this seems important and meaningful to women. On average, women achieve a higher level of education and conclude their studies more rapidly than men. Women have no doubt profited from the change in the rules and logic of the field of education. They enter and move within this field confidently, gaining appropriate forms of cultural capital, as well as social and

symbolic capital. Education and past professional experience can be an important source of competences and skills, providing politicians with political prestige and credibility, and enabling the individual a greater level of autonomy in their relationship towards a political party and its elite (Rožman and Mencin Čeplak, 2012, 371). At the same time, it is clear that the various fields remain relatively autonomous: forms of capital acquired in one field are only gradually and partially transferred to another field; as Walzer (1983) points out, succeeding in one sphere is no guarantee of succeeding in another. The relative security of the spheres in which women have finally established themselves – the academic sphere, law, etc. – no doubt also contributes to this. Notwithstanding contemporary reservations in this regard, these spheres are, in the eyes of women, probably more secure and perhaps even more prestigious than the political sphere.

This is particularly true if we accept that it is necessary to consider the educational successes of girls and women on the background of a contemporary, rapidly changing, globalised, fluid society that presents the individual woman with ever new demands to adapt. With the loss of certain important social mechanisms of security, (well-educated) women are, like everyone else, faced with increased risks and uncertainty (Bauman, 2002; Beck, 2009). It is clear that the choices of women are not internally non-contradictory and unproblematic.

4 The Influence of the Dynamics of Higher Education on the Gender Structure of Contemporary Society

Pavel Zgaga

4.1 On the (dis)connectedness of gender studies and higher education studies

Our point of departure is a fact confirmed by research and by general public perception: in relation to men, women are noticeably underrepresented in the division of social and political power and responsibility. This raises a series of questions, one of the most fundamental of which is: Why is this the case and what are the decisive contributing factors? Several earlier studies established a link between the proportion of women with higher education and the proportion of women in Parliament (e.g., Rule, 1996). Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2000, 9) summarise these studies as follows:

> Early sociological accounts commonly regarded the social system as playing a critical role in determining the eligibility pool for elected office, including the occupational, educational and socioeconomic status of women. Accounts have emphasized the importance of the pool of women in the sort of related professional, administrative and managerial occupations like the law and journalism that commonly lead to political careers, providing the flexibility, financial resources, experiences and social networks that facilitate running for office […].

In view of the fact that we are dealing with a complex set of issues, it is not possible to attribute this phenomenon as a whole to a single factor; however, factors that have been shown to be more important should be treated in more detail. This being one of the central objectives of the present research project, in this chapter we will focus on a specific question: *Can higher education or the higher education system and the changes within it contribute to this, and, if so, to what extent or in what way?* Given that the notion of higher education will not only be considered as a statistical indicator in population analysis but in a wider context, we can further broaden the question: *To what extent can movements, trends and structural changes in contemporary higher education contribute directly or indirectly to this phenomenon?*

At first glance, recent studies devote a great deal of attention to, for example, shifts in the gender structure of the student population as well as academic staff. Statistical overviews enable fairly detailed comparisons between various institutions, countries and regions, which

yield results revealing crucial differences (e.g., between the European north and south), but also some similarities (e.g., a growing number of female students at all levels of study). On the other hand, when more fundamental questions relating to contemporary higher education systems and institutions are addressed, the gender dimension is often ascribed lower priority in research, with the exception of some, still rather rare feminist studies (cf. Morley and Walsh, 1996; Brooks and Mackinnon, 2001; Danowitz Sagaria, 2007). It is entirely possible to concur with the editor of one of these monographs, who says that "[c]ontemporary scholars of higher education change tend to overlook gender, and gender scholars tend to overlook higher education adaptation" (Danowitz Sagaria, 2007, 1).

Up to the beginning of the 20th century, the world of higher education was completely masculinised, after which it gradually opened up to women. In the past two decades, at the turn of the millennium, female students and graduates throughout Europe have begun to dominate the student population, initially as undergraduates and today in growing numbers as postgraduate students. It is more than evident, however, that this trend is out of proportion with women's participation in the division of social and political power and responsibility at the national and regional levels as well as at the level of higher education institutions themselves. We shall focus on these aspects in the following pages.

4.2 Key issues

The disproportionateness in question is a result of very different factors. As an example, let us consider the current proportions of female students in Europe, which persist under 50% only in Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Germany and Turkey.[23] Similarity is thus demonstrated between such diverse countries that interpreting data with the geographical-political criterion alone is inadequate; other factors must also be taken into account, including economic, social, cultural, religious, and similar factors.

[23] Only a few years ago, this group included certain other countries and the proportions were even lower. According to Eurydice data (2011, 17), the prevailing proportions are now close to 50%, or, in more detail: Cyprus 49.0%, Liechtenstein 33.0%, Luxemburg 48.3%, Germany 49.7% and Turkey 43.1%. It should be added that quite a few countries only slightly exceed the 50% limit, having only recently advanced to this group: Greece (50.1%), The Netherlands (51.7%), Austria (53.3%), Portugal (53.5%), Spain (54.0%), etc. These figures relate to higher education as a whole; at universities (countries with a binary system) the proportion is further decreased (to 47.7% in Germany) and increased (to 59.3% in Cyprus). The average proportion for the entire EU27 is 55.3%, or 55.2% at universities and 57.6% at non-university higher education institutions. The highest proportions of women are recorded in Iceland and Latvia (64.4%), Estonia (61.7%), Norway (60.8%), Slovakia and Sweden (60.3%), etc. In the Eurydice publication referred to, Slovenia stands proportionally at 58.1%.

These factors can further be observed either in the macroenvironment (e.g., in the national or even wider regional environment) or the microenvironment (e.g., at the level of an individual higher education institution or even an academic discipline). In the process, we can reach quite different conclusions, thus requiring a theoretical approach to the problem and qualitative research capable of connecting the complex dynamics of higher education with the perspectives offered by contemporary gender studies. From an overview of the literature, it ensues that this is a task only just starting to be tackled in an international framework.

Due to the understandable limitations of the present study, we will focus on the identification of only some of the factors listed above, primarily those that have a direct connection with the key changes in higher education. We will attempt to reflect not only upon what effect the rising level of education in the population is having on the problem outlined here, but also upon how specific mechanisms operating within higher education affect participation in social and political power and responsibility. An additional motivation for this approach was drawn from the trend indicating that the proportion of women is not only on the rise amongst the student or "graduated" population, but also amongst the staff of higher education institutions.

The questions we ask are, therefore: Do mechanisms exist within the dynamics of higher education that – both in the undergraduate and postgraduate period – contribute to gender inequality in inclusion in important social and political functions? Is there a connection between gender inequality in integration into "society at large" and gender inequality within higher education institutions themselves (e.g., in gaining leading positions in universities, faculties, departments, research groups, etc.)? What then are the gender-specific factors within the dynamics of higher education, and how so they contribute to (in)equality? Can the rise in the proportion of women with higher education serve as a lever of their better positioning in the division of social and political power?

It seems that statistical surveys as well as critical literature provide ample evidence confirming the hypotheses contained in these questions. We will attempt to relate them to some of the central topics of contemporary studies on higher education, particularly the problem of its modern "massification". The exponential *growth* in the proportion of the student population is directly linked to broader *access to education* for various social groups that were historically excluded from higher education, or whose access routes to higher education were ridden with significantly more difficulties. Does this "massification" solve the (past) problem of *the exclusion of women from higher education*, and does it provide an

opportunity to solve the (current) problem of *their unequal participation in key social and political functions*?

4.3 Transformations of higher education: from "elite" to "mass" to "universal"

Universities have a long history of more than eight centuries. Although some of their characteristics remain constant, in many ways they have undergone numerous profound transformations. In fact, it appears that over time the frequency and depth of these changes have escalated; this is particularly true for the changing "idea" and social functions of universities. The 20th century was a time when women started gaining access to universities, both as students and teachers. Whereas, by the beginning of the 21st century, female students had become the majority, female teachers had not (yet).

As the last radical shift in the "idea of the university", the relevant literature most commonly lists the period from the 1970s to the present day, and a key phrase used in relation to this era is the *transformation of higher education*. Many authors of important studies on higher education agree that there have been fundamental and essential shifts in the objectives and functions of higher education institutions, as well as a transformation of higher education in its entirety as a social sub-system. All of these tectonic shifts are clearly associated with the exponential growth in the size of the student population. In the early 1970s, Martin Trow (1973), one of the most cited authors in this context, formed a theory on the transition from "elite" to "mass" to "universal" higher education, placing this in relation to the ongoing discussion on the transformations of higher education, which is also relevant to the present enquiry.

Trow points to the fact that "[t]he three phases – elite, mass, and universal education – are, in Max Weber's sense, *ideal types*" (ibid. 18; emphasis by the author), and that, rather than being derived from only one of the developed industrial societies (USA), they are abstracted from numerous components of the empirical reality shared by all of these societies. These three concepts must therefore be regarded as theoretical models that enable us to understand higher education systems and their dynamics. Despite his understanding these phases sequentially, it is obvious that Trow did not treat them as inevitable developmental steps with each new phase completely replacing the previous one; on the contrary, "he saw definite

possibilities of examples of elite forms surviving into the mass and universal stages" (Brennan, 2004, 22), as one of the commentators of Trow's work believes.[24]

"Massification" is set in the forefront of the analysis by Trow (1973, 1): "In every advanced society the problems of higher education are problems associated with growth" and this "growth has its impact on every form of activity and manifestation of higher education". It is in this perspective that the changes in accessing and exiting education are detected first and with the least difficulty: the elite phase is marked by Trow as a system encompassing 0–15% of the cohort, with the mass phase increasing this proportion to 16–50%, and the universal phase exceeding 50%. However, this is only the "superficial" dimension of the transformational processes, with other more complex dimensions revealing themselves under the surface, e.g., changes in the functions of higher education, changes in the curriculum and forms of study, shifts in the conception of the form of students' "careers" and in the influence of experience acquired at university, new and changed characteristics of the way higher education institutions operate, shifts in the position of power-holders and decision-makers in institutions, and changes in the understanding and implementation of academic standards.

The Second World War was, for Trow, "the watershed event for higher education in modern democratic societies" (2006, 245), triggering increased demand for a labour force with more than high school education. Prior to and immediately after the war, the proportion of those studying in these societies was 3–5% of the generation, around 1970 it reached 10–20%, while towards the end of the century it exceeded 30%. With the growing size of the student population, the significance of university enrolment and the actual goals of higher education were subject to increasing change: "first from being a *privilege* to being a *right*, and then, […] to being something close to an *obligation* for students in some class and ethnic groups" (ibid., 246-247; emphasis by the author). The changing social context therefore re-established the basic functions of higher education: in its elite phase, the key function was to prepare the new generations of the ruling class to take over the leading roles in society, in its mass phase the focus became the transmission of skills for a broad range of technical and professional roles to a large proportion of the young, while the universal phase aims to equip the majority of the population with the means to cope with rapid social and technological change.

[24] Trow (2006) devoted particular attention to Brennan's reflections in the contemporary adaptation of his original text.

Like the majority of his commentators, Trow often linked the process of the transformation of higher education with effects that can be identified in class and ethnic contexts, while the context of gender remained virtually unexplored until the advent of contemporary feminist studies, which, as mentioned above, are still relatively rare in this particular field of research. This does not, however, give us a reason to doubt that the passage from elite to mass and universal education should also have direct and/or indirect effects on changes in the gender structure of the population entering and leaving universities, as well as on their participation in social and political power and responsibility. These aspects have only attracted more attention in recent times, but certain general principles, which can be applied in a more detailed treatment, have already been presented in the opening discussion. Trow (ibid., 245) himself says, among other things:

> a high growth rate placed great strains on the existing structures of governance, of administration, and above all of socialization [at higher education institutions]. When a very large proportion of all the members of an institution are new recruits, they threaten to overwhelm the processes, whereby recruits to a more slowly growing system are inducted into its value system and learn its norms and forms. When a faculty or department grows from, say, five to 20 members within three or 4 years, and when the new staff are predominantly young men and women fresh from postgraduate study, then they largely define the norms of academic life in that faculty and its standards.

In light of this, the phenomenon of the so-called “feminisation” of higher (not only primary and intermediate) education should receive proper treatment. The “growth and expansion” of the system is not only a matter of education statistics, but also of qualitative analyses that are often less “simply transparent” than statistical charts. “Massification” has a strong impact on (micro)academic cultures, institution-specific relations and patterns of behaviour, paradigmatic changes and similar. In the background of the attention directed towards the monitoring and analysis of the growth of student populations there is (and was) often a concealed progressivist expectation that this strengthens the process of the implementation of (a higher level of) equality, both in education and in society in general. Although this cannot entirely be denied, we know from numerous ongoing discussions that the statistically higher participation of various social groups in education does not in itself reduce social inequality; on the contrary, higher education systems in the universal phase are characterised by the reproduction of inequality, which, however, occurs in (completely) new horizons, therefore differing in its manifestations from the “former” inequality. In other words, “the elite forms

survive" (Brennan, 2004) both at the mass and the universal phases of the transformation of higher education.

Although some forms of inequality may no longer be recognised in their classical form, they are still present in the amalgamated "new forms". These forms are particularly identifiable when the student population is observed in the universal phase against its socioeconomic, ethnic and, undoubtedly, its gender backgrounds. In this regard, Brennan, for example, when analysing institutional differentiation in higher education with respect to "the myth of meritocracy", lists some characteristics of the student population in present-day England that can to a large extent be identified in other countries as well:

> Students from working-class origins are much more likely to have part-time jobs and other external commitments alongside their studies. They are more likely to study vocational subjects, more likely to live at home, and consequently have less time for the social aspects of university life. And at those institutions which recruit high proportions of such students, there is likely to be relatively little 'social life' at the university. Thus, the broader social and networking aspects of the higher education student experience – which appear to be particularly valued in the UK labour market – may tend to be absent at many of the institutions at the 'mass' end of the system (Brennan, 2013, 191).

Brennan intentionally speaks of the *myth* of meritocracy. As a rule, the dominant academic discourse of today refuses to abandon the principle of merit as the only rational foundation on which to base an academic community, but contemporary research of the academic sphere has pointed out the dependence of this foundation on multiple conditions. Amongst contemporary reference works, we cannot avoid mentioning the celebrated work on "academic tribes and territories" (originally published in 1989; the 2nd edition from 2001 is cited here), in which the authors write:

> Like any other tribal social formation, academic tribes have internal divisions of power, status and labour organised on a basis which is not only meritocratic. Social structural factors play an important part in conditioning the shape of these internal divisions and central among which is gender (Betcher in Trowler, 2001, 54).

Even though this aspect was not treated in detail in their study, the subsequent discussion showed that, particularly when gender is the key issue, it holds all the more that "elite forms survive", but *in a new way*. That which only a quarter of a century ago was regarded as the

key strategy in overcoming inequality in this field – that the low participation of women in higher education should be remedied by more open access and expanded enrolment – today seems like a contradiction, if not a complete anachronism, in a situation where the male student population has become the minority. The question nonetheless remains: Has the initial problem been "definitively" solved now that, statistically, the proportions are actually reversed after having first become equal? Research (e.g., Salvi del Pero and Bytchkova, 2013; Eurydice, 2011) shows that there are important and frequently gender-conditioned differences or inequalities even in the student populations of those countries with higher education in the universal phase. These differences become particularly evident when the students enrolled at individual institutions are studied from the perspective of institutional differentiation (which has intensified through "massification").

In recent decades, "massification" has contributed to a rapid increase in the number of teaching and research staff. This is precisely where recent studies have clearly and consistently shown how the "elite forms" can survive in new contexts. While women have come to represent the majority of the student population, higher education by and large remains a field of "male domination", especially in top positions that are the domain of key responsibilities and decisions. Studies of inequality in higher education from the perspective of gender show that inequality increases exponentially on the path from university enrolment via the study process to its end results: "Women fare relatively well in the area of access, less so in terms of the college experience, and are particularly disadvantaged with respect to the outcomes of schooling" (Jacobs, 1996, 154). The process of "massification" in higher education thus leads to gender inequality becoming "less a matter of inequality in access, and more a matter of gender differentiation in educational experiences and outcomes" (ibid., 177). It is clear that the opportunities for inclusion in tertiary education have increased dramatically and that, from this perspective, we can no longer speak of discrimination and segregation. In the process of massification, however, the mechanisms of discrimination and segregation have moved to deeper levels of the education system. The educational "experience" at a particular type of institution (or discipline, or level of study, etc.) is not comparable with the "experience" at some other type of institution, and this determines career differences, i.e., the opportunities that a male or female graduate either has or does not have. This is in fact one of the important levers that strengthens "male domination" in academic institutions.

On the other hand, we know that the increase in staff began to be associated with "feminisation" ("this is confirmed by statistical indicators"), while the "massification" of

higher education in general is linked with “falling standards” (“elitism is being lost in the universal system”). Such direct and simple associations are, however, difficult to support with arguments, in view of the fact that the inner logic of academic environments is far more complex. There are always possibilities for these milieus to react to the direct influences of the environment according to their own logic and to specific power; this is not, however, typical only of higher education in its current, universal phase. As far back as the early 1980s, when Pierre Bourdieu analysed the French *homo academicus* from the end of the 1960s (i.e., during the break with the elite and the transition to mass higher education), in his “concern to expand the professorial body” – one of the key concerns representing the foundations of an academic career and above all the structuring of academic power – he pointed out that

> [f]or the less prestigious disciplines [e.g. in geography] […] the logic of the defence of the professorial body transpires not in the university diplomas of the newly appointed teachers […], but in feminization, or in a widening of the age range from which the teachers are chosen.

This is also supported by data:

> Thus posts of rank B, which had only 15.2 per cent women in 1963, had 23.6 per cent in 1967; moreover, whereas the majority of teachers appointed before 1950 entered higher education before the age of 28, the mode of distribution according to the same criterion for teachers appointed after 1960 is between 30 and 35 (Bourdieu, 1988, 137-138).

In modern discussions, we could undoubtedly find more points of similar emphasis, albeit of varying weight. The last decade has witnessed particularly interesting discussions related to *individual academic advancement* and the closely associated “research excellence”. Here, then, we can address the issue of *participation in academic power and responsibility*, which finds expression in the vast production of contributions in research journals, as well as in public and political debates (e.g., European Platform of Women Scientists; see http://www.epws.org/). In one of the more prominent monographs from the field, Teresa Rees, having analysed various reports about the state of gender (in)equality at European Universities, summarises the current situation as follows:

> It is clear from these and other figures and reports that the ‘equal access’ to an academic education and career that women have enjoyed for the past 50 years in Europe has not thus far led to ‘equal outcome’ in terms of positions, pay, research funding, or indeed

> scientific prizes. On the contrary, gender appears still to be a significant organizing principle in academic life, despite the rhetoric of objectivity and excellence that imbues scientific and university culture. If academic life is a competitive labour market where the currency is excellence, then how is it that women do so disproportionately badly in it? (Rees, 2007, 8)

The problem of under-participation in the education process arose at the moment of transition from the elite to the mass phase, which means that it had not been "definitively" solved in the universal phase; on the contrary, new dimensions opened up reaching beyond insufficient integration. What is more, the trends with regard to participation in social and political power are, from the gender perspective, very similar to the trends that can be observed with regard to participation in academic power, but the mechanisms of the latter reproducing gender, ethnic or social inequities contain several specific elements. They not only concern formal procedures and structures, but are also present in daily academic processes:

> Gender equality is not just about structures and procedures but also about the content of academic teaching and research, and the deconstruction of non-gendered mainstreams. Sadly, it is still possible to be a respected male social science academic and not read, support or cite scholarship by women, especially feminist scholarship (Hearn, 2001, 84).

The transition of the higher education system from elite to mass to universal does not, therefore, in itself solve the issue of the underrepresentation of individual social groups in education. Even though the elite phase is now a distant past, the "elite forms" characterising it have survived in the universal phase in the processes of institutional diversification, by means of research intensification and its limitation to the "peaks of excellence", by rearranging "academic tribes and their territories", etc. Gender is no longer the central dimension of discussions about insufficient integration into education. This aspect is only encountered in the context of "marginal" topics, such as the question of the proportion of women in the so-called STEM disciplines (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) or in environments marked by specific religion-dominated cultures, etc.

4.4 Raising the levels of education and of participation in social and political power and responsibility: Findings and critical observations from the gender perspective

It has been pointed out that previous discussions of these issues have often rested on the following assumption: the higher the education of a social group, the more power and responsibility this group attains (or should attain) in public life (and vice versa). *The power and responsibility of a group* are therefore largely treated as *a function of the level of its education*. According to the above assumption, and given that highly educated women were a minority in the past, this should be the (key) reason for their lower participation in power and responsibility. If the assumption is correct, this participation should have increased considerably in recent times.

It is more than obvious, however, that higher education is not the key factor in this field. To the *relative* extent that higher education does prove to be a factor, it is imbued with a meritocratic view of the question of participation in public affairs: in fact, in modern societies it is precisely higher education that *legitimises participation* in political power and responsibility. The fact that women today are better educated than in the past, but that their *participation* in positions of power and responsibility is still *low*, confirms that the stated assumption no longer holds true. It is also questionable whether the level of education is in fact the key mechanism enabling an individual to enter politics or take crucial positions of responsibility in society and/or the state. This does not, however, mean that we are denying connections between education and participation in public affairs.

It is time to verify these questions empirically, within a larger time span where possible. Trow limited his analysis of the transformation of higher education through the *massification and universalisation of access to education* to Western democracies of the second half of the previous century, but in socialist countries – particularly in Yugoslavia – a similar process took place after the Second World War (with a few particularities that are set aside in this limited framework). By way of illustration, we shall briefly examine the trends in Slovenia after 1970 (Zgaga, 1998; Zgaga, 2004). This may be all the more interesting for the international reader because there are very few similar analyses for small countries that have experienced the “transition”.

During this period, Slovenia was characterised by relatively *rapid growth* in the proportion of students included in higher (long- and short-cycle) education (tertiary education). This was not, however, reflected in the number of students completing their studies. On the one hand, the latter was due to the high number of dropouts, which has been a constant factor in

Slovenia and has received relatively little attention from researchers. In the context of gender studies, it would be interesting to investigate, for example, the ratio between male and female dropouts. On the other hand, this was a time of complex social activity that hindered the productivity of higher education. The movements of the time showed signs of an accelerated growth in the proportion of women in higher education, despite this being the period when the transition from the elite phase to mass education had only just commenced in Slovenia.

Unlike the 1970s, the 1980s brought *stagnation* in the growth of the student population and even a decline in the number of male and female graduates, which was a result both of the looming social crisis and a reform of "specialised" education. Only in the early 1990s was the trend reversed, with a return to constant and increasingly exponential growth (Zgaga, 2004), giving mass higher education a solid foundation and enabling the transition to its universal phase, which was achieved at the beginning of the new millennium. At a somewhat lower level, this trend was followed by the growing productivity of higher education: in 1990, a mere 10% of the population aged 15 years and older had completed higher (short- or long-cycle) education, which in the context of Europe of that time was a relatively modest achievement. By the turn of the century, however, this proportion had increased to 13%, and in the last census (2011) it had risen to over 17%.

In this period, we can observe another important change, which has already been highlighted above: while in 1991 the group with tertiary education is still dominated by men, this is no longer the case in 2002 (see Table 7), and since this time women have only increased their majority standing in the group. As can be seen, the proportion of educated individuals in the entire population is increasing for both genders, but the proportion of female graduates is growing faster. Statistical data on enrolment in tertiary education today and potential enrolment in the next few years indicate that the overall number of students will stabilise or even decrease, while the proportion of women is likely to continue growing. This prospect is in line with most other European countries.

Table 7: Proportions of the population aged 15 years or more with at least tertiary education, overall and according to gender. The Republic of Slovenia, census of 1971, 1981, 1991, 2002, 2011

CENSUS	Total	Men	Women	M : W
1971	3.3%	4.7%	2.2%	2.136
1981	5.9%	7.4%	4.7%	1.574
1991	8.9%	9.6%	8.2%	1.170
2002	13.0%	12.6%	13.3%	0.947
2011	17.4%	15.4%	19.6%	0.786

Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia

The rapid growth in the proportion of young people enrolled in tertiary education also requires growth in teaching staff. Men dominate in this group worldwide (Jacobs, 1996, 171; see chart on pp. 158–159), but a gradual upwards trend in the proportion of women is evident. The aforementioned monograph (Danowitz Sagaria, 2007) investigates this trend in great detail from the perspective of gender, with the findings confirming a perception that is widespread in academic circles: *the higher the academic level, the lower the representation of women*.

The authors of this study observed and analysed shifts in the proportions of women in five countries (Austria, Finland, Germany, Great Britain and the USA; the 2002–2003 academic year) in the entire career trajectory: from the first degree to a PhD and Full Professorship. From the data and findings brought together in the concluding section, it is evident that, in the spectrum from the beginning to the peak of academic careers, the participation of women falls steadily. In the countries studied, the best result is achieved by Finland, with the ratio of female Full Professors at an enviable 39%, followed by the USA with 16%, Great Britain with 13%, and Austria and Germany with 8% (Danowitz Sagaria, 2007, 216). And where does Slovenia stand?

The Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SORS) recently reported: "Among higher education teachers, men still dominate, with a fifth of them being 60 years of age and older" (SORS, 2012). The Slovenian higher education system displays features known to a similar extent in other countries. The past two decades have witnessed a considerable increase (by a factor of almost 3.5) in academic staff, with the participation of women rising both in absolute and relative terms (see Table 8). If this trend persists, women should, in the second half of this decade, become the majority within academic staff.

Table 8: Higher education teachers and staff, according to gender, 1991/92 – 2011/12

	1991/92	**1995/96**	**1999/00**	**2005/06**	**2011/12**
Total	2,568	3,566	4,666	6,896	8,850
Women	609	987	1,643	2,584	3,633
Proportion of women	23.7%	27.7%	35.2%	37.5%	41.1%

Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia

However, this only clarifies one, rather superficial aspect of the issue. When considering the growing numbers of staff in the academic world, one should remember Bourdieu's conclusions: *feminisation or the extension of the age span* of the staff under observation is an indication of "less prestigious disciplines", i.e., *the lower ranks of academic power and responsibility*. This is evident firstly in the gender structure of staff belonging to individual scientific disciplines or professional fields, secondly in slowed or obstructed individual academic advancement, and thirdly in the occupation of decision-making positions in higher education institutions. A brief glance at the statistical data confirms all of this for Slovenia. Let us first examine the distribution of habilitation titles according to gender in the period between 2002 and 2011 (Table 9).

Table 9: Higher education teachers and staff, research fellows and advisors participating in the pedagogical process, by title and gender; 2002–2011

Habilitation title	**2002**	**2006**	**2011**

Full Prof. total	719	1,177	1,593
- women	87	207	358
- proportion of women	**12.1%**	**17.6%**	**22.5%**
Associate Prof. total	645	1,018	1,187
- women	141	275	377
- proportion of women	**21.9%**	**27.0%**	**31.8%**
Research Fellows total	797	1,248	1,715
- women	239	444	699
- proportion of women	**30.0%**	**35.6%**	**40.8%**
Research Assist. total	1,896	2,263	2,552
- women	802	976	1,101
- proportion of women	**42.3%**	**43.1%**	**43.1%**

Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia

Compared with similar data for some of the states of Western Europe and for the USA, the proportion of female Full Professors in Slovenia was (and probably still is)[25] slightly higher than in Austria and Germany, and slightly lower than in Great Britain and the USA, but it is far lower than in Finland. Although, in the period from 2002 to 2011, the proportion of female Full Professors increased steadily, it has not yet reached a quarter of the staff with this title.

[25] On condition that a comparable methodology was used: due to the differing systems of academic advancement, this is not easy to verify.

The proportion of women grows as we descend the "steps" in the hierarchy of university titles: in recent times, the proportion of women Research Fellows is close to a half, while only a decade ago it stood at less than a third. Thus in this area, too, we can observe a long-term trend similar to that which Trow designated as mass or universal access to higher education. As this trend remains very slow at the highest "step", we can expect that the majority participation in academic power and responsibility will, for a long time to come, belong to male Full Professors ("men [...], a fifth of them being 60 years of age").[26]

A somewhat different trend can be observed at the "preparatory" level, i.e., assistantship: the proportion of women has been relatively high over the years (slightly over 40%) and remains constant. Why should this be so? Does it mean that at all of the other academic "steps" female ratios will come to a halt once they exceed 40%? This and other similar questions suggest that these ratios need to be monitored systematically and constantly in the future.

A third possible perspective concerns participation in decision-making positions at individual institutions themselves. With regard to rector positions, it should suffice to note that, in the entire history of the Slovenian university, we have only witnessed two female rectors, both after 2000. Even at the faculty level, women are rarely present in key positions. We have collected data pertaining to the two largest Slovenian universities, which are taken to be representative in view of their domination of the Slovenian higher education space. Based on information found on the websites of these universities, only about a tenth of all of the leading faculty positions are occupied by women: at the end of the 2012/2013 academic year, there were three female deans (11.54%) at the head of the faculties and arts academies of the University of Ljubljana, and two female deans (8.5%) at those of the University of Maribor. At the next level, i.e., that of associate deans, the situation is slightly better, although women are still very much in the minority: the faculties of the University of Ljubljana boast 21 female associate deans overall (30.0%), whereas the faculties of the University of Maribor (with the exclusion of student associate deans, which are a special feature of this university)[27] have 19 female associate deans (35.9%).

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[26] A change might come about only as a consequence of a thorough transformation of the higher education system of governance, which, in the last two decades, has actually taken place in some parts of the world: the transfer of power and decision-making from "inefficient academic circles" to "academic managers". However, another of our investigations shows that there is a pronounced aversion to this option amongst the Slovenian academic public (Zgaga et al., 2013, 42). Furthermore, we have serious doubts that this type of change could benefit women in regard to the question of gender structure in decision-making circles.

[27] Although the gender structure is better here, more than half of the positions are still in the hands of men.

To sum up, with the transition to the mass and universal phase of higher education, the proportion of the population enrolled in tertiary education and of those who complete their studies successfully have both begun to increase in Slovenia. Within these ratios, the proportion of women has been growing more rapidly: in terms of structure, women caught up with and surpassed men at the turn of the century. However, the higher education institutions where these important changes are taking place remain "male dominated"; they themselves have been affected by waves of "feminisation", but the cliffs of prestigious disciplines, the highest academic ranks and decision-making positions are seldom conquered.

The institutions on the inside perpetuating "male domination" produce more and more woman graduates, professionals in various fields. We would therefore expect that, in the fields where higher education is of particular significance, their proportion would grow at a higher rate, as would their participation in political power and responsibility. We have attempted to verify this assumption by an analysis of the education structure of the members of the Slovenian Parliament (hereafter: MPs) for the period after 1990. The result was very different from what we had expected. [28]

Much has been said about the comparatively very low proportion of women in the Slovenian Parliament (e.g., Antić Gaber et al., 2003, Antić Gaber, 2011a), but the specific question addressed here has not yet been asked. First, we will determine the trend regarding the proportion of MPs with tertiary education in the perspective of the past two decades. In so doing, one must take into account the fact that their level of education is above average with regard to the whole population (which confirms the postulated importance of education for participation in political power). Our key finding, however, is that *the dynamics in the educational structure of Parliament does not in the least follow the general trend in the growing proportion of the population – particularly women – with tertiary education* (see Table 10).

The data collected indicate that, *in terms of tertiary education, the composition of the Slovenian Parliament after 1992 has stagnated or even regressed*. If we focus particularly on the doctoral and master's level of education, the Parliamentary Assembly (hereafter: PA) of the RS after the 1992 election would rate the highest. It is worth keeping this fact in mind, but it cannot be treated in greater detail at this point; we will instead focus on an analysis of the

[28] Due to a considerably different political system prior to 1990, and also in view of this research being focused on modern times, we shall not seek comparison with the past in this limited space.

dynamics of the proportion of male and female MPs with at least tertiary education in the past two decades. First, a few methodological and other clarifications are needed. The composition of Parliament changes during its mandate, and consequently the data of interest to us changes as well. In principle, the data we have used refer to the beginning of the mandate. The survey data for the earlier assemblies is largely available (the sources used are listed in the notes under Table 10), but for the parliamentary term beginning in 2011 data were not yet available at the time of writing. For the evaluation of the assembly 2011–2014, we have therefore used the data available on the websites of the PA and the parliamentary political parties.[29]

Table 10: Ratios regarding shifts in the number of male and female members of the Parliamentary Assembly RS (PA RS) with at least tertiary level education (TLE), 1992–2013.

	Year or mandate	**1992–1996**	**1996–2000**	**2000–2004**	**2004–2008**	**2008–2011**	**2011–2015 (2013)**
1	All female MPs	N: 12 12.3%	N: 7 7.8%	N: 12 13.3%	N: 11 12.2%	N: 12 13.3%	N: 31 34.4%
2	Female MPs with TLE	N: 11 14.5%	N: 7 9.7%	N: 11 15.3%	N: 9 12.5%	N: 10 14.5%	N: 27 37.0%
3	Coefficient in women (2 : 1)	**0.9166**	**1.0000**	**0.9166**	**0.8181**	**0.8333**	**0.8709**
4	All MPs	N: 78 86.7%	N: 83 92.2%	N: 78 86.7%	N: 79 87.8%	N: 78 86.7%	N: 59 65.6%
5	MPs with TLE	N: 65 85.5%	N: 65 90.3%	N: 61 84.7%	N: 63 87.5%	N: 59 85.5%	N: 46 63.0%

[29] Our survey was conducted in the second half of 2013, so we were not able to include and consider the changes that occurred in the parliamentary elections in July 2014.

6	Coefficient in men (5 : 4)	**0.8333**	**0.7831**	**0.7821**	**0.7975**	**0.7564**	**0.7797**
7	***Total / all with TLE***	***76***	***72***	***72***	***72***	***69***	***73***

Notes: The data on education was collected as follows: the number of those with doctorates + master's degrees + higher education (long cycle) + higher education (short cycle); since 1996, higher education has comprised professional and university programmes. For 2011, there are (for now) no available official data; we have collected the relevant data from the websites of the PA and the parliamentary political parties (status: August 2013)

Sources: Antić Gaber et al., 2003; Antić Gaber, 2011a; Bartelj, 2011; Gašparič, 2012; Zgaga, 2004; SORS; PA RS and parliamentary political websites; websites of the Delo, Dnevnik and Večer daily newspapers.

It is astonishing how difficult it was to acquire transparent information on the (tertiary) education of MPs from the relevant websites. In individual cases – particularly when, as verified, this level has not (yet) been achieved – the relevant information is often missing on the website. In some cases, we have therefore taken recourse to scrutinising reports in the public media; as a consequence of some notorious scandals, the education level of Slovenian MPs has become a popular topic recently. In fact, the experience of searching for data demonstrated a need for this data to be collected systematically and presented publicly.

The question we have raised is concerned first and foremost with relative ratios; these are accessible through the *coefficient* obtained by calculating the ratio between male and female MPs with tertiary education and the total number of MPs. This coefficient is notably higher amongst female MPs (in 1996, it was actually absolute, at 1.0, while it was the lowest in 2004, at 0.8181) than amongst male MPs (here it fluctuates between a maximum of 0.8333 in 1992 and a minimum 0.7564 in 2008). In the second half of the previous decade, a moderate decline in this coefficient is observed regarding female MPs, with a subsequent return to the

more or less long-time average. In the same period with regard to male MPs, this coefficient is – despite certain minor oscillations – in a state of moderate, but constant decline.

In the past two decades, the trend of expanded access to higher education and the increase in the proportion of the population with at least tertiary education has accelerated more amongst women than amongst men. However, this trend is not reflected in the dynamics of the gender ratio in the PA. It can only be established that, in principle and on average, *women have to be slightly better educated than their male colleagues in order to have a chance of getting into Parliament*. On the other hand, the importance of education remains an emphasised quality, albeit in a sort of "inverted" way: if, in an individual case, tertiary education has not been achieved, this may, for example, be withheld in the CV and concealed by other achievements. Scandals related to the dubious education levels or qualifications of individual MPs demonstrate that, in the world of politics, education is (or can) be assessed in a distinctly instrumental way.

4.5 Education and power, power and education

What conclusions can thus be reached and what new questions can be asked on the basis of the collected data?

Let us first reiterate the initial question: Does higher education contribute to the possibility of women entering politics and occupying the most responsible positions in society (including academic positions) in higher numbers? We certainly could not claim that this is not *one of* the factors; however, it would be difficult to claim that this factor is by itself of crucial importance. This is not only shown by the data on the changes in the education structure of the PA, but also by the comparative monitoring of the effects of the increased proportion of women with academic titles *inside* the higher education system: the proportion of women in teaching and research is on the increase, but universities remain "male dominated". Education alone cannot, therefore, be the key determining factor; the "secret" is obviously in the complex processes of the structuring of power within the political field (political party, Parliament) or within the central social fields (in "societies of knowledge", universities and institutes in particular should be counted amongst these fields).

Why is education important for participation in political and social power, and what specific significance does it acquire in the perspective of gender? We have seen that, on average,

women need a somewhat higher level of education than men to enter Parliament, but they nonetheless remain in the minority or at the lower levels of the hierarchy. This paradox seems even more surprising if we consider the fact that "some […] professions from which politicians are most commonly recruited have become strongly feminised" (Antić Gaber and Selišnik, 2012, 403). However, on reviewing the results of the higher education system, we again observe that women are more productive than men but still have more difficulty entering the academic world with their acquired academic qualifications and occupy lower academic ranks within it. There are obvious similarities between the two systems, but important differences also exist.

The question needs to be asked whether engagement in and entry into politics merely requires the educational "badge" – that is, a status that legitimises such entry instrumentally – or whether perhaps higher education is in fact needed to equip an individual for successful engagement with the problems and tasks that people in politics have to deal with. We have witnessed indications that the former may be quite realistic with regard to participation in *political* power, but this does not hold for participation in *academic* power: here, education is a *conditio sine qua non*, it is the substance of its meritocratic essence. On the basis of these and other indications from the above analyses, we can also conclude the following: *gender has an important effect both on the attractiveness of the educational "badge"* (in order to achieve this "attractiveness", more is expected from women than from men) *and on the recognition of academic merits* (to recall Hearn: it is possible that a respected male academician in the social sciences does not read, support or cite the discussions written by women). What is actually recognised as "education" in a given horizon is thus decided in another horizon where power is structured and allocated.

Women are not the only underrepresented group in politics; youth are a similar case. In contemporary developed countries, voting abstinence and "a lack of interest in politics" is not an uncommon research topic, but investigations carried out in the light of gender and education are less common. Among the rare studies of this sort, it is worth mentioning a report by the American institution CIRCLE (Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning & Engagement) on a study that investigated whether, and to what extent, gender is a salient factor in developing norms related to the behaviour of citizens and their political engagement, particularly with regard to education. One of the findings of this study was that "[e]ducation does little to change the story"; it is true, however, that it "gives a sizable boost to the activism of both men and women, but few gender differences are apparent regardless of

college attendance" (Jenkins, 2005, 6–7). The author establishes a lower cognitive engagement in young women (25% as opposed to 35% in young men), but this seems to be at the expense of young women often better understanding that engaged citizenship is a matter of duty rather than choice (51% as opposed to young men 43%).

Why then insist on the importance of education if education has so little impact on this "story"?

The finding that women (or the young generation) score lower on the scale of participation in political (or academic, etc.) power and responsibility does not only speak of the *powerlessness* of these social groups, but also of the way *the spheres of power are structured*. It speaks of the paradigms in which we perceive the state and active participation in politics: Do we perhaps perceive it as the "duty" of a citizen or a personal "duty", a "vocation", "a professional challenge" and similar, or, as the case may be, as an "experiment" with no rationally assigned coordinates, which appeals first and foremost to "the daring" and "adventure seekers" without (higher) education? Today, we may well be seeing signs of the latter prevailing. Would it be possible to conclude that male adventure seekers outnumber female ones?

In dealing with our question, the significance of the *dominant political culture* has to be taken into account: particular ways of political engagement, entering personal and social relations, communication, shaping and/or respecting hierarchies, etc., can play an important role in *the decision* of certain groups *not to engage* politically or enter politics. Gender and education can also be markers of such groups. If I have the possibility to develop a career in my profession, why should I risk an "excursion" into politics that can end badly for me? Such and similar questions point to "a different understanding of the sphere of politics, which is most likely the result of both a specific political and general socialisation in terms of gender" (Antić Gaber and Selišnik, 2012, 413). If politics is all too often reminiscent of a "men's game" (Jenkins, 2005, 3) this can, of course, have important effects on the perspective of gender (both male and female), but it also has causes that need to be identified and explained with great precision.

Part III
Women Entering Politics: Structural Opportunities and Barriers

5 Institutions and Mechanisms of the Reproduction of Gender Order in the Fields of the Family and Politics

Iztok Šori and Živa Humer

5.1 Unpaid work and the participation of women in politics

In this chapter, we will analyse some institutions and mechanisms that reproduce the asymmetric participation of women and men in the fields of the family and politics. We are interested in how, in both of these fields, inequality between men and women, or the patriarchal permanence of "gender order", has been maintained through decades of socioeconomic and political transformations as well as private life changes. We shall pursue the determined goal first and foremost with an analysis of the restructuring of unpaid work within the family in the last 50 years in Slovenia, scrutinising data on the division of unpaid labour between the sexes, policies that concern the family, and changes that have taken place in mothering and fathering practices. The analysis is based on the findings of research carried out in this field in Slovenia[30] from the 1960s onwards. In tracing these findings, we also follow the development of the sociological field itself.

As established by Pierre Bourdieu (2001) and Raewyn Connell (2005), at each point in history, it is possible to identify the operation of "male domination" or "male hegemony", which is a result of the continuous regeneration of patriarchal gender order regardless of empirically verified social transformations. In the fields of the family and politics, inequalities are particularly noticeable and deeply rooted, and seemingly little has changed in the past 50 years. In the private sphere, men "traditionally" do significantly less work than women, which brings them "patriarchal dividends" (Connell, 2005) in the labour market, in using their leisure time, or in the acquisition of the capital needed for active involvement in politics. Due to the operation of gender-specific habitus (Bourdieu, 2001), the social capital of women is to a larger extent bound to the daily reconciliation of paid and unpaid work, and is also used for this purpose (Lowdnes, 2004).

[30] In the times of Yugoslavia, several studies were carried out both independently in other republics and comparatively between individual republics; these have not, however, been included in the present analysis, as the focus of interest is the Slovenian habitus.

Bourdieu (2001) and, in particular, Connell (2005) explain the establishment of male domination and hegemony by means of the operation of the "structures" or "configurational practices" of masculinity and femininity. Similarly, they conclude that male domination and hegemony define hierarchies not only between men and women but also within each group. The manifold operation is broken down with particular clarity by Connell (2005, 76-81), who introduces the concept of hegemonic masculinity. The author distinguishes four types of masculinity: hegemonic, complicit, marginalised and subordinated. The norms defining what men should be like are in line with hegemonic masculinity, which not only socially marginalises women, but also other men, even if very few of them live by its standards. "Hegemonic masculinity can be defined as the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women" (Connell, 2005, 77). The concept of masculinity and femininity is largely in accordance with one of the most widespread conceptualisations in the field of gender research, including our own research: gender roles. Firstly because it interprets gender relations as social constructs, but also because it understands the relations between gender roles relationally; if one is excluded, the other loses its sense (Bourdieu, 2001; Connell, 2005, 43). The distinction appears when Connell breaks down the structure of the "male sexual role" and points out its multilayered hierarchisation.

The concept of gender roles has received the biggest response in critical feminist theory, and more broadly in the field of gender research.[31] Many feminist authors establish that a failure to distribute household and care work equally between men and women is one of the basic consequences of gender inequality in society, and point out the operation of "traditional" gender roles (Oakley, 1980; Bubeck, 1995; Bowden, 1997; Oakley, 2000). The research field has been particularly marked by the concept of "stalled revolution", first presented by Arlie Hochschild more than twenty years ago, which seems crucial over and again in explaining the social division of labour between the sexes. Even after the feminist intervention, the "second shift" together with the "third shift" remain primarily "women's shifts" (Hochschild, 1997).

[31] Second-wave feminism gave a particularly strong impetus to the exploration of inequality, which is the focus of interest in the present paper. It is only feminist research into housekeeping and, more broadly, into domestic work, that highlights the fact that domestic work has the status of non-work, as opposed to paid, productive, professional work. The "Domestic Labour Debate" (DLD) in feminist theory of the 1970s and 1980s treats domestic work, including care work, as unpaid work that takes place in the isolation of the home and is systematically excluded from the perception of paid work.

This not only structures the positions of men and women in the family, but also in other fields. Back in the 1970s, studies carried out in the USA showed that traditional patterns of household and care work represent an obstacle to the active engagement of women in politics (Gluck Mezey, 1978; Lee, 1976); later, similar conclusions were reached by other studies (e.g., Budig and England, 2001; Ferree, 1991; Gornick, Meyer and Ross, 1998; McKay, 2007; Davidson-Schmich, 2007).[32] Studies have also determined that politics is a masculine profession not only due to its gender composition but also because of the family-related trade-offs required from those involved in politics (Mennino Falter and Brayfield, 2002, 250; Davidson-Schmich, 2007; McKay, 2007, 382-387). It is therefore not surprising that politics is incompatible with the dominant social construction of femininity, in particular with the role of the mother. In fact, women engaged in politics report that they are criticised if they cannot participate fully in all political events due to family responsibilities, while at the same time being admonished for neglecting their children if they constantly appear in public (MacKay, 2001, 19; McKay, 2007, 383).

According to Bourdieu, the family "undoubtedly played the most important part in the reproduction of masculine domination and the masculine vision; it is here that early experience of the sexual division of labour and the legitimate representation of that division, guaranteed by law and inscribed in language, imposes itself" (Bourdieu, 2001, 85). Within the family, a process occurs in which socially constructed differences between the sexes are naturalised (or dehistoricised), representing one of the most important mechanisms of legitimising the better position of men in certain fields. Gender roles and gender inequalities seem natural, a product of the body itself, and consequently more resistant to change. Seen in this light, "the ideology and practice of 'separate spheres'" (Connell, 2005, 195) seem natural, according to which, in patriarchal societies, the male body is the bearer of the desire for political power, while that of the woman is the bearer of the desire to care for others, particularly for family members. However, the family is not the only agent of the reproduction of gender order; Bourdieu (2001, 81-88), for example, also lists the Church, the education system and the state.

[32] These studies raise questions about the possibilities of the political participation of men and women being affected by certain private practices, the structuring of everyday life, the influence of family life, family labour division, care for dependent children, time and financial sources of individuals of both sexes, and their inclusion in leisure and voluntary activities (Selišnik, Antić-Gaber, Kogovšek, 2012, 341).

In the present chapter, in addition to the family, we analyse the state as an institutional agent of preserving male domination, especially particular family-oriented policies. As research shows, normative expectations associated with the responsibilities of women and men towards household and care work operate in such a way that the majority of instruments provided by the state (such as parental leave or childcare leave) come to be used by women (Scott, Crompton and Lyonette, 2005; Ule and Kuhar, 2003). In general, accommodating work and family responsibilities is a problem faced daily above all by women (Meyer, 2000; Rener et al., 2005; Kanjuo Mrčela and Černigoj Sadar, 2007). Although men enjoy greater freedom in deciding how much care work they will do, they also have less manoeuvring space if they want to undertake care work, as some mothers consider family policy instruments such as parental leave as their privilege (Sundstroem and Duvander, 2002, in Ellingsæter, 2010, 260). These findings confirm the persistent reproduction of male domination, even through the mechanisms put in place in the name of equal opportunities. They also clearly show the reinforcement of anthropocentric gender order by means of social constructions of male and female roles and their close attachment to the practices of mothering and fathering. Connell, who understands equality policies as policies of social justice, writes that their goal must be to change body-reflexive practices, not by losing agency but by extending it, working through the agency of the body; for example: caring for a baby means developing new abilities of the male body that are different from those developed in war, sport or factory work, and it also means experiencing a different pleasure (Connell, 2005, 233).

In the present study, we shall seek to deconstruct the male-dominant mechanisms of the policies in operation by posing the question as to whether, by these mechanisms, equality is assumed (e.g., parental leave is only intended for mothers), made possible (parental leave for every family) or encouraged (leave granted to the mother or father individually) (Brighouse and Wright, 2008, in Ellingsæter, 2010). Beyond this, we are interested in the relationship between policies and normative practices associated with gender roles. With an analysis of the practices of mothering and fathering, we also seek to determine how the “structures” (Bourdieu, 2001) or “configurational practices” (Connell, 2005) of femininity and (hegemonic) masculinity have changed in the past decades.

5.2 Changes in the structures of the family and the division of unpaid work

The changes in the structures of the family and the household in the past decades have been extensive. In the last 40 years, the size of the average household has decreased by approximately one person (from 3.4 in 1971 to 2.48 in 2011). The reduction in the size of households is, among other factors, associated with a decline in the birth rate (from 2.16 in 1971 to 1.56 in 2011). Despite the decrease in live births, the number of women becoming mothers has increased over the last 150 years (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, SORS, 2012a), which shows that motherhood and parenthood in general are not losing significance in the (late) Modern period. According to the most recent data, four fifths of women aged 35 are mothers (SORS, 2014); the Statistical Office has not, however, published data regarding the proportion of fathers among men, which indicates the reproduction of socially attributed gender roles through official statistics. The statistics also reveal changes in family planning: the average age of women giving birth fell between 1954 and 1980 (from 28.4 to 23.5), and then started to rise again, reaching a mean age of 30.4 years in 2011. Until the end of the 1980s, men and women clearly pursued the goal of establishing a family as early as possible (for more on this, see Rener, in Ule and Rener, 1985, 71-74), whereas today we observe a tendency to delay this decision to a later age. In the 1970s, early family planning came with an early marriage, given that marital union was the dominant form of family life. In 1977, 89.4% of all children were born within a marital union (Rener in Ule and Rener, 1985, 74-75), but by 1991 the proportion had fallen to 72.6%, after which an even more rapid decline is observed, with the strongest downward trend at the turn of the millennium. In 2007, the proportion of children born to unmarried parents exceeded 50% for the first time, and it stood at 56.8% in 2011. These data are an important indicator of the detraditionalisation of some family practices, which does not, however, necessarily mean the detraditionalisation of relations and roles in partnerships. Data reveal a growing divorce rate in this period, despite the fact that Slovenia boasts one of the lowest divorce rates in the European Union. The latter can be explained in part by low marriage rates and, indirectly, by the placing of marital and extra-marital unions on an equal legal footing in 1976. An upward trend can also be observed in the number of single-parent families, consisting, in the majority of cases, of mother and child. In 1991, 15.8% of children lived with a single parent (Vojnovič, 1996, 31), while, according to the last national census from 2011, single-parent families represent a quarter of all families in Slovenia (SORS, 2011). A single-parent family is usually the result of divorce, with child custody being awarded to women in the majority of cases. This reveals how the state, by means of its legal system, implements stereotyped conceptions of femininity and masculinity instead of encouraging equal responsibilities. In the early 1970s, mothers were

awarded approximately 60% of children and fathers 4%, with even fewer children being awarded to both parents in joint custody (the remaining divorcees did not have children) (Rener in Ule and Rener, 1985, 91). According to data for 2012, the majority of children were still awarded to their mothers in sole custody (49%), while a higher proportion were awarded to their fathers (9.2%) and particularly to both parents in joint custody (30.1%) (SORS, 2012b).

The first Slovenian study of time use on the part of men and women, or "time budgets" as it was then called, dates back to 1965 (Boh, 1966).[33] That year, women represented 39.7% of all employed workers, while in the 1964/1965 academic year the proportion of women enrolled in universities was 34.47% (The Statistical Yearbook, 1965). According to the author, certain new phenomena influencing the organisation of time were just starting to become established, e.g., daily migrations, shift work, free weekends and annual leave. The study found that, in Slovenia, there was a pronounced asymmetric distribution of work at home, and that women had "double jobs", which made it necessary to see employment, and the economic independence associated with it, as only a first step on the way to gender equality. Among the causes of this condition, the author lists "an old-fashioned conviction deeply rooted in a cultural tradition that assigned to the woman the exclusive role of a housewife; this conviction belongs not only to men, but also to women themselves" (Boh, 1966, 160). Other impact factors were also identified, such as the low educational and vocational structure of the female population, which caused women to take on jobs that brought no personal satisfaction and failed to fulfil their career aspirations. Furthermore, the very low consumption of goods placed the entire burden of work at home on family members, particularly women. At the same time, Katja Boh identifies a trend towards a more equal division of domestic work.

Table 11: Daily use of time by employed men and women in 1965 and 2007.

Type of work	**1965***		**2007****	
	Women	**Men**	**Women**	**Men**
Paid work	6:54	7:54	4:23	5:20
Other work or domestic work	5:30	2:30	4:24	2:24
Leisure time	2:16	3:42	3:50	4:49

Source: *Boh, 1966, 35. **Aliaga, 2006, 8. The data are not directly comparable, as they are the results of different research and are acquired on the basis of different methodologies.

[33] The sample comprised 1,996 people in the area of Maribor and the surroundings, who kept a diary and completed questionnaires.

The data for 1965 (Table 11) show that, if we consider the sum of both paid and unpaid work hours, an employed woman worked more hours than an employed man. The difference was almost 2 hours per day, meaning that men had an average of 1½ hours more free time per day. While it is true that men spent 1 hour per day more on paid work, women spent almost 3 hours more undertaking unpaid work. According to the report, employed women used 4 hours and 12 minutes per day for domestic work, while men used significantly less time, i.e., 1 hour and 42 minutes. On average, women spent 30 minutes and men 12 minutes per day engaged in child-rearing activities. The study, which was carried out simultaneously in industrial cities in ten European states and the USA, showed that women in Slovenia bore the heaviest burden of unpaid work. The greatest differences were recorded for Sundays, when an employed woman from Maribor spent 6 hours and 12 minutes on domestic work while women in other countries worked significantly less (1½ hours less in the USSR, 2 in the USA and 4 in Germany). Although men in Maribor also spent more time on domestic work than men elsewhere, the differences between the hours spent on domestic work by men and women were, compared internationally, the greatest in Maribor.

Data on labour division from 1966 will be compared to data from the last available international study that includes Slovenia (Aliaga, 2006).[34]Although a direct comparison is not possible due to the different methodologies used and the different selection of countries, the key trends and ratios can nonetheless be indicated (Table 11). According to Statistical Office data, in the 40-year time span covered in our comparison, the proportion of employed women increased by approximately 8 percentage points (in 2010, 47.6% of all employed workers were women), while the proportion of women enrolled in tertiary education surpassed the proportion of men by almost 19 percentage points. In 2006, just as forty years earlier, working women in Slovenia were, by way of international comparison (in this case, the selection included 14 EU member states), in first place according to the amount of time invested in domestic work (4 hours and 32 minutes) and the same holds for men (2 hours and 24 minutes).[35] In 2006, however, men still had almost one hour more free time per day, with

[34] In recent years, very few studies have been carried out on the subject. The last data published by the OECD for Slovenia were, for instance, acquired in 2000 and 2001.

[35] The stated findings are very similar to those from 1976, when the first study representative of the whole of Slovenia was carried out (Ule, 1979). At that time, women were also proportionally more burdened particularly with housekeeping (with the exception of minor maintenance around the house). Men took part in child rearing, especially in pleasant activities such as taking walks and playing, while making routine as well as more

the difference between the number of hours dedicated to domestic work by men and women in Slovenia being amongst the highest in Europe (after Lithuania and Italy), again mirroring the situation in 1966 (Aliaga, 2006).[36] While, in the last four decades, the amount of time dedicated to domestic work has decreased by approximately an hour for women, it has hardly changed in the case of men. More detailed data on the time allocated to domestic work (Aliaga, 2006) show that, in international comparison, women in Slovenia spend a more than average amount of time on food preparation, washing the dishes, cleaning and maintenance, ironing and gardening, although they use less time than average on washing, shopping and services, as well as on childcare. As in other countries, it is evident that men in Slovenia spend the least time, or no time at all, on doing the washing and ironing, and washing the dishes.[37]

It is clear from the quantitative data that, despite the many changes in family structure, the division of labour at home has not undergone significant changes in the past 50 years. Furthermore, some types of work remain "female" and others "male". This is also the case in the field of politics, where in the last 50 years the proportion of women in various political bodies has seldom exceeded one fifth. During most of this period, the field of politics has been marked by a characteristic strengthening of male domination, especially in view of the fact that, since the 1970s, the difference between the participation of men and women has increased, reaching its peak after the first democratic elections in 1990 (Antić G., 1996; Antić G., 1998; Vrečko Ashtalkoski and Antić G., 2011; Bahovec, 2005). At the same time, in all of the stated periods, the proportion of women typically declines as we progress towards the top of the decision-ladder. Only in 2011, when 35% gender quotas were introduced, did the proportion of women in Parliament reach one third. In the continuation, we shall examine how, since the post-war period, the field of sociological research has approached the

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important decisions was equally distributed between the parents. The intergenerational comparison detected shifts towards greater equality among younger generations, but these were small.

[36] OECD data (2011) show a similar picture regarding the proportion of time that men and women use for paid and unpaid work. Slovenia is among the states with the highest proportion of time consumed for unpaid work both by women (19.7%) and men (11.4%). In Italy, women spend even more time on unpaid work (21.2%), with the differences between the sexes also being greater, considering that men only dedicate 6% of their time per day to this kind of work. This means that men in Italy are far more excluded from domestic work than their Slovenian counterparts. In spite of this, women in Slovenia still bear a heavier workload, given that they dedicate a total of 33.5% of their time to paid and unpaid work, compared to 31.1% in Italy.

[37] It is characteristic of Slovenia that, compared to their European counterparts, both men and women occupy first place when it comes to the time spent on gardening. Both sexes dedicate approximately an hour per day to such work, which is considerably more than in any other country (Aliaga, 2006). Although gardening can be understood as a hobby, it is also linked to a widespread "anti-urban way of life" (Uršič in Hočevar, 2007) or limited urbanisation, which is reflected, amongst other things, in the figures on the highest proportion of individual housing in Europe and in the preference expressed by a large number of inhabitants to live in an independent house.

deconstruction of male domination in the fields of politics and, in particular, the family, and what the key findings of the studies carried out are.

5.3 Research on the family, unpaid work and the participation of women in politics

Immediately after the Second World War, researching the family and the position of women in Slovenia was under the influence of the "dogmatic (Stalinist) version of Marxism", after which a reorientation towards functionalist theory took place. The latter dominated sociological research until the late 1960s, focusing mainly on the impact of industrialisation and urbanisation (Jogan and Rener, 1981, 4). In the 1970s and 1980s, the functionalist approach to researching the family was subjected to strong criticism, largely due to interpretations of the family and family relations as eternal, and to the uncritical application of functionalist theory in Yugoslav research practice (ibid.; Ule, 1979).[38] This retreat enabled the formation of new concepts and new research questions, and the application of new theory (the thesis on the modernity of the nuclear family, the isolation of the contemporary nuclear family, the interactionist approach, etc.) (Rener, 1988). In the 1980s, the number of family-related studies increased somewhat, and we also note a methodological shift from exclusively quantitative research methods to combined qualitative and quantitative approaches, as well as calls for the research of everyday family life (e.g., Ule and Rener, 1984, 1985). In addition, we identify attempts to achieve a more holistic approach to the research problem, and more critical reflection on the socioeconomic system. Daša Bole-Kosmač (1984, 16–27), for example, criticises the "neofeminist concept", i.e., seeking the crucial cause of the discrimination of women in male domination. As she argues, the cause lies in the actual social system, in which the discrimination of women is only one of numerous, mutually complementary forms of submission and exploitation, which also affect the male population. Furthermore, Mirjana Ule points out in the mid 1980s that "the family is not only a social group apart from other groups and an institution apart from other institutions, but is more deeply and more completely associated with the rest of society, despite the fact that it is

[38] The behaviourist symbolic interactional approach was also discarded, as it understood the family too much as "an autarchic unit" (Jogan and Rener, 1981).

separated from the processes of economic production, the allocation of political power and processes of exchange" (Ule in Ule and Rener, 1985, 106).[39]

With the change of the political system in the early 1990s, class theory and the critique of the "bourgeois" dimension of society, which attributed the reproduction of the patriarchal order to capitalism, vanish from research. Despite the fact that the majority of researchers had previously referred to Engel's work *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884), class theory was not the dominant theoretical framework. Much more pronounced was the frame of gender equality or "silent feminism". The ideological turn also embraces tendencies to redefine the family and its internal roles within the political space. It is even proposed that the family should be defined in the constitution as a "natural community". In a thematic issue of the *Journal for the Critique of Science* (Klemenc, Rener and Skupina Ženske za politiko, 1991), feminist authors bring to our attention the fact that the ideological embedding of the family in nationalist discourse and its idealisation in the form of a unified and conflict-free subject is detrimental to equality between men and women, as it enhances traditional gender roles. An important shift in terms of theoretical research takes place in 1995, when the collection of papers *Families: Different – Equal* was published (Rener, Potočnik and Kozmik, 1995), in which the authors re-examine the definition of the family and once again point to its ideologisation. In so doing, Slovenian sociology begins to move away from a predominantly heteronormative understanding of the family. In the 1990s, qualitative research methods become established, giving rise to a new research impetus. Rener (1995), for example, concludes that sociology knows very little about the life experiences of men in the social spaces of women and vice versa, and, based on biographical interviews, she carries out a pilot study on the relations between the private and public spheres. Class theory, in its ideological function, is soon replaced by European(isation) discourse and, after 2000, particularly by discourse built on the argument of the EU. This discourse rests on gender equality policies, primarily on those actions helping to balance work and family life, which are designed to encourage women to enter the labour market. At the end of the 1990s, and after 2000, the research focus is on parenting practices and the reconciliation of work and family life, on the topicalisation of motherhood and the so-called new fatherhood, and on the gendered division of domestic and care work as well as casual paid domestic help (Kanjuo Mrčela and Černigoj-Sadar, 2004, 2007; Hrženjak, 2007; Humer, 2009; Rener et al., 2008;

[39] As Ule adds, despite his general dependence on capital, "even" the male proletarian succeeded in preserving islands of relative autonomy through exercising his authority in the family as father and husband, which was not the case for the female proletarian (Ule in Ule and Rener, 1985, 106).

Rener et al., 2005; Šadl, 2009; Švab and Humer, 2010; Žakelj and Švab, 2009). The research, supported by predominantly feminist arguments, raises questions regarding the reproduction of inequality both between men and women and among women themselves.

Slovenian studies detected the double workload, or double employment, of women as early as in the 1960s, and have confirmed it ever since (e.g., Boh, 1966; Ule, 1979; Kanjuo Mrčela and Černigoj Sadar, 2004). In an empirical study from 1985, for instance, women, despite receiving lower salaries, expressed greater satisfaction with their pay than men, as they felt that they could not dedicate themselves fully to their job, with "one more work shift" awaiting to be completed at home (Rener in Ule and Rener, 1985, 137). Due to this kind of labour division, even women unburdened with unpaid work are deprived of opportunities in the labour market; in fact, employers assume that women have such obligations, or that they may have them in the future, and that they are not interested in pursuing a career (Černigoj Sadar, 2000). Research has consistently shown that the heaviest burden is placed on women with children, especially those with preschool children and with two or more children; as their level of education increases, however, women spend less time on domestic work and the division of labour with their partners is more equal; similar conclusions can be drawn for the younger generations (Boh, 1966; Boh and Černigoj-Sadar, 1986; Boh and Černigoj-Sadar, 1980).[40] Furthermore, studies have consistently demonstrated a positive correlation between the employment rate and motherhood. In the 1980s, just as today, women with children had a higher rate of employment than those without children (Boh, 1966, 22), and the same applies to men.

In 1963, a report compiled within the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia entitled *The Social Situation of Women in Slovenia* established that the socio-political activity of women was on the rise, but that it could not keep up with the dynamics of the participation of women in industrial production. Amongst the causes, the report lists a conservative and patriarchal attitude towards the inclusion of women in political life, highlighting the fact that women were socially active primarily in the fields of social welfare, schooling and childcare. This gave reason to believe that, even amongst publicly active women, reproduction of the traditional division of labour was in place. It also identifies the lagging behind of the social services designed to help families in need (in Rener, 1983b, 46-47). Notwithstanding the above findings, no empirical studies can be found until as late as the

[40] These conclusions are also confirmed by the current measurements of time consumption carried out by Eurostat and the OECD.

end of the 1970s that establish a direct link between gender roles, domestic work division and the lower representation of women in politics (Ule, 1979; Jogan and Rener, 1981). The first Slovenian representative study that treated both domestic work division and the social participation of women was carried out by Mirjana Ule (1979). Her analysis of data collected in the Slovenian Public Opinion (1968–1978) study showed, amongst other things, that men were better informed than women, but that women were nonetheless equally willing to take on a political function. Much like in the report from the early 1960s, Ule concluded that the main cause of the apolitical position of women was not their double workload but their social position and the roles they were expected to play in society, as well as their own personal ideas about the socio-political role and position of women, and the power of the traditional understanding of a specific male and female nature (Ule, 1979, 31-32).

Until the 1990s, we can observe a certain falling behind in investigating the political participation of women compared to studies of the family and labour division within the family. We can ascribe this partly to restrictions placed on the criticism of politics (and thus inevitably of the League of Communists), which were in place prior to the transition to a multi-party system. At least until the 1980s, the predominant conviction was that "the woman question" had been solved in socialism simply by the implementation of formal equality between men and women, while defending specific women's interests was regarded as feminism, i.e., a bourgeois ideology (Antić G., 1998, 162). With the acceleration of research of this question, studies were mainly focused on the system factors of the political underrepresentation of women, such as the electoral system, the policies and practices of political parties, and quotas (see Selišnik, Antić Gaber and Kogovšek, 2012, for an overview of the research).

It was only after 2000 that studies began to point out more emphatically that fewer women in politics is also due to the heavier burden of unpaid work in the private sphere (Antić G. and Ilonszki, 2003; Matland and Montgomery, 2003; Bahovec, 2005). The study *Balancing Private and Professional Life as an Obstacle to the Higher Participation of Women in Politics*, carried out between 2009 and 2012, confirms that Slovenian politics is a highly masculinised profession, and is consequently unfriendly towards balancing private and professional life (Kanjuo Mrčela, Šori and Podreka, 2012). Another finding of the study is that, when deciding to enter politics, women take the family into account to a greater extent than men, and that their entry is jeopardised by "the high risks in 'protecting what they have achieved' in their basic profession when they leave it for politics, the bad reputation of

politics, deeply rooted expectations associated with child and family care, and a lack of support on the part of the husband or partner" (Antić G. and Selišnik, 2012, 413).

5.4 Family-oriented policies

In the period under investigation, there was hardly a decade when the policies passed concerning the family and gender equality were not accompanied by the discourse of economic crisis (referred to, amongst others, by Ule and Rener, 1984, 1985; Bole-Kosmač, 1984; Boh and Černigoj Sadar, 1980; Vojnovič, 1996; Humer and Roksandić, 2013; EWL, 2012). It is therefore all the more important to point out that family policy is not just a professional but also a political question. Various professional fields can offer reflections on and analyses of potential measures and their effects, but the definitive answer to the question of what kind of family policy is appropriate or even feasible in a particular system is a political decision (ČKZ, 1991; Rener, 1990, 26), or, as Ule (1979, 35) argued at the end of the 1970s, the more equal redistribution of roles within the family will depend on social legitimacy. In the continuation, we are primarily interested in how family-oriented policies have affected gender equality. We undertake a detailed analysis of child allowance, institutional childcare, parental leave, paternity leave and certain other measures in the labour market. In so doing, we are aware that our analysis is merely exemplary and that there is a range of other instruments that could be included (e.g., the legalisation of abortion in 1974 and the simultaneous promotion of contraceptives).

5.4.1 Child allowance

Child allowance was introduced between 1947 and 1952 with the aim of improving the material position of families after the birth of a child. In 1972, a special allowance was introduced for single-parent families. In the 1980s, a proposal was put forward to provide unemployed women who bear a child with an additional material benefit. Given that this measure would enable women with no income to raise a family, it could be understood as a step towards greater gender equality. However, the motivation behind the initiative was of a different kind: to stimulate birth rates in a republic that was overwhelmed by the rhetoric of a

small endangered nation.[41] In the beginning of the 1990s, this argument gained strength and additional political legitimacy within the emerging family policy. At that time, Milica Antić Gaber (1991) concluded that when women bear fewer children the significance of motherhood becomes increasingly emphasised, while the argument of bearing children for the nation is used as an additional ideological stimulant to encourage the decision to have children.

Transformations in the political field are well reflected in the *Resolution on the Foundations of Formulating Family Policy in the Republic of Slovenia* (1993). Among other things, it states the objective of gradually introducing universal child allowance, which would thus cease to be an instrument of social security policies and instead become an instrument of family policy. Due to a lack of funds, the implementation of this idea was initially postponed until the end of the 1990s and later abandoned altogether. Since 2000, there have again been initiatives to introduce universal child allowance, primarily in order to ensure a unified system and to rationalise costs. Recent legislative reform has, however, run contrary to the goals of the Resolution: in the 2012 reform of social legislation, the number of child allowance beneficiaries decreased by 28,205 (Dremelj et al., 2013, 37).

Previous periods were also characterised by fluctuations in the number of children who were beneficiaries. While between 1972 and 1977 their number increased more than threefold, in the early 1980s the remaining allowance beneficiaries were mainly children of parents who received unskilled or semi-skilled workers' salaries (Boh and Černigoj Sadar, 1980, 83-84). At the end of the 1980s, child allowance was allocated to fewer than 20% of all children, while in 1995 the figure was 40%, which means that at least this many children lived in families receiving less than 50% of the average salary in Slovenia (Vojnovič, 1996, 128). The amount of child allowance also changed with time. In the years after its introduction, the allowance was relatively high compared to salaries, but it later decreased and became a less important component of family income. In addition, different systems were employed to determine the amount: a system of regression until 1967 (the higher the number of children in the family the lower the amount per child), a linear system between 1968 and 1970, and a progressive system from 1971.

[41] The birth rate decreased from 2.1 to 1.5 children in a period of ten years (Šircelj, 2006, 118). According to a Slovenian study, the measure would, in the Yugoslav context of the time, have a positive effect on the birth rate mainly in areas where it was already above average, but would have no such effect in Slovenia due to the high employment rate amongst women (Rener in Ule and Rener, 1985, 61).

From the post-war period, child allowance was conceived predominantly as an instrument for levelling social inequities between families. In the 1970s, the objective was expanded to include improving the situation of single-parent families[42] in comparison with two-parent families, and, in the 1980s, to raising the birth rate. Attempts to introduce universal child allowance in the 1990s can also be understood within the context of fertility politics, as this measure improves the situation of all families relative to people without children. As a measure addressing gender equality, child allowance works best within the context of special benefits for single-parent families, as such families predominantly consist of a mother and children.

5.4.2 Institutional childcare of preschool children

The development of public childcare of preschool children experienced the greatest leap forward between 1971 and 1985 (Figure 2). The lowest growth was recorded in the 1990s, when, in a period of 10 years, the proportion of children included in preschool childcare increased by only 5%, followed by rapid growth after 2000 (by more than 20%). According to data for the 2012/2013 school year, 89.9% of children in the second age group (3–5 years) and 55.7% of children in the first age group (1–3) are included in kindergartens (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, SORS, 2013). Over the years, the number of children in institutional childcare has thus surpassed the number in informal forms of childcare (grandparents, private child minders, mothers staying at home), with the exception of one-year-olds, of whom only 42.1% are included in kindergartens (ibid.). Today, much like in the 1980s, the proportion of children included in public childcare is higher in urban environments than in rural areas (Boh and Černigoj-Sadar, 1986; Kanjuo Mrčela and Černigoj Sadar, 2004).

This field also faced a considerable paradigmatic shift in 1993 with the introduction of family policy announcing the childcare benefit for children up to three years of age who were not included in kindergartens (Resolution on the Foundations of Formulating Family Policy in the Republic of Slovenia, 1993). The proposal was substantiated by the argument of "free choice", but it was to be expected that in the existing habitus, acting in compliance with the dominant constructions of femininity and masculinity, its introduction would primarily

[42] Single-parent families are still among the most socially vulnerable families (Rener et al., 2006, 66; Leskošek, 2009, 31), a situation due largely to the discrimination of single mothers in the labour market (Kanjuo Mrčela and Černigoj Sadar, 2004, 29).

encourage women to stay at home. This is confirmed by data from countries that have actually introduced an allowance of this kind. In Finland, Norway and Sweden, the recipients are predominantly mothers with a low income, a low level of education and a migrant background. This means that the measure has negative effects on the employment of women and reproduces social divisions (Ellingsæter, 2012), and is thus in contradiction with one of the goals of the Resolution (1993): "promoting equal opportunities for both sexes".

Figure 2: The proportion of children included in kindergartens



Source: Vojnovič, 1996, 138; SORS, 2013.

Slovenia has a unified system of public kindergartens for children of all ages, which on the formal side means guaranteeing the same quality and equally trained staff for all preschool children. Nonetheless, there are deviations due to the fact that some local authorities provide (i.e., finance) above-standard programmes while others do not. Well-organised and subsidised institutional childcare is one of the key instruments enabling parents, particularly women, to participate in the labour market and in political activities. It also has a significant impact on the amount of time spent on care work, with regard to which women in Slovenia are amongst the least burdened in Europe. The points of criticism have remained the same throughout the

years: difficulties in ensuring capacities and an acutely imbalanced representation of men in preschool teaching staff.[43]

5.4.3 Maternity leave and parental leave

In the first few years after the Second World War, maternity leave in Slovenia amounted to 84 days. In the 1950s, it was extended to 105 days, in the 1960s to 135 days, in the 1970s to 6 months, and in the mid 1980s to one year (Jogan, 2004a, 370). As with the aforementioned instruments, important changes were announced by the *Resolution on Family Policy* (1993), which foresaw maternity leave being extended to 2 or 3 years, thus determining that legislative solutions be designed in a way that does not jeopardise equal employment opportunities for women. Nonetheless, Jogan (2001, 218) recognised in this measure an attempt to redomesticate women, which, in the long run, would increase their economic dependence. This claim is supported by the fact that, although the possibility of dividing parental leave between parents has been stipulated by law since 1976, an average of only 1–2% of fathers took advantage of parental leave prior to 1990, after which this proportion fell below 1% (Jogan, 2004a, 370; Obersnel Kveder and Vojnovič, 1996). In 2007, a part of parental leave was utilised by 1,008 fathers, representing 4.99% of the number of births, while in 2012 the figure was 1,549, representing 5% of parental leave claimants (Rener et al., 2008, 224–225; MDDSZ, 2013). As early as 1986, maternity leave was divided into two parts: one whose beneficiary was the mother (maternity leave of 105 days) and one intended to be divided between the partners.[44] However, even this intervention did not result in significant changes in practices and social roles regarding the division of parental leave. For mothers, an important improvement was made in 1986 with the introduction of 100% pay compensation for maternity leave, which demonstrated the state's recognition of the importance of unpaid work in relation to paid work. With the implementation of the Fiscal Balance Act in 2012,

[43] On 2 September 2013, there were almost 1,000 children on the waiting list in Ljubljana, while in the whole of Slovenia men account for only 2% of professional staff in kindergartens, and are predominantly employed as preschool teacher assistants rather than preschool teachers (Hreščak, 2010; SORS, 2010).

[44] A similar system was in place in the 1990s. It differed from today's legislation in that the right of the father to childcare leave was derived from the mother's rights, her employment and her prior consent to the father becoming the beneficiary of childcare leave (Rules Implementing Childcare Leave, the Official Gazette of the RS, No. 2/1997). In 2001, the Parental Protection and Family Benefit Act (the Official Gazette of the RS, No.110/03-UBP) was passed, which redefined the rights ensuing from parental protection insurance. These were further subdivided into parental leave, parental benefit and the right to part-time employment. Parental leave comprises maternity leave, paternity leave, childcare leave and adoptive parent leave.

however, the allowance was lowered to 90%, which weakens the economic position of mothers, especially poor mothers, and reduces the achieved level of gender equality (Humer and Roksandić, 2013).

5.4.4 Paternity leave

In Slovenia, paternity leave first came into force in 2003. It comprises 90 days, of which 15 days are paid leave that must be used in the child's first sixth months, and 75 days are unpaid leave, during which the state only provides for social security payments based on the minimum wage, and which can be used prior to the child turning three. The "special feature" of paternity leave is that it is non-transferrable, as it is intended exclusively for fathers (The Official Gazette 47/2006), which makes it the only proactive measure for the increased participation of men in child upbringing and care. However, this measure again illustrates how the state, through its policies, reproduces the unequal participation of mothers and fathers in family life: paternity leave is much shorter than maternity leave and the state only provides pay compensation for a small proportion of the time (11 working days). The effects of such incentives in practice can be deduced from the statistics. In 2011, paid leave was claimed by 80% of fathers or 17,776 individuals, while unpaid leave was claimed by 3,669 fathers (SORS, 2013). Apparently, even proactive measures strengthen the different expectations in relation to men and women with regard to their engagement at home. In 1985, Jogan (1985, 622) wrote that the more a father is actually involved in childcare from the child's birth, the more he learns about the importance of these tasks, thus dispelling the (existing) prejudices regarding the simplicity and even the inferiority of child-rearing tasks in the family. The early involvement of fathers would lead to questions regarding the social organisation of the institutions designed to satisfy the developmental and educational needs of the child (and the family) being resolved more rapidly.[45]

[45] In 2000, Iceland introduced a 3 + 3 + 3 model of parental leave, whereby the first three months are intended for mothers, three months are reserved for fathers and the remaining three months can be divided by the partners. The success of this kind of reform of parental leave lies in the fact that, within a very short time, the proportion of men benefitting fully from the three months of paid leave increased. At the same time, the three months that can be divided are still predominantly used by women (80%), with the proportion of men slowly increasing. In 2005, 14% of fathers divided the three months of paid parental leave with their partner (Gíslason, 2006; Langvasbråten and Teigen, 2006).

5.4.5 Labour market

In the labour market, the biggest changes affecting the organisation of work in the family and partnership occurred after 1990. The transition to a free market economy transformed the previous high employment rate into a high unemployment rate, with stable employment gradually giving way to employment characterised by alternating periods of work, joblessness, training and acquiring new skills. Furthermore, the previously unified working hours were replaced by divided "European" working hours, an extension of the 8-hour working day, seasonal employment, and changed opening hours in administrative offices, banks and service providers (Vojnovič, 1996, 151). These phenomena heralded the precarisation of labour conditions, a process that is not yet complete today. It can be placed in the context of the domination of neoliberalism, which, as claimed by Connell (2005, 255), indirectly operates in such a way that it weakens the position of the majority of women by dismantling the social state, while at the same time hailing the entry of a minority of women into the officially gendered bliss of professional success.

The growing insecurity in the field of employment has been accompanied by certain measures designed to facilitate the reconciliation of professional and private life (of families). As early as in the 1980s, a proposal was put forward to reduce the working hours of mothers. Although later formulated in gender-neutral terms, the measure continued to predominantly concern women and, consequently, their opportunities in the labour market. In 1993, 1.8% of the active population worked shorter working hours, of which 57% were women (Vojnovič, 1996, 151). In 2011, 13.3% of women and 7.9% of men worked reduced working hours. Despite the fact that the practice of shorter working hours is not quite as widespread as in some other European countries (e.g., The Netherlands), many women view reduced hours as an opportunity for the easier reconciliation of private and professional life. At the turn of the millennium, approximately one woman in three stated a preference for working part-time when asked to consider the optimal setup of her working and family life, while slightly more than one in ten men shared these preferences (Stropnik and Černič Istenič, 2001, 88). Other measures intended for better reconciliation of private and professional life include the possibility of flexible working hours and the accumulation of hours; the latter is particularly worker-friendly if the hours can be used as leave. OECD data (2010) show that, in comparison to other European countries, Slovenia lags behind in this respect (Figure 3). The use of these instruments may, however, also have a negative impact on gender equality if they

are predominantly used by women while men are more able to conform with the expectations of the employer.

Figure 3: Accessibility of some of the instruments designed for the easier reconciliation of professional and private life amongst employees (OECD, 2010).



Source: OECD, 2010.

5.5 Motherhood and fatherhood

Virtually all Slovenian studies treating labour division in the family explain asymmetries and their persistence by the socially ascribed gender roles (e.g., Boh, 1966; Ule, 1979; Rener, 1983a; Rener, 1992; Rener et al., 2005; Kanjuo Mrčela and Černigoj Sadar, 2007; Humer, 2009). On the other hand, we have seen that, in Slovenia, the state only rarely directly encourages equality or seeks to erode the dominant structures of femininity and masculinity, and consequently those of motherhood and fatherhood.

In Western societies, motherhood entered the public debate at the end of the 19th century as an integral part of the ideology of gender and the promotion of a family model in which the

man's role was that of the breadwinner, thus encouraging the marginalisation of father care practices. Complementary to the man's position was the woman delineated within the triangle mother–housewife–spouse. Domestic and care work "were determined as being naturally within the woman's domain and, consequently, women (due to their biological capacity to bear children) were above all ascribed the role of mother and housewife" (Jogan, 2001, 185). Whereas a woman was primarily destined for home, a man's domain was the public sphere. These roles have changed considerably since the Second World War, in the sense that motherhood is no longer necessarily perceived as a fundamental assumption of the identity of women (Švab, 2001, 2006; Humer, 2009), nor is it inconceivable for women to take top positions in business and politics. Having said this, data on the political representation of women and the division of domestic work show that some aspects of the social role and position of women have failed to undergo notable changes. Women are still expected to bear the primary responsibility for childcare, while the ideology of motherhood not only includes care work but also household work, which needs to be understood as an integral part of mothering practices. "The very ideology of motherhood as the social function of a woman in her private life has caused women to accept their housekeeping role (and with it their marginalised position in the labour market) as something taken for granted, even though it is precisely the housekeeping function that has turned out to impose numerous limitations on the mothering function" (Rener, 1992, 150). In fact, women perform multiple tasks at the same time, e.g., playing with a child and simultaneously doing a household chore, which can be stressful and can make them feel only half present (Rener et al., 2008). As established by Alenka Švab (2001, 96), it is motherhood that has changed the least in the Late Modern period, partly because it is the most linked to nature: "In the Western perspective (at least in the context of reproduction), social attributes associated with nature are regarded as the most unchanging constant of human dynamism".

We have already established that, from the 1960s to the present day, Slovenian research has observed a trend of the greater inclusion of men in the context of the home, especially with regard to care practices (Boh, 1966; Ule, 1979; Boh and Černigoj-Sadar, 1980; Rener in Ule and Rener, 1985). The changing masculinity of the past decades has thus been accompanied by the appearance of a "new", "active" fatherhood, characterised by a father who takes an active part in the pregnancy period, is present at birth, and takes part in the care and upbringing of children, as well as sharing domestic tasks equally with his female partner (Švab, 2001). In Slovenia, as in other countries, this "ideal of Western societies" (ibid.) has

become an integral message of gender equality policies, which, at the systemic level, is evident in changes in family policies, especially with the introduction of paternity leave and encouraging men to partake in parental leave. Empirical studies have, however, observed that the transition to the "new" fatherhood is largely marked by a greater emotional and care attachment between the father and the children, but not necessarily by taking over other domestic duties. On the individual level, changes in the sense of new fatherhood are most prominent on the level of the symbolic, of convictions and desired actions and values (Švab, 2000; Rener et al., 2005; Humer, 2009; Ule and Kuhar, 2003). Thus the shift from the paternal authority of the Modern period, based on the model of the father as breadwinner, to the "new" father of the Late Modern period is characterised first and foremost by a turn to making fathering practices more sensitive and no longer purely linked to the material and financial aspects of the family (Švab, 2001). The shift in actual practices, such as the division of care work and, in particular, household work and other domestic chores, has been notably less significant. Furthermore, men participate more actively in those care activities that offer pleasant, less routine-dominated experiences, and those that include children and education, most notably teaching and spending leisure time together. Today, fathers spend more time with their children compared to the generation of their fathers, but still disproportionately less when compared to women. The relationship with children, especially emotional bonds with the child, is an important indication of the relocation of care from women to men, which does not, however, pose a "threat" to the unequal division of household duties between partners (Humer, 2009). While male engagement in the family retains its supportive character (which is indirectly encouraged by state policies), the main responsibility remains in the domain of women and femininity, regardless of the division of family labour and childcare between partners. One of the most difficult issues regarding gender inequality in family life is household work, which does not represent an integral part of fathering practices (ibid.). Although the process of expanding fathering practices is underway, it has only slightly shifted the established models of masculinity and has so far barely contributed to a reduction in the double workload of women. The changes in patriarchy and family-related gender roles in recent decades have thus predominantly occurred at the level of language and legitimisation, while the actual practices are lagging behind (Connell, 2005).

5.6 The double workload of women as a mechanism for preserving patriarchal distinctions

The shifts recorded in the field of the family in the last 50 years show a rather complex and, in terms of gender equality, ramified development. Modernisation of the family is reflected in a linear reduction in the size of the family, as well as in the number of marriages and the birth rate. The divorce rate has increased, as has the number of single parent families, children born to unmarried couples and children assigned to joint custody of their divorced parents. An interesting milestone was established in 1980, when the trend was reversed from early to delayed family planning, accompanied by an accelerated decline in the birth rate, which could be interpreted as an indication of the shift from the Modern to the Late Modern in society. This shift was, however, accompanied with the rise of nationalism, which is clearly observable from the development of family policy. The dialectic of modernisation or detraditionalisation is also supported by a lack of significant change in the division of care and particularly of household work between partners. Due to changes in the labour market, technological development, modified standards and other factors, the quality of domestic work has undoubtedly changed; nonetheless, just like in the 1960s, women today do a considerably larger proportion of work at home than men.

In the period examined, family policies have been designed primarily to diminish social differences, with gender inequality placed amongst secondary objectives. The analysis of policy instruments in terms of gender equality shows that the approaches adopted so far have not proven sufficiently successful, and that a transition to policies encouraging equality by means of expanding the established experience of both men and women is essential. The first important shifts in implementing policies that could be seen as pertaining to the field of gender equality were observed in the 1970s (a special allowance for single-parent families, the possibility of dividing maternity leave between the parents, increased investments in kindergartens), and these instruments were partially upgraded in the 1980s (a formal distinction between parental leave and maternity leave, with the latter including 100% pay compensation for the time of its duration). Subsequently, there was a paradigm shift in the 1990s, with the passing of “family policy” comprising a series of measures known from before, but also announcing certain new instruments seemingly designed to offer parents more choice in childcare practices (such as the expansion of maternity leave to three years, a special allowance for children cared for at home by their parents, and proposals for flexible working hours). The implementation of these instruments was later hindered by a lack of funds, and by warnings on the part of sociologists that in the existing habitus these measures would reduce

equal opportunities for women. As a result, family policy in Slovenia continues to be more or less a series of instruments of social welfare policies, but it is nonetheless an important agent of the instrumentalisation of men and women as parents, since it exists as a separate policy set in place to improve the position of families in relation to non-families. Both social welfare policy and family policy are partial policies that fail to treat the different forms of social inequity holistically, instead establishing hierarchies among them. Furthermore, since the 1980s, "family" policies have become increasingly "fertility" policies, understood by at least one part of the political spectrum as a return to traditional gender role practices. Only in 2003 was a policy instrument adopted for the first time in Slovenia that entitled men to an untransferable right associated with children and care work: paternity leave. However, the limited set of rights and compensations associated with this instrument (in comparison to maternity leave) once again assigns men a secondary family role and consequently discriminates against them. Following the onset of the economic crisis in 2009, several modifications of social and family legislation were introduced that considerably infringed upon the rights and benefits of parents and which disproportionately affected women. The field of politics, where these decisions have been undertaken, has throughout the last five decades been strongly androcentric, with male dominance becoming increasingly stronger for most of the period and reaching a peak after the first democratic elections. A notable increase in the proportion of female MPs at the 2011 elections is most likely linked to the effects of proactive policies, predominantly the introduction of gender quotas. Paternity leave and gender quotas are among the rare political interventions into the well-established patterns of labour and power division between men and women in Slovenia.

On the basis of data on the distribution of time, we can conclude that the Slovenian habitus is characterised by a high appreciation of continuous work, especially in the home, very likely including a clean and orderly home. In this respect, more time dedicated to work, less free time and a greater responsibility towards home and family is more characteristic of female than male sets of habitus. Comparing the field of the family and that of politics, we can establish that there is a marked difference between male and female participation in both, and that this difference arises from the continuous operation of the same social structure: "male domination" (Bourdieu, 2001) or "male hegemony" (Connell, 2005). In fact, greater responsibility towards the family imposes limitations on women and brings advantages for men in their engagement in fields of the public sphere, particularly in those that are strongly masculinised, such as politics. Family and politics are not merely transmitters of patriarchal

gender order but also its agents. From birth, children grow up in families with distinctly gendered daily practices and routines, which contribute to the naturalisation of socially constructed differences between the sexes. The power of the reproduction of the patriarchal system also derives from the fact that the vast majority of people have experienced family life and that policies are mainly decided upon by men. As we have shown, social and family policies are also based on the premise of the differentiated responsibilities of men and women for particular spheres of social life and thus preserve or even strengthen the patriarchal gender order, i.e., the policies themselves naturalise inequalities. The third field we have analysed, sociological research, has, since the 1960s, observed that the problem of inequality in the family and politics cannot simply be reduced to asymmetric labour division but should be interpreted through the operation of socially constructed gender roles. It is thus difficult to speak of yet another agent of the traditional gender order; interestingly, however, the field itself reflects the modern distinctions between men and women in view of the fact that the family and questions of gender inequality are predominantly researched by women.

Social constructions of femininity and masculinity are intertwined with social constructions of mothering and fathering and inscribed in the body, family, politics and policies, as well as in all other social spaces. Despite the social roles of men and women having changed considerably since the Second World War, the distinction between woman as a family being and man as a political being has retained its power, which means that the fundamental structure of the patriarchal system has also been preserved. If the motor of patriarchy is “hegemonic masculinity” (Connell, 2005), then one of its basic configurational practices in Slovenia is leaving domestic work to women. At the same time, the image of male hegemony is increasingly imbued with “new fatherhood”, i.e., the greater inclusion of men in domestic and care work. This transition, however, takes place mainly at the level of discourse, while the actual labour division at home, especially regarding household work, as well as policy instruments aimed at the family and the use of such instruments, remain highly asymmetrically distributed. If we believe in the power of emancipatory policies, one of the key priorities for the future should be the as yet untouched area of household work, which, in the family, is to be understood as a practice integral to care work. It seems that, since the Second World War, the structures of femininity have expanded much more notably than those of masculinity, the experience of women having changed more drastically, if nothing else due to their entry into universities and the labour market, fields once reserved exclusively for men. However, alongside the unchanged practices of mothering and fathering, the model of the

“double workload” for women (work and home) has become established, operating as a key mechanism for distancing women from the field of politics (or “a third workload”) and consequently for preserving the patriarchal gender order.

6 Paid work, prestige professions and politics

Jasna Podreka and Milica Antić Gaber

6.1 The inclusion of women in the labour market and the position of the genders in the social structure

A great deal has been written about the importance of economic equality for ensuring equal opportunities for women to enter public life and politics. Virginia Woolf's metaphor of a room of her own, demands for the opening up of "masculinised" professions to women, demands for equal pay for equal work, calls for the elimination of visible and non-visible barriers to the advancement of women in professional careers, and recent attempts to legislate quotas for the highest decision-making positions in business in the European Union bear witness to the fact that, despite certain shifts in the direction of establishing gender equality in the fields of the economy and business, work and earnings, economic power and decision making, men still retain a privileged position in this area in relation to women as a social group.

The importance of the economic independence of women for their active participation in politics was determined by a number of studies in the second half of the 20th century, a period when, particularly immediately after the Second World War, the proportion of women in politics was not high (Rule, 1987; Norris, Inglehart and Welzel, 2002; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995).

Although important shifts can be observed regarding the position of women in the area of employment in Slovenia in the last ten years (particularly the high representation of women in the labour market, increased full-time employment, and the breaking through of women into particular "prestige" fields, such as law, journalism and the university), we nonetheless find that women have not yet achieved appropriate positions in the labour market, as data clearly indicate the continued presence of horizontal and vertical gender segregation/segmentation, as well as differences in pay between the genders (Kanjuo-Mrčela, 1996, 2000, 2007). It is therefore clear that women still encounter certain (gender-specific) limitations that condition their position in the sphere of paid work. The limitations that women face on entering the field

of paid work cannot be considered purely in terms of evident (inadequate policies and legislation) and concealed (glass architecture) discrimination, but must also be reflected upon in the context of existing social practices and habitus, which continue to reproduce the conventional images of masculinity and femininity that dominate processes of subjectivisation and identity unconsciously and on the symbolic level (Bourdieu, 2010). In spite of the fact that we live in a time in which it appears that individuals' choices in creating personal biographies are autonomous, individuals are, as Duncan et al. (2003) explain, always dependent on decisions linked with moral and interpersonal obligations from everyday life. A person's choices are not purely individual or economically rational, but always also influenced by specific social circumstances and value orientations (Duncan et al. 2003, 256) that consciously or unconsciously condition decisions made both by those planning their own professional careers and by those seeking suitable candidates for specific employment positions.

In the present chapter, we seek to determine whether, and if so which, structural shifts in the area of paid work have, in the last ten years, contributed to our being able to speak about a pool of suitable female candidates for entry into politics in Slovenia (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Matland and Montgomery, 2003).

6.2 Mapping changes: Shifts in the sphere of paid work in the last decades in Slovenia

At least since the first half of the 20th century, women in Slovenia have represented an important part of the workforce. Historical sources show that in 1923 women represented 27.32% of all employees in Slovenia, a figure that had increased to 38.55% by 1934 (Kraigher, 1937).[46] From that time on, the proportion of women in the workforce has continued to grow, and since the 1990s it has not fallen below 46% (SORS; Kozmik and Jeram, 1997).[47]

[46] The author states that, in absolute terms, the number of employed women rose dramatically from 17,341 in 1923 to 30,458 in 1934, representing a 77% increase (Kraigher, 1937).

[47] More detailed data by year will be presented in the continuation.

The period of the socialist economy had an important influence on the employment of women, as the participation of women in the workforce was part of the socialist project. This gave women above all the right to work and to financial independence, and consequently to personal emancipation (Kanjuo Mrčela, Křížková, Nagy, 2010). Another important factor in this regard was that "in the period of the socialist economy, unemployment was virtually unknown, with the level of registered unemployed hovering around a symbolic 2%" (Černigoj Sadar and Verša 2002, 405).

A survey of the position of women in the labour market in Slovenia, presented in Table 12, shows that the proportion of women in full-time employment has grown steadily since 1950, when women represented just over a third of the workforce. Even during the present crisis, the proportion of women in the structure of the workforce in Slovenia has remained at almost 50%, amounting to 47.6% in 2010 and 47% in 2013 (SORS). Women in Slovenia are typically employed on a full-time basis, as Eurostat data show that only 14.4% of women were employed for a part time in 2009 (which is 5.5 percentage points more than men) (Eurostat, LFS, January 2009).

Table 12: The proportion of employed persons by gender in Slovenia from 1950 to 2013

Year	Men	Women
1950*	66%	34%
1960*	63.9%	36.1%
1970*	58.8%	41.2%
1980*	55.8%	44.22%
1990**	53.5%	46.45%
2000***	52.1%	47.9%
2010***	52.4%	47.6%
2013****	53%	47%

Source: * Census Books from the census in SRS, 1971, 1981. ** Statistics Yearbook RS, 1991; ***SORS, Workforce Survey; ****SORS, Active Population, Slovenia, January 2013 – final data.

Whereas the "labour market" was stable until the transition period, there were major upheavals at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Due to the transition from a planned socialist economy to a market economy and the restructuring of the labour market, major structural changes arose. This period was accompanied by tightened economic conditions and growing unemployment. A further consequence of the transformation depression was a significant reduction in the active working population, which, according to registry sources,[48] decreased by almost 200,000 in the years from 1988 to 1998 (Ignjatovič 2002, 13). Due to large companies in the heavy and machine industry sector going into receivership, as well as the closure of mines, transition events in the labour market initially had a greater impact on the male workforce, while the service sector and public administration, which mainly employed women (as they do today), were not affected to such a great extent at that time. Women therefore were less subject to redundancy than men in the initial phase of the transition. The first signs of a relative worsening of the position of women in the labour market in Slovenia began to emerge with the quietening of transition movements and the improvement in economic conditions, as the level of both the surveyed and registered unemployment of women began to exceed that of men at the end of the 1990s (Černigoj Sadar and Verša, 2002). This continues to be the case today, as in Slovenia, just as in other EU countries, unemployment in all age groups is higher amongst woman than men (European Commission, 2009).

In line with crisis events in the economic sector and the labour market, at the end of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, post-socialist countries were caught in a serious attempt to redomesticate women and revive their traditional gender roles. As Maca Jogan (2001) explains, in the time of transition, the time of "democratisation" and "Europeanisation", these efforts were characteristic of all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The author determines that it was in fact women who felt the negative effects of transition most markedly and comprehensively (Jogan 2000, in Jogan, 2004).

[48] The Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SORS) collects data about the active working population using two methodological approaches: on the basis of registry and survey data. Registry data is based on the Statistical Register of the Active Working Population, while survey data is based on the Workforce Survey. Registry data represents a complete catchment, while the results of the Workforce Survey are an assessment based on a statistical sample. Registry data only takes into account employed persons with an employment contract, while the Workforce Survey is undertaken amongst the entire active working population, including individuals assisting family members and people who work on the basis of a work contract or a contract for copyright work, or who receive direct payment, i.e., people who, in the week prior to the conducting of the survey, have undertaken any kind of work whatsoever for payment (financial or non-financial), profit or family good (SORS, Active Population. Methodological Explanation: www.stat.si/doc/metod_pojasnila/07-009-mp.htm).

The economic crisis, increased workloads and unemployment (Kanjuo Mrčela, Křížková and Nagy, 2010), as well as attempts to achieve the re-patriarchalisation of Slovenian society and the redomestication of women, all contributed in part to the perpetuation of the ideology of women as the primary caregiver, and the consequent double workload of women. As Kanjuo Mrčela, Křížková and Nagy explain, at the beginning of the 1990s, "certain researchers and policy creators expected that women would leave the workforce *en masse* and become housewives" (2010, 649). Although in certain regions there was in fact a deterioration of the position of women both in the labour market and in society in general, these attempts were less effective in Slovenia, as women continued to remain an important part of the workforce and the reversion to traditional relationships between the genders did not eventuate (Antić Gaber 2006).

This is also confirmed by statistical data indicating that, in terms of the high proportion of active working women, Slovenia stands out during this period in comparison to other European countries. According to statistical indicators (European Commission, 2009), which will be presented in detail below, Slovenia is today amongst the countries with the highest level of women in full-time employment. Slovenia also stood out, and continues to stand out, regarding the high proportion of women who remain employed while establishing a family and bringing up children. Women in Slovenia did not typically leave the workforce and interrupt their professional careers due to caregiving and family obligations (Černigoj Sadar and Verša, 2002, 404). This is also true today, as Eurostat data from 2008 indicate that the difference between active working women with and without children is minimal and significantly below the European average.[49]

The reason why the transition conditions described above did not have such a drastic impact on the position of women in the Slovenian labour market can, on the one hand, be found in the fact that in Slovenia, due to its historical tradition, the process of the emancipation of women had already developed to such an extent that it had become "almost impossible to push women into the reserve army of the workforce in the name of economic efficiency" (Jogan, 1986, 28). As early as in the beginning of the 1990s, women understood work as a

[49] In Slovenia in 2008, the level of employment of women aged 25–49 years with children younger than 12 years was 86.1% (EU 68.1%), while the level of employment of women in the same age group without children was 87.2% (EU 80%) (Eurostat, LFS – annual average for 2008).

value and not as a necessity, as the majority of women reported that they would not cease working even if they were provided for financially in a different way (Kanjuo Mrčela, Křížková and Nagy, 2010, 649). Similarly, research of public opinion undertaken in 1992 reported that a very high proportion of women (69.7%) strongly agreed with the assertion *"For a woman, to be employed is the best way to achieve independence"* (Jogan, 2004), which testifies to the high value placed on work by women. Furthermore, one must not overlook the fact that, in Slovenia, policies concerning employment and the reconciling of paid work and the family – which represent one of the key elements in regulating the position of women in the labour market – had been put in place decades before the transition, and that these policies had already taken into account the principle of gender equality (Kanjuo Mrčela, Křížková and Nagy, 2010).

6.2.1 Policies, measures, legislative solutions

Policies concerning employment and the reconciling of paid work and family obligations undoubtedly made a key contribution to enabling the relatively favourable position of women in the labour market and their continued existence within it. Although Slovenia, like the majority of former socialist countries in Eastern Europe, did not begin to engage more systematically with issues and policies concerning equal opportunities until the mid 1990s (Slana, 2010), when it was prompted to do so primarily by the process of alignment with the European Union (Jalušič and Antić, 2001),[50] the first budding of policies and mechanisms for promoting women, and the first demands for gender equality and the transformation of the traditional gender order in the Slovenian territories, can be traced back to the end of the 19th century.[51] Jogan[52] (1986) believes that a decisive role in liberating women in Slovenia was

[50] Jalušič and Antić (2001) explain that state bureaucracies, parties and institutions in countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia "acquired an interest in equal opportunities policy only after strong pressure from the European Union in the area of social policies" (p. 19).

[51] As early as at the end of the 19th century, educated and economically independent employed women began to campaign for the elimination of gender discrimination in the professions and to demand political equality. In 1898 the Society of Slovenian Women Teachers was established, whose mission was the struggle against professional discrimination. Thus organised women teachers laid the foundations for the political and social movement whose demand was gender equality in all areas and the full entry of women into politics. Two years later, in 1900, female postal and telegraph workers also joined the struggle against gender discrimination in the workplace (Verginella, 2003, p. IV).

[52] Maca Jogan is a professor emeritus at the University of Ljubljana, the recipient of several national awards, and an honorary member of the Slovenian Sociological Association. As a sociologist, she deals especially with the

played by the revolutionary workers' movement, which formulated a concise summary of its demands as early as in 1940.[53] This undoubtedly also had a significant bearing on the fact that, during the period of self-management, Slovenia introduced important legislative changes that facilitated the reconciliation of professional and personal life, as well as providing protection for female workers during the period of planning a family.

Another important contribution to increased employment opportunities and easier reconciliation of family work and participation in the sphere of paid work was made by well organised care for pregnant women and childcare. In Slovenia, the first significant increase in maternity and childcare leave was made in 1975,[54] when the previous three-month period was extended to eight months. The second extension occurred in 1986, when leave was increased to a total of 365 days, which is still the situation today (Voga and Pristav-Bobnar, 2007). In 1979, the Social Child Care Act (Official Gazette RS, No. 35/1979) also regulated the question of family benefits. Under this legislation, mothers or other rightful claimants also gained the right to compensation for loss of income due to childbirth and childcare (ibid.).

Measures in the area of social policy were also of crucial significance, as they enabled the organised and co-financed transfer of specific household and caregiving obligations to the public sphere, such as investing in and developing childcare institutions, organising cafeterias in kindergartens, schools and public companies (Černigoj Sadar and Verša, 2002), and investing in care of the elderly and healthcare (Jogan 2006 in Kanjuo Mrčela, Křížková and Nagy, 2010). These measures were, and still are, highly significant for the emancipation of women, as they made it easier to reconcile professional and family life, while also preventing

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sociology of gender, as well as with the development of sociological theory and the history of sociology in Slovenia.

[53] At the 5th State Conference of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in Zagreb, demands were formulated for the protection of motherhood, the nationalisation of tasks associated with childbearing in workers' and farmers' families, the guarantee of equal pay for the same work as men, and the recognition of equal political rights, with which the workers' movement significantly surpassed the middle-class orientation of the movement (Tomšič, 1976, in: Jogan, 1986: p. 27). With the first constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in 1946, which established the foundation for a special policy regarding women, the demands of the women's movement for the elimination of discrimination also gained a formal legal basis (Jogan, 2004, p. 269).

[54] Maternity and childcare leave had increased gradually since the end of the Second World War. In the first post-war years, it increased from 84 days to 105 days, and in the 1960s it was extended to 135 days (Jogan, 2004, p. 271).

women – who are typically more burdened with caregiving obligations – from having to interrupt their professional careers due to family obligations.

The topic of equal opportunities and the establishment of related mechanisms did, therefore, enter the Slovenian political agenda prior to the process of joining the European Union, and we cannot understand it simply as a result of EU directives. One can speak about endeavours to realise the principles of gender equality in Slovenia even prior to independence.[55] Legislation prior to independence primarily protected women in the labour market, and was mainly protective legislation. It provided women with certain privileges on the basis of assumed "biological" differences, such as privileges due to childbirth (Jalušič and Antić, 2001).

After independence, in the mid 1990s, Slovenia addressed equal opportunities policy in a much more intensive and systematic way, as it had made a formal commitment to take the principle of equal treatment and equal opportunities into account when passing legislation (Slana, 2007). In the process of fulfilling demands and harmonising Slovenian legislation with that of the European Union, which was a condition for gaining full membership, in the subsequent years Slovenia had to engage with "a series of directives from the area of equal opportunities for women and men, and transfer their provisions to the national legal system" (Gortnar and Salecl, 2004,115), as it was soon evident that the existing legal framework was inadequate for ensuring real gender equality (Slana, 2007).

According to data of the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Slovenia commenced activities aimed at the integration of the principles of gender equality on the governmental level in 1997, with a pilot project that included a number of ministries. Within the framework of this project, civil servants attended education about gender equality policy and received training to increase their understanding and awareness of the importance of including the principle of gender equality in all policies (www.mddsz.gov.si).

The key period for passing legislation in this area was during accession negotiations with the European Union (1998–2002), as it was then that Slovenia harmonised its national legislation

[55] We understand the concept of gender equality as meaning the equal recognition, power and participation of both genders in all areas of public and private life. The principle of gender equality attempts to encourage the full participation of women and men in society, and involves the acceptance and equal evaluation of the differences between women and men, and of the different roles that they have in society (*Sto besed za enakost* [A Hundred Words for Equality], 2007, p. 6).

with EU *acquis communautaire*, thus enabling the amendment and passing of legislation regarding the equal treatment of men and women (Gortnar and Salecl, 2004, 122). It was during this period that an important shift occurred in the Slovenian legal system with regard to legal emphasis on the principles of equal treatment and equal opportunities for men and women, particularly in the area of employment and the rights derived from the employment relationship, as well as the areas of social and health security. Equality before the law and ensuring the freedom to work under equal conditions had already been determined by the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia.[56]

A milestone marking Slovenia's commitment to implementing the integration of the principle of gender equality was the passing of the Equal Opportunities for Woman and Men Act (henceforth EOWMA) (Official Gazette RS, No. 59/02), which was renamed the Act on Equality between Women and Men in 2013.[57] With this legislation, Slovenia gained an umbrella act that determined guidelines and established a basis for improving the position of women and for creating equal opportunities for men and women in individual areas of social life. The basic purpose and important advantage of this act is that it introduces a general legal basis for passing various measures aimed at encouraging real gender equality and the creation of equal opportunities for men and women. It also enables the creation of state policy in this area and defines specific procedures for solving infringements of the principle of equal treatment of the genders (Hazl, 2002, 7).

The EOWMA (Official Gazette RS, No. 59/02) also served as a direct basis for the passing of the Resolution on the National Programme for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (Official Gazette RS, No. 100/2005). With this resolution, passed in 2005, Slovenia gained

[56] Equality before the law is determined by Article 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, where it is written: "In Slovenia, each individual shall be guaranteed equal human rights and fundamental freedoms irrespective of national origin, race, sex, language, religion, political or other beliefs, financial status, birth, education, social status or whatever other personal circumstance. All persons shall be equal before the law." Article 49 determines: "The freedom of work shall be guaranteed. Each person shall freely choose his employment. There shall be no unjust discrimination in work opportunities available to each person" (Official Gazette RS, No. 69/04).

[57] After more than ten years, the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, under the leadership of Minister Dr Anja Kopač Mrak, revised the old Equal Opportunities for Woman and Men Act and renamed it the Act on Equality between Women and Men, with the intention of placing greater emphasis on gender equality and the upholding of contemporary European directives in this area. Ministry staff emphasise that the principal aim of the revision of the Act was to ensure that women and men have equal recognition and power, and that they participate equally in all areas of public and private life. In this regard, the Ministry has initiated the implementation of two projects in the area of gender equality and equal opportunities. The first project is called *Include.All* and is aimed at encouraging gender equality in decision-making processes in the business sector, while the second important project in this area is entitled *Let's Balance Gender Power Relations* (MLFSAEO, http://www.mddsz.gov.si/nc/si/medijsko_sredisce/novica/article/1939/7317/).

the first strategic document that determined the goals and measures, as well as the key agents responsible for policy, for realising gender equality in individual areas of the lives of women and men in the Republic of Slovenia.

As strategic goals of gender equality policy in the area of employment, the Resolution states: ensuring equal opportunities for women and men in employment and work; ensuring a quality work environment, without any form of harassment; ensuring the reconciliation of the professional and private/family obligations of employees; ensuring equal opportunities for women and men in science and research; balanced representation and participation of women and men in political decision making; balanced representation and participation of women and men in selection for positions in public institutions and the judicial system; and balanced representation and participation of women and men in decision-making positions in the socioeconomic field (Official Gazette RS, No. 100/2005).[58]

In addition to the EOWMA and the Resolution on the National Programme for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (Official Gazette RS, No. 100/2005), one must not overlook certain other legislation passed after 2002, which is also of strategic significance for ensuring equal opportunities, both in the area of employment and in Slovenian society in general.

One case of such legislation is undoubtedly the Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment Act (IPETA; Official Gazette RS, No. 50/04), passed in May 2004, which upgrades the legal basis for ensuring the equal treatment of persons in all areas of social life, irrespective of their personal circumstances, including their gender. The Act highlights the areas of employment, employment relationships, and inclusion in trade unions and interest groups as being of particular importance to the area of ensuring equal treatment (Official Gazette RS, No. 50/04).

[58] Kanjuo-Mrčela, Filipovič-Hrast and Humer (2013), who undertook an assessment of the execution of the resolution in question, judged that its acceptance was one of the most important contributions to the political and institutional framework of equal opportunities in Slovenia. Through their analysis, they ascertained that, in the period of the existence of the Resolution, the visibility of and sensitivity towards questions of gender equality had increased in society, that there were more (statistical) data available on the position of women and men in many areas of life, and that, in the previous ten years, there had been a significant increase in the research of topics that are important from the perceptive of gender. Furthermore, legislative changes and the introduction of new practices were evident in certain areas due to the influence of the guidelines brought by the Resolution (p. 95).

One of the most important legal documents from the perspective of the treatment and protection of women in the labour market is undoubtedly the Employment Relationship Act (ERA), passed in 2002. The ERA (Official Gazette RS, No. 42/02) represents one of "the most important elements of the new labour law system" (Končar 2003, 24), as it systematically regulates the question of workers' rights in the area of employment and the employment relationship, as well as in the area of social and health security, and security of motherhood and parenthood. With this act, Slovenia legislated certain very important European directives that ensure the equal treatment of women and men in the labour market. One of the most important features of the ERA is undoubtedly the prohibition of indirect and direct discrimination. Article 6 of the Act determines that the employer may not place the employment seeker or the employee, either during the duration of the employment relationship or in connection with terminating the employment contract, in an unequal position due to gender, race or any other personal characteristic determined by the Act. Women and men must be ensured equal opportunities and equal treatment in employment, promotion, pay and other benefits from the employment relationship, as well as in other respects.[59] In accordance with this, Article 25 of the ERA determines that the employer may not advertise a vacant employment position only for men or women, except in cases where the work can only be undertaken by one gender or the other. Amongst other provisions, the Act also determines the prohibition of sexual harassment and other forms of harassment in the workplace (Article 45, ERA), the establishment of national institutions for the introduction of sanctions in cases of discrimination (Article 229, ERA), and special protection of employees with regard to pregnancy and parenthood (Articles 197–193, ERA) (Official Gazette RS, No. 42/02).

In addition to the measures listed above for encouraging gender equality in the labour market, it is worth mentioning measures aimed at encouraging entrepreneurship amongst women, which Slovenia included in its active employment policy. These are measures and programmes that are supposed to be based on the actual needs of women and the demands of the market, ensuring female entrepreneurs ongoing counselling and development. The measures were intended for implementation in Slovenia in the period 2004–2006, within the framework of programmes financed by the European Social Fund (Gortnar and Salecl, 2004,

[59] In addition to the areas listed, the Act determines equal opportunities in training, education, requalification, absence from work, working conditions, working hours and termination of the employment contract (Official Gazette RS, No. 42/02).

133). A report published in 2010 by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SORS) entitled "Female Managers in Slovenia" states that, in the strategy for the development of small business in Slovenia (1996), women are already defined as one of the target business groups that should be supported in the realisation of their business capabilities. Despite the fact that a number of important steps from this strategy are yet to be implemented, it has apparently had an impact on the proportion of businesswomen active in Slovenia, which has approached that of developed countries (Vertot, Divjak, Brnot, 2010, 2).

In addition, one should not overlook the important measures introduced in the area of family policy, particularly the introduction of non-transferable paternity leave aimed at fathers, which, in 2003, first gave fathers a legally defined opportunity to be actively included in childcare immediately after the child is born (Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities http://www.mddsz.gov.si/).[60]

All of these measures and policies, as well as the development of various bodies and non-discrimination laws ensuring the promotion of gender equality in public life, have had a favourable impact on the position of women in the labour market in Slovenia and on their economic emancipation.

6.2.2 Shifts and alternations in the still segmented structure of paid work

We are aware that data on the proportion of women in the active working population do not provide a complete picture of the current state, of the shifts and alternations in the social structure. Despite certain positive trends and the constant presence of women in the labour market, research in recent decades (Jogan, 1986; Kanjuo Mrčela, 1996, 2000, 2007; Černigoj-Sadar and Verša, 2002) has highlighted the fact that both horizontal and vertical segregation (or segmentation) according to gender are still present in the Slovenian labour market, as is the gender pay gap (although the latter is less than the EU average).

In the report Female Managers in Slovenia (2010), for instance, it is pointed out that, although the proportion of businesswomen approaches that of developed countries, women in Slovenia still have many difficulties breaking into traditional male fields. In the Human Development Report 2009, Slovenia was ranked 34 amongst all of the countries in the world in terms of the

[60] More about this in the chapter by Šori and Humar.

measure of the distribution of power between the genders, the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), and was ranked 14 amongst member states of the European Union. In this report, it is stated that comparisons of the value of various development indicators show that countries typically display a significantly lower value in the distribution of power by gender than in other indicators of development.[61] Slovenia's weak point continues to be the relatively low representation of women in leadership and senior positions and the low proportion of politically active women (Vertot, Divjak, Brnot, 2010).

The fact that Slovenia, despite certain positive trends, still has a long way to go in achieving full, or even satisfactory, gender equality is also demonstrated by a study conducted by the European Institute for Gender Equality[62] (henceforth EIGE), which states that the domain with the greatest difference between the genders is the domain of power.[63] Nor does the index of gender equality in the domain of work indicate a satisfactory picture in Slovenia: in spite of being significantly higher than in the domain of power, it amounts to 69.1 and does not differ from the European average (EU27 69).[64]

The unsatisfactory position of women both in the labour market and in Slovenian society in general is further confirmed by the Fifth and Sixth Reports of the Republic of Slovenia on the Realisation of the Provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 2013), in which it is stated that the labour market in Slovenia is still horizontally and vertically segregated by gender, as women predominate amongst employees in service activities, primarily in the fields of health and social care as well as education, while their share of the most senior and best-paid positions, such as those of senior officials, top management and legislators, is still significantly lower than that of men. Furthermore, data for 2011 show that women on average earn 4% less than men, with

[61] For example, the Human Development Report 2009 ranks Slovenia in 29th place in terms of the human development index, i.e., amongst countries with a very high level of development (Vertot, Divjak, Brnot, 2010).
[62] With a special measurement tool called the Gender Equality Index, researchers attempted to determine the level of gender equality in the 27 member states of the European Union (EU27), in which 1 represents absolute inequality and 100 represents absolute equality. The Gender Equality Index is calculated on the basis of gender differences within six fundamental domains: work, money, knowledge, time, power and health (more in EIGE, 2013).
[63] The domain of power measures the difference in the representation of women and men in the political and economic fields, as the greatest measure of gender equality can only be achieved with the balanced representation in and access to decision-making positions (EIGE, 2013).
[64] Gender gaps in full-time equivalent employment rates demonstrate the difference in the participation of men and women in the labour market. In all countries, it was found that women are less present in the labour market than men, that they work fewer hours and that they are present in the labour market for fewer years in their life. The data also indicate that horizontal gender segregation or segmentation (sectoral segregation) remains characteristic of the European labour market, with women still leading the way in typically feminised sectors, such as education, health services and social work (EIGE, 2013).

the greatest difference in the average earnings of women and men being amongst employees with short- and long-cycle higher education, where the difference amounts to almost 19%. The proportion of women involved in political decision making is also low (CEDAW, 2013).

In view of the longstanding inclusion of women in the labour market, their success in the field of education,[65] and the long tradition of the implementation of policies encouraging gender equality, one would expect the position of women to be significantly better both in the labour market and in the index of gender equality.[66] However, it is clear that, in Slovenia as well as elsewhere in Europe, women are still significantly underrepresented in positions of decision making and power.

Research highlights the fact that women encounter significantly more difficulties on entering the labour market than their male colleagues (Mencin-Čeplak, 2002; Ule and Šribar, 2008). Aleksandra Kanjuo Mrčela (2007) points out that the reasons for discrimination against women in the labour market can be found in the fact that positions with the greatest power are strongly masculinised, both in terms of gender as well as the expected leadership style and way of exercising power. Research shows that, due to the way of working (long and inflexible hours, frequent business travel, expectations regarding dedication to work, etc.), masculinised professions, irrespective of whether they are populated by men or women, are typically less adaptive in terms of harmonising work and family (Falter Mennino and Brayfield, 250). This kind of work environment represents an obstacle primarily to women, as both foreign (Drobnič and Rodriguez, 2011; Hochschild, 2003; Rosenthal, 2001; Wajcman, 1998), and Slovenian (Kanjuo-Mrčela and Černigoj-Sadar, 2007; Kanjuo-Mrčela and Černigoj-Sadar, 2011; Rener et al., 2005; Sedmak and Medarič, 2007; Ule et al., 2003) research incontrovertibly demonstrates the continued presence of the traditional division of caregiving and housework between the genders. In spite of their full integration into paid work, women remain the primary care providers of the home and family. This is also confirmed by the findings of the EIGE (2013), which state that the second domain in which differences between the genders are the greatest is the domain of time, particularly with regard to time invested in unpaid care and housework. Although Slovenia, with an index of 49.1 (EU27 38.8), is above

[65] Research shows that women in Slovenia achieve a higher level of education and successfully conclude their studies more quickly than men (Mencin Čeplak and Tašner, 2009; Gaber and Marjanovič-Umek, 2009; Ule, 2010; CEDAW, 2013).

[66] The index of gender equality measured within the framework of the research project EIGE (2013) amounted to 56 for Slovenia, just two points higher than the European average (EU27 54).

the European average in this respect, there is still a major difference between the genders in the use of time for caregiving and domestic chores.

In Slovenia, thanks to socialist ideology, there is intensive inclusion of women in the area of paid work. However, the essentially traditional division of work between the genders in the private sphere has not changed, as there have not been significant shifts in the ideology, thinking and perceptions associated with the traditional division of roles, particularly the conventional roles of women as mothers and housewives. The state "to some extent disburdened women in the socialist period with certain 'measures' such as the well-developed childcare network and all-day primary school, but it was far from eliminating the double workload and the ideological thinking and perceptions regarding the maternal role of women" (Kozmik and Jeram 1997, 12–13).

The developmental trends in the labour market and the behaviour of men with regard to equality and partnership remain largely embedded in traditional patterns and practices, and are out of sync with the expectations of young women, whose patterns of life have changed markedly in recent decades. Although contemporary men have developed the rhetoric of equality, they fail to behave according to it (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2006), which has negative effects in the context of everyday practices, particularly for women.

Giving written form to the principles of gender equality is, therefore, not enough; it is essential that these principles also be consistently put into practice on all levels of social action. It appears that, although the question of gender equality is present on the declarative level, its realisation still lags far behind the desired effects, as everyday practices and expectations in the labour market reveal numerous inconsistencies with the expected effects and practices with regard to gender equality.

6.2.3 Slight shifts in the vertical and alternations in the horizontal…

In this section, we will focus our attention on the question of the inroads made by women into certain "prestige" professions, such as the legal profession (the judiciary), leadership positions in business, leadership and expert positions in public administration, and senior positions in education, all areas that were long reserved exclusively for men. The position of women

within these professions[67] is of particular interest due to the fact that, as certain foreign studies have demonstrated (Cairney, 2007; Kenworthy and Malami, 1999), these are the professions that facilitate entry into the field of politics. Len Kenworthy and Melissa Malami (1999) find that relevant work experience linked with leadership and expert work are much more relevant to a political career than mere participation in the labour market.

Although the data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia for the period from 1970 to 2000 are, due to the use of different methodologies and changes in the classification of professions, not entirely comparable, they nonetheless bear witness to the kind of shifts that have occurred in the ratio of women and men in leadership and senior positions. It is evident from Table 13 that shifts have in fact occurred, but that they are extremely slow and certainly not yet sufficient. It is very significant that, in the period from 1980 to 1990, there was no shift whatsoever with regard to gender structure in leadership and senior positions, although it should be noted that different methodologies were used in collecting these data. From 2000 onwards, however, data were collected with a unified methodology and classification of professions, and are therefore directly comparable. These data show that the proportion of women in leadership and senior positions[68] is gradually increasing, but that the process is slow, with the proportion of women increasing by less than 5 percentage points over 12 years.

Table 13: The proportion of women amongst leadership and senior personnel[69]

Year	Total	Women	% Women
1970*	22,836	3,032	13.3%
1980*	20,106	4,095	20.4%
1990**	18,702	3,864	20.7%

[67] We understand a profession as an occupation that has achieved high status in society as well as autonomy based on specific expert knowledge (Watson, 1995, 222), while also taking recourse to the definition by X. Hall, who understands a profession as a social role that has a central significance for an individual, as well as having indirect or direct financial and social consequences (Hall, 1969).

[68] From 2000 onwards, the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia included the following professions under the category of leadership and senior personnel: legislators, senior officials, directors and member of management boards, and managers (SORS, 2000, 2010, 2012).

[69] Due to the incomparability of data, in Appendix 1, Figure 1, the data are divided by period, whereby it is evident what was included under the category of senior personnel within the framework of national statistics databases in specific periods.

2000**	32,081	9,142	28.5%
2010**	45,870	14,778	32.2%
2012**	43,172	14,503	33.6%

Source: *Census Books for censuses, SRS, 1971, 1981. **SORS, Statistical Register of Employment, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2012.

Although one could say that the proportion of women in leadership and senior positions has increased significantly since the 1970s, it is clear that women have barely achieved a one third share of the positions of power and decision making, both in public administration and in the business sector.

Table 14: The proportion of women amongst legislators and senior officials

	2000	2010	2012
LEGISLATORS[70]	23.1%	16.6%	23.3%
SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	48.2%	56.0%	53.7%
SENIOR OFFICIALS OF SPECIAL INTEREST ORGANISATIONS	38.5%	51.7%	49.9%
TOTAL	**40.9%**	**47.8%**	**48.4%**

Source: SORS, Statistical Register of Employment, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2012.

[70] According to the Standard Classification of Occupations (SCO), legislators include: president of the Republic, president of the National Assembly, member of Parliament, president of the National Council, national councillor, prime minister, minister, municipal mayor, urban municipality mayor, president of a regional council, president of a municipal council, president of a local community council, president of a village community council, president of an urban quarter community council (SORS – SCO, V2, http://www.stat.si/klasje/tabela.aspx?cvn=1182).

Public administration is an important field in which women (who, as has been determined in the previous chapters, surpass men in higher education achievements) have for some time represented the majority of those gaining employment. This is demonstrated by Table 14, in which it is evident that the proportion of women in leadership and senior positions in public administration is increasing significantly: in 2000, women represented 40% of legislators and senior officials, whereas in 2012 the figure was just over 48%. *The Report on the Position of Women in Slovenia in the 1990s* states that, in the 1990s, women occupied all of the most demanding positions in the state administration, including the positions of senior officials (secretary general, state undersecretary, advisor, undersecretary, deputy director, advisor to the director, senior advisor), amongst which women represented 47% of all employees on 30 June 1996. The highest representation of women was amongst undersecretaries (62%), while 55% of general secretaries and 52% of advisors to the director were women (Kozmik and Jeram 1997, 113).

Earlier data show that, in the 1970s, women were also well represented in certain segments of senior positions. From the 1971 Yearbook, it is evident that there were 28 women amongst the 55 officials and managers in chambers, the Chamber of Commerce and similar,[71] which represents approximately 50% of all of those employed in these functions.

However, we must not be misled by these kind of data, as closer examination reveals that the proportion of women is inversely related to the degree of power of the positions: the higher one goes on the scale of decision-making positions in the public or state administration, the fewer women are present. Thus, for example, the overall picture of the gender structure of employees in various leadership and senior positions in 1970 shows that the proportion of women in the highest positions of power in the state administration (members of representative bodies with ongoing responsibilities, elected officials with ongoing responsibilities, members of representative bodies and officials) was lower than 20%.[72] Amongst members of representative bodies with ongoing responsibilities, the proportion of women was only 10.1% (SORS, Census Books from the 1971 census).[73]

[71] In the original: *"funkcioneri i rukovodioci u komorama i slično"* ["power holders and managers in chambers, etc."].
[72] For a more detailed presentation, see Vrečko and Antić-Gaber (2011).
[73] For a more detailed presentation for 1970, see Appendix 1, Table 15.

A similar situation is observed in all of the other periods. We do not have precisely elaborated data from the 1980s;[74] however, data from the 1990s show that, in spite of the presence of women in important positions in the public administration and in other senior positions, the highest positions of power were still reserved for men (Kozmik and Jeram, 1997). Data for later periods, from 2000 to 2012 (see Table 14), also show that women in the public and state administration occupy the most demanding positions, such as those of senior government officials and senior officials of special interest organisations.[75] The authors of the report *Women in Political Decision-Making: Monitoring Report by the Slovenian Presidency* also state that the proportion of women in all of the most important areas of operation of the public administration in Slovenia is amongst the highest in the EU, amounting to 42% in 2007. In the same year, Latvia registered the same proportion, and only Sweden had a higher proportion (43.9%) (Antić-Gaber, Rožman, Šepetavc, 2008). Nonetheless, it is evident from the data that women remain underrepresented in the most senior positions of power in public and state administration, occupying only 23.3% of such positions in 2012.

We find a very similar situation with regard to leadership and senior positions in the business sector. From statistical data (Table 15), it is evident that the proportion of women amongst leadership and senior personnel in companies has been gradually increasing since 1970, but these shifts are very slow. In 1970, women accounted for 10.8% of directors and other leadership personnel in economic bodies,[76] while in 1990, women represented 11.9% of all directors and presidents of managerial bodies. Comparable data from 2000 to 2012 show that the proportion of women amongst directors and members of management boards is gradually increasing, but that it increased by less than 3 percentage points in this twelve-year period, from 22.6% in 2000 to 25.8% in 2012 (Table 15). It is also important to point out that companies led by women are typically smaller and are predominantly engaged in providing services.[77]

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[74] For a more detailed presentation, see Appendix 1, Tables 16 and 17.

[75] The Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia has classified the following as senior officials of special-interest organisations: senior officials of political-party organisations; senior officials of employers', workers' and other economic-interest organisations; senior officials of humanitarian and other special-interest organisations (SORS, http://www.stat.si/klasje/tabela.aspx?cvn=1182).

[76] In the original: "*privredni organi*".

[77] Companies led by women in 2009 were predominantly small companies (92%), i.e., companies with fewer than five employees. The largest proportion of companies led by women were service providers in hospitality (19.4%) and commerce (18.6%). In absolute terms, the only areas in which the number of companies led by women was greater than those led by men were health care and social care (Lah, 2012).

Table 15: The proportion of women amongst directors, presidents and members of management boards[78]

Year/Description	Total	Number of women	Proportion of women
1970* Directors and other leadership personnel of economic bodies	9,290	1,002	10.8%
1990** Directors, presidents of managerial bodies	3,939	469	11.9%
2000** Directors and members of management boards	11,913	2,695	22.6%
2010** Directors and members of management boards	18,617	4,977	26.7%
2012** General directors and members of management boards	1,983	511	25.8%

[78] Data from 1970 and 1990 are not comparable, nor can data from these years be compared with those of 2000, 2010 and 2012. Data from the years from 2000 to 2012 are, however, comparable. It was not possible to obtain data about directors for 1990.

Source: *Census Books from the SRS census, 1971.**SORS, Statistical Register of Employment, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2012.

The data presented above leave no doubt as to the presence of vertical segregation or segmentation both in the area of public and state administration and in the area of the economy. Furthermore, they testify to the existence of "glass architecture", that is, "informal but very powerful obstacles to mobility within organisations, which are never explicitly defined and are very difficult to overcome" (Kanjuo-Mrčela, 2007, 181).

In addition to vertical segregation/segmentation, data clearly demonstrate that the phenomenon of horizontal segmentation – the concentration of personnel in gender-specific professional areas – is still present in the labour market. Data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia show that, in all historical periods, women have dominated in professions from the areas of education, health and social care, social work, accounting, bookkeeping, human resources and secretarial work, sales, personal services and cleaning services. Men, on the other hand, prevail amongst engineers, drivers, builders, heavy mobile machinery operators, carpenters, mechanics, and device installation and maintenance workers. Notwithstanding certain minor changes, this gender division of professions and sectors remains strongly present today, as is confirmed by Eurostat data. These data show that, both in Slovenia and in the EU27, markedly feminised professions are particularly evident in the area of health and social care, where women represented 80% of employees (EU27 78.3%) in 2007, and in the area of education, where 77.8% of employees in 2007 were women (EU27 72.2%). Particularly masculinised professions were evident within the industrial sector (builders, engineers, machinists, etc.), where only 29.4% of employees in Slovenia in 2007 were women (Eurostat 2010).

The data presented thus far leave no doubt that, in spite of the long tradition of the presence of women in the sphere of paid work in Slovenia, the position of women in the labour market is far from satisfactory. At the same time, there is no denying the fact that important, highly visible and positive shifts have occurred in certain professions. A historical analysis of the position of women in the labour market shows that, from the 1970s on, women have made an important breakthrough in certain prestigious and previously highly masculinised areas, such as law, journalism and university or tertiary education, with the latter being the slowest to change.

In the continuation, we will attempt to determine the shifts and displacements in the aforementioned fields. As mentioned above, research (Cairney, 2007; Kenworthy and Malami, 1999) has demonstrated that transitions from these professional fields are more frequent than from others. In addition to a high level of education (cultural capital) and experience in top positions in one's professional field, gaining entry to politics is also influenced by the knowledge, competences, abilities, operational practices and developed social (professional) networks (social and symbolic capital) that can be gained precisely in the professions in question.

6.3 Breakthroughs in individual professions

6.3.1 The case of law

At first sight, it appears that law is the field from which it is natural, so to speak, to cross into politics and back again. Lawyers' knowledge, expertise and experience regarding the workings of the political, legal and economic system seem indispensable for successful and efficient engagement in politics. Data indicating that many Slovenian politicians (MPs, ministers, etc.) come from the field of law suggest that law and politics are very closely related. How does engagement in law affect the possibilities of women to enter politics? What shifts have taken place in this field in the past few decades?

According to statistical data, it is precisely the field of law that has witnessed the most evident breakthrough by women. It is clear from Table 16 that the proportion of women legal experts has more than doubled since the 1970s, resulting in women accounting for more than two thirds of employees in this profession today. The greatest rise was recorded in the decade 1980–1990, when the proportion of women increased by more than a quarter (or 26 percentage points), reaching 62% in 1990, after which their share has remained stable, fluctuating between 61% and 68%. Thus, we can speak today of the legal profession as a feminised professional field.

Table 16: The proportion of women amongst the total number of legal experts and lawyers

Year	Total number of legal experts and lawyers	Women	Proportion of women

1970*	1,487	428	28.8%
1980*	1,050	380	36.2%
1990**	2,822	1,758	62.3%
2000**	4,173	2,564	61.4%
2010**	6,659	4,527	68.0%
2012**	6,909	4,684	67.8%

Source: *Census Books from the SRS census, 1971, 1981.**SORS, Statistical Register of Employment, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2012.

Amongst all of the legal professions, the most obvious reversal has occurred in the judiciary. Whereas, until the mid 1990s, the judiciary was reserved almost exclusively for men, today we can talk about its feminisation. As is evident from Table 17, in 1970, women occupied just under a fifth of all judicial positions within the general courts and specialised courts,[79] but their share had risen to more than three quarters (77.6%) by 2010 and has not diminished since, continuing to show slight growth.

Table 17: The proportion of female judges in general courts and specialised courts

Year	Judges Total	Women	Proportion of women
1970*	367	73	19.9%
1980*	475	217	45.7%
1990**	551	284	51.5%
2001***	745	497	66.7%
2010***	1045	811	77.6%
2012***	1001	779	77.8%

Source: *Statistical Yearbook SRS. Administration of Justice. 1971. 1981. **Statistical Yearbook RS. 1991.***Judicial statistics. 2002, 1-9 2010, 1-9 2012.

[79] In this period, the term "specialised courts" was not in use, but we can consider as equivalent the so-called Commercial Court, which has not existed since the 1980s.

It is, however, necessary to point out that, within the judicial profession, the promotion of women to senior positions (in the Supreme Court and the High Court of Justice) occurred at the slowest rate. The data in Appendix 1, Tables 21, 22, 23, 24 show that women in general courts and specialised courts took the longest to advance to the positions of judges in the Supreme Court and the High Court. In the Supreme Court, as Figure 4 shows, women remain underrepresented to this day.

Figure 4: The number of male and female judges in the Supreme Court in Slovenia between 1970 and 2012



Source: *Statistical Yearbook SRS. Administration of Justice. 1971. 1981. **Statistical Yearbook RS. Administration of Justice. 1991.***Judicial statistics. 2002, 1-9 2010, 1-9 2012.

Thus, in 1970, only one of the 21 judicial positions in the Supreme Court was occupied by a woman, whereas in the High Commercial Court all of the judges were men (Statistical Yearbook SRS. Administration of Justice, 1971). Even more significant are data for 1980 and 1990, which show that the proportion of women in judicial positions had already caught up with or surpassed that of men; however, this can only be ascribed to an increased proportion of women in lower courts, such as Basic Courts and Courts of Associated Labour. While in Basic Courts the proportion of women amongst judges reached 50% in 1980 and just over 55% in 1990, women also accounted for more than 50% of judges in Courts of Associated Labour in 1990.[80] In the Supreme Court, the proportion of female judges in 1980 was only 10% (2 female judges, 18 male judges), while in the High Court it was 24% (Statistical

[80] The figure for the Court of Associated Labour for 1980 is not rendered by gender, and has therefore not been stated.

Yearbook SRS. Administration of Justice, 1981). In 1990, the proportion of female judges in both superior courts of general jurisdiction was slightly higher but still remained low compared to the overall share of women in judicial positions (Statistical Yearbook SRS. Administration of Justice, 1991).

In the period 2001–2012, an important turnaround took place, especially in the High Court. In 2001, the proportion of women in this court, at slightly over 54%, already exceeded that of men, and by 2010 it had risen to 72%, remaining the same in 2012. However, in the Supreme Court, the highest court of general jurisdiction, we can observe no such turnaround. Despite the proportion of women increasing somewhat compared to previous periods, it stood at 34.3% in 2001, reached 42% in 2010 and fell again to 37% in 2012 (Figure 4). The Supreme Court is the only court where women remain underrepresented (Judicial Statistics, 2002, 1–9 2010, 1–9 2012).

An important breakthrough in women occupying judicial positions can be observed in the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia (since 1991, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia),[81] which we treat separately due to its different jurisdiction. Since Slovenia's independence in particular, the Constitutional Court has been the supreme body of judicial authority for the protection of the constitution, as well as for legislation, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Judges of this court are elected to their functions.[82]

Table 18: The proportion of women in the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia and the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia

The Constitutional Court	The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia			The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia*			
Year	1970*	1980*	1990**	1991-1998	2000	2010	On 1 March

[81] The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia came into being on 5 June 1963. When, in 1991, Slovenia became an independent state, this court became a court of the independent state. On passing the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia on 23 December 1991, which introduced the principle of the division of powers, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia gained the position of the supreme organ of the judiciary for the protection of the rule of the constitution and law, human rights and basic freedoms (http://www.us-rs.si/).

[82] The Constitutional Court comprises nine judges. They are elected to their positions by Parliament, after having been nominated as candidates by the President of the Republic (http://www.us-rs.si/).

							2014
Judges Total	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
Women	1	2	1	0	4	4	5
Proportion of women	11.1%	22.2%	11.1%	0	44.4%	44.4%	55.6%

Source: *Statistical Yearbook SRS. Administration of Justice. 1971. 1981. **Statistical Yearbook RS. Administration of Justice. 1991.***The Constitutional Court RS, for the periods 2000, 2010, 2014. http://www.us-rs.si/o-sodiscu/sodniki/vsi-sodniki/

As is evident in Table 18, women only represented a minimal proportion of judges (one or two at a time) in the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, which was established in 1963. It is interesting, however, to observe the situation subsequent to Slovenia's independence and the establishment of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, which introduced the principle of the division of powers and became the supreme organ of the judiciary, and consequently one of the most prestigious institutions in the country. In the period until 1998, there were no women amongst the judges of this prestigious institution; since 2000, however, women have become an important part of the Constitutional Court, representing almost half of the court's judges.[83] It is significant, however, that, from independence until the present day, only one of the nine presidents of this court has been a woman.[84] It is again the case, therefore, that the most prestigious and crucial positions – those that are the most important symbolically and sometimes the most delicate politically – are still reserved predominantly for men.

Despite the fact that the most symbolically important positions, such as presidents of the Supreme Court and the most prestigious Constitutional Court, continue to be reserved for men, we can still say that, in this field, women have successfully converted their cultural capital and taken the majority of positions in the courts of general jurisdiction and specialised courts, and, in the past decade, in the High Court as well.

[83] In the current composition of the Constitutional Court, female judges occupy 5 of the 9 judicial positions (on 1 March 2014).

[84] The only president of the Constitutional Court has been Dr Dragica Wedam Lukić, in the period from 11 November 2001 to 10 November 2004 (The Republic of Slovenia, The Constitutional Court. http://www.us-rs.si/o-sodiscu/sodniki/vsi-sodniki).

Some cases of women politicians who previously pursued successful careers in the legal profession (Darja Lavtižar Bebler, Irma Pavlinič Krebs, Katarina Kresal) show that they were able to efficiently convert their prior experience and practice into political capital, covering fields such as human rights, proposals for electoral legislation, and the controversial case of individuals who had their Slovenian citizenship revoked shortly after independence (the so-called "Erased").

6.3.2 The case of journalism

Much like law, journalism is a profession that is extremely close to "professional politics". Following political events and being familiar with them is a vital precondition for success within the profession. Journalists observe politicians closely but, at the same time, there are many cases of women journalists (as well as their male colleagues) who make their way into politics and back both in Slovenia and elsewhere (Danica Simšič, Ljerka Bizilj, Tanja Fajon, Melita Župevc, etc.). Whereas, at least at first sight, a transition from law to politics and back seems unproblematic, this is certainly not true with regard to journalism, as is clear from a number of cases, even in the short period in which the Slovenian state has been in existence, that have revealed a slightly more complicated situation in this field. Nonetheless, journalism is a social activity that provides those who practise it with certain knowledge, experience and competencies that can be successfully capitalised on in politics. But is this true regarding women as well?

As in the field of law, we can broadly observe important positive shifts in journalism (Table 19). The proportion of women journalists has more than doubled in the last four decades. In 1970, women accounted for only 24% of those employed in journalism, but this figure had risen to 40% by 1990. The proportion of women surpassed that of men for the first time in 2000 with 53%, while in 2012 more than 58% of journalists were women. Women also occupy the highest positions in journalism, with data for 2000 and 2010 (Table 20)[85] clearly showing that their proportion amongst "editor-journalists" and "desk editors" is either the same as or higher than the proportion of men.

[85] Data on editors for prior and later periods are unavailable.

Table 19: The proportion of women amongst journalists[86]

Year	Total	Women	Proportion of women
1970*	807	201	24.9%
1980	No data	No data	No data
1990**	1,414	566	40%
2000**	872	466	53.4%
2010**	1,375	821	59.7%
2012**	2,170	1,270	58.5%

Source: *Census Books from the SRS census, 1971**SORS, Statistical Register of Employment, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2012.

Table 20: The proportion of women amongst editor-journalists

	2000			2010		
	Total	Women	Proportion of women	Total	Women	Proportion of women
Editor-journalist	620	290	46.7%	440	222	50.5%
Desk editor	72	42	58.3%	234	135	57.7%

It is possible to conclude from the above data that the gender structure of this field – a field that, according to certain findings (Cairney, 2007), should by its very nature lead women more directly into political activity in the broadest sense – should not represent an obstacle to women, as they have not only exceeded the proportion of men but have also occupied a corresponding proportion of decision-making positions, i.e., editorial positions. It may well be that an additional obstacle to women from this field entering politics in greater numbers is a belief, often detected amongst the public, that it is not possible to act properly as a professional journalist after having been engaged publicly in party politics, this having marked and tarnished the reputation of the journalist. We find examples of this in the past when, after a period in politics, some women journalists were unable to return freely to their

[86] Surveys for 2000, 2010 and 2012 include journalists employed in companies, societies and similar organisations, as well as freelance journalists.

working environment (Ljerka Bizilj, Mirjam Muženič). However, in order to reach a fully substantiated conclusion in this area we would need more rigorous methods of investigation enabling more thorough qualitative analyses of the field and the way individuals operate within it, and of the perceptions the broader public have of journalism, particularly with regard to its links with politics.

6.3.3 The case of university

The field of education in general and the university in particular should, by definition, be a field in which people prevail who have expertise in their scientific field, who can ask the right questions – questions pertaining to a particular time and space – and who are capable of transferring their knowledge to others, which means that they should know how to speak in public, how to present their arguments well, and how to accept criticism and corrections of their work.

In the previous chapters, we have seen that it is in this profession that women have experienced the greatest shifts: this is the area that has become the most feminised. Closer inspection, however, reveals a rather strong affirmation and reinforcement of gender stereotypes with regard to the appropriateness of the activate participation of one gender or the other in particular areas. At the lower levels of education, which are considered to be oriented more towards moral education, women represent the majority of employees (moral education is considered to be more the domain of women), whereas at the higher, presumably more science-oriented levels men continue to dominate. This is particularly emphasised here because this situation persists despite the fact that women have prevailed amongst the total professional staff in education since the 1970s,[87] with the proportion of women never dropping below 70% from that time on, and standing at slightly more than 81% in 2012 (Table 21).

Table 21: The proportion of women amongst the total teaching/professional staff in education

[87] While the statistical yearbooks for 1970 and 1980 use the term “teaching staff”, statistical registers for later periods use “education experts”, with both categories comprising the entire staff employed at any level of education in the country.

Year	Total	Women	Proportion of women
1970*	17,206	12,061	70%
1980*	30,933	22,560	72.9%
1990**	31,685	24,198	76.4%
2000**	30,742	23,297	75.8%
2010**	37,046	28,949	78.1%
2012**	45,923	37,259	81.1%

Source: *Census Books for censuses, SRS, 1971, 1981. **SORS, Statistical Register of Employment, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2012.

At the same time, these data show that the proportion of women in the field of university and higher education has increased significantly, although the shifts in this regard have been very slow.

From Table 22, it is evident that the proportion of women amongst the total teaching staff at universities and (short- and long-cycle) higher education schools has increased steadily since 1970. Between 2000 and 2012 (the period for which data are comparable due to a unified methodology), the share of women amongst higher education teachers and fellows, as well as amongst research workers who participate in higher education programmes, has risen by 6 percentage points, reaching 42% in 2012.

Table 22: The proportion of women employed in the field of university and higher education[88]

	Total	Women	Proportion of women
1970 Teaching staff at universities, short-cycle and long-cycle higher education schools[89]	1,086	254	23.4%
1980	/	/	/

[88] As classifications have changed through time, further specifications are added in Table 22 related to individual years. Since 2000, the category of higher education teachers used by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia has included: full professors, associate professors, assistant professors, senior lecturers, lecturers and language instructors. In 1980, lecturers and language instructors were not included, while in 1990 only language instructors were not included.

[89] In the original: "*Nastavno osoblje univerzitetnih, višjih i visokih škola*" [Teaching Staff at Universities and at the Short- and Long-Cycle Higher Education Schools].

1990** Teaching staff at universities, short-cycle and long-cycle higher education schools	2,295	667	29.1%
2000 ** The proportion of higher education teachers, higher education fellows and research workers teaching at the higher education levels	4,825	1,744	36.1%
2010** The proportion of higher education teachers, higher education fellows and research workers teaching at the higher education levels	8,474	3,384	39.9%
2012/2013*** The proportion of higher education teachers, higher education fellows and research workers teaching at the higher education levels	8.763	3.689	42.1%

Source: *Census Books for census, SRS, 1971.**SORS: ŠOL-KP. A statistical report on higher education teachers and research workers, short-cycle higher education school lecturers, and experts in higher vocational education, 2000, 2010***SORS, Pedagogical staff at higher education institutions and short-cycle higher vocational schools, 2012/2013 academic year.

Table 22 also shows that, although the proportion of women amongst higher education teachers has increased significantly since 1980, it has consistently remained significantly lower than that of men. A detailed examination of data on the proportion of women amongst higher education teachers by workplace, as presented in Table 23 below, also shows that the proportion of women decreases noticeably as they climb the career ladder. In the 2012/2013 academic year, women accounted for 23% of full professors, 33.2% of associate professors, 43% of assistant professors and 44.2% of senior lecturers. The highest proportion of women is recorded amongst language instructors, who accounted for 79% in 2000[90] and 83% in 2012.

It should not be overlooked, however, that certain positive trends can be observed within all of the categories, while the cross-section by years (Table 23) also indicates that the proportion of women has witnessed an upward trend in all positions amongst higher education teachers. Nonetheless, changes in the top positions are still very slow, reflecting the effects of the glass ceiling (cf. also Ule 2013, 36-37). The period after 2000 represents an important milestone in

[90] Data for language instructors prior to 2000 are unavailable.

the process of women achieving the positions of full and associate professor, with the proportion of women amongst full professors increasing by 8.2 percentage points and amongst associate professors by 11.7 percentage points, whereas in the previous decade (1990–2000) the proportion of women in both categories had increased by 2.5 percentage points. Based on the above data, it is possible to conclude that women's breakthrough to lecturing positions at university can only be traced back to the last decade of the previous century,[91] which means that women are relative novices in this field and that their further advancement to top positions is (hopefully) to be expected.[92]

Table 23: The proportion of women amongst higher education teachers by title/position

Category of pedagogical staff	1980*	1990*	2000*	2010*	2012/2013**
Higher education teachers	**19.4%**	**17.6%**	**24.8%**	**35.9%**	**37.8%**
Full Professors	-	9.4%	11.9%	20.1%	23.1%
Associate Professors	-	16.5%	19.1%	30.8%	33.2%
Assistant Professors	-	16.1%	28.6%	40.7%	43%
Senior Lecturers	-	23.3%	29.3%	39.2%	44.2%
Lecturers	-	52.1%	49.6%	59.7%	56.4%
Language Instructors	-		79.1%	80.0%	83.2%

Source: **SORS: ŠOL-KP. A statistical report on higher education teachers and research workers, short-cycle higher education school lecturers, and experts in higher vocational education, for the period 1980–2010.

[91] In the period 1990–2000, the proportion of women increased by 12.5 percentage points, and in the period 2000–2010 by 12.1 percentage points.

[92] To date, the position of the Rector of the University of Ljubljana has, in all of the years of its existence, only been held by one woman (Dr Andreja Kocjančič), and at all of the Slovenian universities together only by two women (apart from Kocjančič, Dr Lucija Čok). The changes are nowhere near monodirectional, as is demonstrated by the fact that all four universities in Slovenia are currently run by men, that women deans only account for 10% of all deans, and that, in 2012, there were only 5 women amongst the 100 full members and associate members of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, whose members are elected for their special achievements in sciences and arts (SORS, Women's Day 2012).

*SORS, Pedagogical staff at higher education institutions and short-cycle higher vocational schools, Slovenia, 2012/2013 academic year.

6.4 Employment, advancement and formative professions and the transition to politics

The above outline of the dynamics and structural shifts in the fields examined clearly demonstrates that Slovenia possesses a sufficiently broad pool of suitable women candidates for the highest political positions. For some time, women in Slovenia have been equally present in the sphere of paid work, and they have successfully gained entry to previously masculinised employment areas (law, journalism, university); they do not, however, occupy decision-making positions in proportions comparable to men.

It can be concluded that the presence and high representation of women in the field of paid work is only the first step towards recognition of the fact that women can participate equally in political decision making, and in no way guarantees their balanced presence in politics. Achieving political positions requires a great deal more. As Kenworthy and Malami (1999) determine, it is necessary to acquire experience associated with leadership and expert work. Women face significant barriers in this regard related to career advancement, as they often reach a “glass ceiling” while men elegantly overtake them in the “elevator”.

Although women have battled their way into those professions that facilitate entry into politics (law, journalism, teaching), and in some of these professions (journalism) have even taken an almost equal share of the decision-making positions (editorial posts), this does not ensure an easier breakthrough into politics.

In determining transitions to politics from individual professions, we are faced with certain problems hindering the establishment of reliable patterns of transition. The completion of education and the occupation of a specific position within a profession are not always unequivocal, monodirectional and unproblematic processes. The type of work undertaken prior to entering politics or a political function seems to be particularly important, while the direct linking of this work to advisory or expert work for politics appears to be an especially effective strategy.

Examining the employment structure of the current MPs in Slovenia, we can determine that the majority of women MPs are professionals who, prior to being elected, occupied certain important senior/leadership and advisory positions in the state administration or the business sector (of 29 women MPs, 16 had previously occupied senior positions of responsibility in various companies and firms, as well as in public administration, working as business advisors, heads of administrative units, secretaries-general in local communities and project leaders), some of them having come from formative professions (4 from journalism). Approximately half of male MPs had previously occupied senior positions, and as many as 6 (10%) had spent their entire careers in politics (meaning that from their first employment they had been employed in a political party or had been active as professional politicians). There are no cases of career paths of this kind amongst women MPs.

It seems that, in the future, we will have to focus much more on a detailed analysis of the career paths of politicians, as well as documenting their multiple orientations and instrumental professional paths (Cairney, 2007) prior to entering professional politics. In this way, it will be easier to determine which professions can traditionally be understood as facilitating entry into politics (beyond formative professions) and to establish the importance of instrumental professions for active engagement in politics. In examining politicians' professional paths, it is insufficient to simply determine their basic formative professions: the variety of professions and activities performed by politicians prior to their election should be established. It would seem that, in order to determine the possibilities for making the transition from a professional career to politics, it is important to examine the entire combinatory potential of professional engagement (Shephard et al., 2001) as well as the professions in which individuals were engaged directly prior to standing for office (Rush, 2001).

Of course, all of this requires monitoring the political careers of politicians across longer stretches of time, as well as applying purely qualitative research methods and approaches that, like elsewhere, will need to be developed in Slovenia in order to be able to answer the questions asked in the present study in a more comprehensive way. What we can say in the present chapter is that, although women have made significant inroads into many professional fields, they have not yet succeeded in converting the acquired experience and capital into political capital. This is not only their loss; it is a loss for Slovenian politics and society as a whole.

7 Women, Politics and the Value Orientations of Contemporary Slovenian Society

Irena Selišnik and Milica Antić Gaber

After more than two decades of dealing with the issue of the (still) low presence of women in Slovenian politics, during which time we have witnessed relatively favourable changes in some other fields (education, employment, pay), we cannot ignore the fact that, despite certain favourable shifts (mostly at the institutional level), the dynamics of change have stalled and we are recording stagnation or, at least, a rate of change that is (too) slow.

Slovenia belongs to a group of Central European countries that display many common features in their development to date (Fuchs and Klingemann, 2006), while, at the same time, it is a country with many special features originating in its previous history within the Austro-Hungarian Empire as well as in its specific situation in the once common state of Yugoslavia. This distinguishes Slovenia from many other countries of the former socialist-communist block (Miheljak, 2006).

Following its transition to a new political and economic system, and despite the many attempts to retraditionalise Slovenian society (especially with regard to the position of women) (Jogan, 2000; Antić Gaber, 2006), Slovenia was one of the first of the transition countries (Jalušič and Antić, 2001) to address the issue of gender equality at the institutional level (for example by setting up the Parliamentary Committee for Women's Policy and the Government Office for Women's Policy in the beginning of the 1990s). However, having introduced gender quotas at the beginning of the second decade of Slovenia's existence as a sovereign state, it seems that the position of women in the field of politics still leaves much to be desired, as it was only after the last general election in 2011 that the presence of women in parliament reached a critical mass.

This inevitably raises the question: How is it possible that in Slovenia – a country that was once considered the most economically developed and the most open and pro-Western part of the socialist block, a country that was the best prepared for the looming transition period changes, that was the first to join the EU and enter the euro area, that managed to keep its income inequities below an alarming level, that did not strip women of or severely limit abortion rights during the transition to the new political system, that allowed women to preserve their jobs to a higher degree than in many other post-socialist states, and that, for a long time, succeeded in maintaining a relatively favourable level of social benefits (paid

maternity leave, a public childcare system, etc.) – we are lagging so far behind when dealing with the question of the equal participation of women and men in politics, particularly in the highest positions of political decision-making?

Where, then, do the reasons lie for the low participation of women in Slovenian politics? Why is it that highly educated, economically independent women, who are working full time and are relatively successful in their professions and workplace, cannot find their way to positions of political decision-making? What type of obstacles hinder this step and where are they located? What is the role played in this regard by the broader cultural context? What is the role of the prevailing social norms, values, convictions, myths, stereotypes and everyday practices that are identifiable in Slovenian society and/or how have these changed in recent decades?

In considering the above questions, we will focus on the trends and changes of the past few decades. This approach is taken because we feel that the current course of events cannot be adequately comprehended without understanding the past: the continuities and discontinuities, the shifts and turns, the persistent features and the changes that have taken place over a longer period of time. In collecting data, undertaking analysis and interpreting historical events, we will go back several decades (to the late 1970s and early 1980s), to the time when Slovenia was part of Yugoslavia. It seems that the period of the old regime significantly marked the events that followed much later in the country's development.

Given that our focus is on understanding gender equality in the field of politics, we cannot avoid mentioning that Slovenia (Yugoslavia) was, in 1974, the first country in the world to give women reproductive rights including the right to abortion (Rožman, 2009). It was also a country that, as early as in 1975, expanded maternity leave from three to eight months and later to a year of paid childcare leave, and stipulated by law the division of parental leave between the mother and father. In addition, it set up a broad system of public childcare, it introduced the principle of equal pay for equal work, it decriminalised homosexuality in 1976, and it enabled civilian service as an alternative to compulsory military service, in so doing beginning the demystification of manhood associated with power, heroism and similar. We assume that all of these factors contributed significantly to creating conditions in which women can be active in the public sphere and politics. Indeed, these legislative and practical solutions set women free from the bonds of family life in which they are considered first and foremost – or only – as a mother and housekeeper. The stated measures provided women with

an initial exit from the exclusive framework of the family, thus facilitating their engagement with questions of the broader (political) community.

We are also interested in the dominant perceptions of gender equality amongst the population. How do people perceive the roles of men and women in society and in politics? Where do they predominantly position men and where women? Do they see women as capable of embarking on a political career, or do they still see them first and foremost in their traditional roles? Who, according to them, is more suitable for performing political posts? We will examine persistence as well as shifts and alternations in the perceptions of citizens over a longer period of time. This will help us to better understand the slow pace of change in establishing gender equality in the field of politics.

7.1 Theoretical re-examination

Our point of departure was the question as to where the reasons lie for the still relatively low proportion of women in Slovenian politics. On the basis of research carried out to date, we can conclude that the participation of women in decision-making processes is influenced by three types of factors: cultural, socioeconomic and political. Here we will focus mainly on the first of these, which, despite some exceptions (Antić, 2011a; Fink Hafner, Krašovec, Deželan and Topolinjak, 2011), has, in our view, not yet been adequately investigated in Slovenia with regard to the participation of women in politics.

Before tackling this issue, let us briefly address the other two sets of factors. Socioeconomic factors create conditions that enable women to engage in the field of politics in the first place. Amongst the more important of these factors are the Human Development Index, the country's GDP, the gender pay gap (imbalances in wages between men and women), the proportion of women in the labour market, the birth rate, the level of development of social welfare (Siaroff, 2000; Tremblay, 2007), and the influence of the welfare state (Inglehart and Welzl, 2005). Political factors are largely associated with the structure of the political system and the type of electoral system (proportional or majority) (Antić, 1998; Antić, 2003; Fink-Hafner, Deželan and Topolinjak, 2005; Murko Pleš, Nahtigal and Pleš, 2011), as well as with the political party structure and the organisational structures, type of leadership and ideological orientations of political parties (Krašovec and Deželan, 2011). Also of relevance are issues associated with the pool of eligibles (Norris, 1996, Matland and Montgomery, 2003) from which parties recruit their candidates, which, in turn, depend on recruitment procedures and selection rules associated with the role of party gatekeepers (Antić, 1998).

In the present text, cultural factors are defined as factors referring to the values, convictions and attitudes of social groups and individuals towards important institutions of the (political) system. Special importance is attributed to the role and significance of religions in society, and how these influence the prevailing conceptions of gender relations and gender equality. Research into the representation of women in politics addressed this question with great scientific rigour relatively early on (cf. Rule, 1987). Protestantism appears to be more in favour of women's education and gender equality, but a country's development rate is also an important factor (Inglehart and Welzl, 2005). Thus, it seems that Protestantism and post-industrial society are extremely important factors encouraging a high proportion of women in the processes of decision-making (Siaroff, 2000, 201).

In their research, Ingelhart and Norris (2000, 2001, 2003) concluded that the representation of women in politics is significantly influenced by the general attitude of society towards gender equality. Welzel (2002) even sought a connection between a high representation of women in politics and a low level of corruption in the country. In fact, this research confirms the finding that the dominant culture – with its beliefs and convictions regarding proper gender roles in the family and society, gender relations within the sphere of paid work and employment, but most of all with ideas regarding the roles of men and women in the field of politics – has a major impact on the behaviour of women and their daily lives. On the basis of all of the above, attitudes are constructed towards gender positioning in politics (Inglehart and Norris, 2003, 10).

Inglehart and Norris (2003, 11), probably the leading researchers of the interdependence between value orientations, the characteristics of individual national cultures and women's presence in politics, formulate their hypothesis on the basis of slightly modified modernisation theory, which, in a very simplified way, claims that modernisation should be followed by changes in cultural norms and values. Modernisation is thus bound to bring greater representation of women in politics. While the beginnings of modernisation theory can be found in the works of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, we witnessed its revival in the 1950s and 1960s with the works of Lipset, Lerner, Rostow and Deutsch. In the 1970s, Daniel Bell claimed that after a period of industrialisation we can foresee the subsequent developmental phases of post-industrial society, while also pointing out that the development is nowhere near linear. Bell's studies refuted certain presuppositions of the earlier studies mentioned above, such as the unilinear path of development, the irreversibility of change, the succession of phases, etc. Despite presumably coinciding economic, cultural and political changes, the

subsequent development of a country is unforeseeable due to its specific cultural factors (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Indeed, the key new feature of the modified modernisation theory is a change of perspective according to which modernisation is no longer a unified linear process but one taking place in two stages: modernisation and postmodernisation (Inglehart and Welzl, 2005). As well as arguing that it is, therefore, not a case of an irreversible and culturally converging process, Inglehart provides a convincing explanation of the significance of socioeconomic development for political culture, which, in turn, affects the political structure (see also Kirbiš, 2011, 86). These processes apparently operate with a reciprocal effect (Inglehart and Norris, 2003).

In his exposition, Inglehart claims that citizens who have grown up in a society providing economic security show a higher degree of post-materialist value orientations. The spreading of these values is based on the *hypothesis of deprivation*, which states that the orientations of the individual reflect the socioeconomic environment, with the individual apparently highly valuing that which does not abound, that which is lacking or is hard to obtain, and the *socialisation hypothesis*, according to which there is a certain time (generational) delay in accepting values, with key values taking shape in the course of an individual's maturation in a specific socioeconomic environment (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, 97-98). Human development thus represents a crucial stimulus for an equal relationship between the sexes; however, the pace of this development is still very much dependent on religion, historical development and tradition, as well as on the institutional structures in a particular environment. Changes in the traditional understanding of the family enable women to take their place in the labour market, with the literacy rates and participation of women in education processes also improving. This phase of development changes the traditional distribution of family roles, resulting in shifts in decision-making processes, which start to include more women (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Inglehart and Norris compared the implementation of gender equality to a rising tide that is very difficult to halt, as this process is part of a larger process involving the social and cultural changes with which a society has become deeply imbued; individual events can, however, stop or even redirect the flow of change, as we shall see in the case of Slovenia. Such a broad conception of culture also affects the proportion of women in parliament and in politics in general, having a decisive impact on political institutions and the social structure (Inglehart and Norris, 2003).

In addition to the framework offered by modernisation theory, we will also draw from a concept developed by Geert Hofstede. It forms a part of so-called cultural explanatory

hypotheses, which anticipate that, in traditional societies, women have less chance of standing for office and being elected. According to these hypotheses, traditional assumptions about women have a detrimental effect on the voters and party gatekeepers' decisions, as well as on the stipulation of institutional mechanisms for increasing the proportion of women in politics, including the introduction of gender quotas (Inglehart, Norris and Welzel, 2002). We therefore postulate the hypothesis that the attitude towards gender equality in society and the presence of women in politics are closely interwoven or, in other words, that a greater consensus on the importance of gender equality as a value orientation in society contributes significantly to a more significant presence of women in politics at all levels. In the continuation, we shall also seek to investigate other factors, such as power distance and the traditional division of gender roles, which are addressed by Hofstede, as well as certain hypotheses arising from an analysis of his findings.

In his culturological typology of societies, Hofstede thematised five value orientations: *individualism-collectivism* (the relationship between the individual and society); *uncertainty avoidance* (the reaction of the individual facing circumstances of instability); *power distance* (the desired level of equality in society); *masculinity/femininity* (whether typically masculine or typically feminine gender roles prevail in society; whether the ethos in society is ego-oriented or other-oriented); and *short-term/long-term orientation* (whether society is oriented towards sustainable development). Although Hofstede initially developed his theory within the framework of so-called organisational sociology and corporate culture, he later applied it to the level of national cultures; he did, however, understand that there is a significant difference between organisational and national cultures (organisations enable individuals to decide whether they want to join them) (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010, 47). In their recent studies, Hofstede and his colleagues have drawn data for the research of national cultures from the same databases as Inglehart (*World Value Survey*).[93] Apart from religious, ethnic and regional differences, Hofstede also emphasised that, in national societies, there are important gender differences in terms of value orientations, which according to him should, but usually do not, form part of the description of the culture of a nation (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010, 45).

Hofstede goes so far as to speak of two types of culture, identifying a male culture that is different from a female culture. It is precisely this difference that is supposed to clarify why it

[93] This research has been conducted worldwide since the early 1980s.

is so difficult to change traditional gender roles. In male culture, women are not perceived as individuals who are capable of performing certain roles, not because of their incapacity to fulfil the tasks required by a particular job, but simply because they are symbolically not recognised as capable, they do not fit the widely accepted image of power holders, they do not participate in the rituals that accompany certain roles, or they do not share the values of the dominant male culture (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010, 45). This is why Hofstede speaks of typically masculine- and typically feminine-oriented societies, which are presumably distinguishable on the basis of whether they are self- or other-oriented. Hofstede believes that this not only has an impact on state policy formation, but also on the informal rules of the "political game" and on men's and women's chances of being elected, with power distance being an important factor indicating the level of importance a society places on the value of equality, that is, the level to which a specific culture tolerates an unequal division of power among the people (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010, 175).

We can therefore predict that the values of a society influence not only the formation of political structures but also the possibilities of balanced gender representation in politics. In the continuation, we will investigate the extent to which this holds true for Slovenian society, seeking to determine when the proportion of women in politics has increased and when it has decreased, and what, according to researchers, the reasons have been for the low presence of women in politics. Based on an analysis of data acquired in the Slovenian Public Opinion survey, which, since the late 1960s, has been carried out by Slovenia's Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre, we will test Inglehart's and Hofstede's hypotheses and their validity for Slovenia. In the concluding section, we will verify whether the shifts in the proportion of women in politics coincide with changing values associated with gender equality, with the acceptance of the values of equality (power distance), and with orientation towards family life.

7.2 Findings in Slovenia to date

Research on women and politics, and on women in politics, was carried out as early as in the time of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, when, in February 1963, the Commission for the Social Position of Women in Slovenia of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia (LCS) issued the report *The Social Status of Women in Slovenia*. The analysis covered education, employment and the socio-political activities of

women, and essentially postulated that the “socio-political activity” of women was gradually increasing, but that it was failing to keep up with other indicators of the improvement of the position of women, such as the growing level of education and employment of women. The authors of the research sought the reasons for this primarily in cultural factors, such as the conservative mindset, the patriarchal attitude towards women and their engagement in politics, and the “quality of the participation of women in the processes of political decision-making”. They concluded that the participation of women in the life of local communities was unsatisfactory, with their participation in the activities of the LCS being equally low. On investigating women’s engagement, it emerged that women were typically active in the fields of family policies and education. The authors of the study arrived at the conclusions that are still valid five decades later, such as the fact that female politicians are considerably better educated than their male colleagues, that women are more self-critical and prone to negative self-evaluation, and that women are simply less often invited to participate in politics. Perhaps the most interesting of the findings is that women were the most active in politics between 25 and 35 years of age (Rener, 1983a, 18-20), a situation that was to change drastically in the 1990s.

Many assertions from the aforementioned analysis were confirmed in subsequent analyses. At the end of the 1970s, Stanič conducted a study on the female members of the LCS, determining that the proportion of women in the LCS had remained unchanged since 1945, standing at 29%. Women of up to 25 or above 40 years of age represented the majority, with the generation of partisans and members of the League of Young Communists of Yugoslavia (known as SKOY) being particularly prominent (see Rener, 1983a, 25-26). Seven years later, a study by Barbič and Ule showed, amongst other things, that women in Slovenia were excluded from decision-making at the local level (Rener, 1983a, 27; Ule, 1979, 25).

In her first study *Socio-Political Activity of Women in the Republic of Slovenia*, undertaken in 1977, Ule scrutinised data from public opinion surveys from the period 1968–1973. She was interested in the viewpoints of both genders regarding political events, as well as their readiness to participate in politics and their actual involvement. Her conclusion was that men were more interested in and ready to participate in politics, as well as being significantly more active in political reality. The most active generation of women in politics was the age group 25–40 years. Based on an analysis of data from the Slovenian Public Opinion survey in the period 1968–1978, this surprising finding confirmed those of earlier studies (Ule, 1979, 29, 32). In interpreting this result, Ule rejected the double burden of women in the workplace and

home as a reason for the lower presence of women in politics, instead seeking the explanation in so-called cultural reasons.

In the aforementioned study, Ule stated that women's "double burden" could not be a valid excuse for their under-representation in politics, as the empirical data clearly showed that employed women were more socially engaged than unemployed or retired women, and much more than housewives. The attachment of the housewife to her home reinforces the traditional role of women, particularly as home is perceived as an apolitical space. It was, in fact, employed women who undermined the idea that women were apolitical, in so doing raising awareness amongst women of the need for political engagement. This point is further emphasised by Ule: "*[...] in my opinion, the key subjective cause for the lack of social engagement, at least for the time being, is the power of traditional conceptions of a specific male and female nature, and from the ensuing specific male and female roles in the family and in society. Today, stereotypical images remain a very significant obstacle to the greater engagement of women in social life [...]*" (Ule, 1979, 33).

Assumptions related to traditional stereotypes could therefore be significantly weakened with the modernisation of society. These issues were addressed by certain studies in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). In a study conducted in the SFRY in 1983, Mirčev found that an increase in the general level of development of society brings with it an increase in the proportion of women in delegate structures (see Rener, 1983a, 24). These findings were not, however, entirely confirmed in a study carried out in Slovenia by Barbič (comp. Rener, 1983a, 27).

The studies performed in this period differ to some extent in their conclusions. Počuča, for instance, concluded that the key obstacle to the adequate participation of women in politics in the SFRY was a lack of free time and overburdening with housekeeping. Similar conclusions were drawn by Leinart, who investigated the political representation of women in Croatia (see Rener, 1983a, 36). Kuzmanović and Radović added a third reason for the low representation of women: women's higher level of self-criticism and greater sense of personal responsibility, which acts as an obstacle to participation in politics (ibid., 33, 115). In her study conducted in Slovenia in 1983, Rener confirmed that these factors have a significant impact on the participation of women in decision-making processes. Women are more prone than men to locate reasons for their non-participation in politics in themselves, typically in the form of statements such as "I am not good at public speaking" or "I find it hard to position myself as

an individual in society" (Rener, 1983b, 77, 79). Furthermore, men are more likely to draw on personal experience in their political engagement, whereas women tend to rely on informal contacts in their living or working context (neighbours, colleagues) (ibid., 80). Rener also found that two thirds of the female respondents had never been asked for their opinion in the local community, thus supporting the hypothesis regarding "silent women" and the deeply rooted convictions about the ascribed roles of women (Rener, 1983b, 91). Consequently, women are less motivated to enter politics and less involved in politics.

After 1991, research into the participation of women in politics continued and, in line with the transition of the political system to parliamentary democracy, was driven by the systematic investigation of elections, political parties and special measures. Research and analyses of the representation of women in Slovenian politics have confirmed the results of research in other parts of Europe showing that in order to achieve a critical mass of women in politics certain special measures have to be introduced (Antić, 1998; Jalušič and Antić, 2001; Antić and Ilonszki, 2003; Antić, 2007). In the period since 1991, studies in Slovenia have been mainly focused on the operation and influence of institutional mechanisms on women's presence in politics, the influence of party policies (Antić, 1999; Fink-Hafner and Krašovec, 2004), the electoral system (Antić, 2003; Fink-Hafner, Deželan and Topolinjak, 2005; Murko Pleš, Nahtigal and Pleš, 2011), national mechanisms (Jalušič and Antić, 2001; Antić, 1999), quotas (Antić and Gortnar, 2004; Antić, 2008) and other factors of the political system (Fink-Hafner and Krašovec, 2004; Jalušič and Antić, 2001; Bahovec and Šetinc, 2006). Researchers have concluded that the electoral system and party policies, with their conceptions of gender equality and the operation of individual factors (such as quotas), have an important impact on women's eligibility. Poor results in parliamentary elections are understood as mainly being a consequence of women standing for office on the voting lists where they cannot be elected, i.e., constituencies where the party they represent has less chance of being elected (Antić, 2011a; Murko Pleš, Nahtigal and Pleš, 2011). The studies have also confirmed that women find their way into high politics in their middle age to late middle age, which means that politics is entered mostly by women whose children are grown up and who have a large part of their professional (or political) career behind them, having already proven themselves as successful. Women entering politics are, as a rule, better educated than men and have fewer children or children who are no longer dependent (Antić and Ilonszki, 2003). In principle, women enter politics to make improvement in the fields in which they work, and they refer to professional knowledge and professional solutions more often than their male colleagues.

Interviews with politicians at the highest level also show that public and private spheres are not two entirely different areas of life, and that an important obstacle to women entering politics is balancing professional and private life (Rožman and Mencin Čeplak, 2012; Kanjuo Mrčela, Šori and Podreka, 2012), along with the prevailing political culture, understanding of politics and the position of the genders in politics (Antić 2011a; Antić and Selišnik, 2012).

In addition to the aforementioned research on the entry of women to the highest positions in the processes of political decision-making, i.e., parliamentary and ministerial positions, certain other studies have been undertaken dealing with women's engagement in local politics. Having included a much larger population of women and displaying a more quantitative nature, these studies are more comparable with those carried out prior to 1991, even though their initial objective was simply to acquire data on the current state of affairs without seeking to explore the reasons for the low participation of women in local politics. In 1996, Guček and Oblak compiled an analysis entitled *The Slovenian Local Elections 1994: Comparison of the Candidates and Their Eligibility by Gender* (Guček and Oblak, 1996), commissioned by the then Parliamentary Committee for Women's Policy. In 1999, the former Government Office for Women's Policy conducted a survey amongst municipal and local councillors reiterating a number of questions from the survey of 1993, addressing the female members of all political parties, as well as adding several new questions (Antić et al., 2001, 4). In 2001, Milica Antić Gaber and colleagues carried out the study *Women in Local Politics*, which, in addition to establishing the state of affairs, sought to investigate the reasons for the low presence of women in politics. The qualitative part of this research consisted of interviews with female mayors, of whom some are today established politicians in top positions. These interviews provide relevant material for a longitudinal study. The qualitative part was accompanied by a questionnaire. Some of the findings of this research were confirmed a few decades later by the study *Balancing Private and Professional Life As an Obstacle to the Higher Participation of Women in Politics* (2008–2011), which surveyed male and female councillors (Antić et al., 2011).

Both studies confirmed the following findings: women in local politics, i.e., councillors, are better educated than their male colleagues and enter politics believing that they can make a positive difference, while men prefer to speak of an "election victory" and a "political game". The study also showed that two thirds of men and only one third of women decided to enter politics on their own initiative, which represents a significant difference and indicates that women need special encouragement to engage politically. An important role is played by "an

invitation" on the part of the president of a party or a prominent party member, or individuals in other prominent political positions.

The study also revealed that, in their own opinion, the greatest hindrance to women entering politics is care for their children and family, as well as fear of a lack of knowledge and experience in general and in the field of politics in particular. This again shows a high level of self-criticism in women. The findings of both sub-studies also disclose a disturbing shift in politics in relation to the age of women who are active in politics. While we can still speak of a "normal" demographic structure of the female councillor population in 2001 (10% below the age of 35, 6% above 66), by 2011 this ratio had changed to the advantage of older women (5% below the age of 30, 10% above 60). In the population surveyed, the share of women who were party members had decreased (from 82% in 2001 to 49% in 2011), as had the share of women satisfied with politics. All of this has been observed by certain other studies that have, at the local level, identified the rise of independent (male) candidates and candidate lists. This could have a negative impact on the development of the political careers of women, who, as independent candidates, will have more difficulty finding their way into political parties operating at the national level or accessing party recruitment officers and adequate social networks.

The trends in women's participation in politics, especially prior to 1991, are almost impossible to establish due to the frequent changes in the representative systems and the decision to pursue the so-called third way, i.e., self-management, which abandoned the bicameral parliament and replaced it with the (partly flexible) delegate system in the 1970s. Taking this fact into account, the collected data was analysed by Vrečko Ashtalkoski and Antić Gaber (2011), who found that women were represented in decision-making bodies to a level of approximately 20%. Their representation never exceeded the critical mass (around 30%), coming closest in 1978 and, despite contrary expectations, diminishing in subsequent years, as was evident at the very next election in 1982 (ibid., 100). Data on the local level also show that the proportion of women active in local community bodies initially increased gradually, but that it never exceeded 20% and, as at the level of the Republic, started to decrease in 1982.[94]

[94] In 1962, the proportion of women in the local community people's committees (*občinski ljudski odbori*) was 5.9% (Marija Čemažar, 8 March, Naša smučina, 5.3. 1963, 1-2). In 1969, 5.6% of members of the Local Assembly were women (Statistical Yearbook 1970, 38). In 1977, women represented 18% of the membership in Local District organs (*krajevna skupnost*) (Statistical Yearbook 1974, 44). In 1977, the share of women amongst

In the time of independent Slovenia, the upward trend in the proportion of women in politics has mainly been a consequence of the enactment of legislation on quotas at all the three levels of political decision-making (European, national and local) (Antić, 2011a). At European elections, the legislated quotas had an immediate effect due to the fact that parties presented nationwide candidate lists with a minimum of 40% of each gender stipulated by law. A similar effect was produced by the legislation of quotas at the local level in municipalities applying a proportional electoral system, while in those with a majority electoral system quotas did not produce the desired effect. The case of parliamentary elections is slightly more complicated due to the existence of electoral districts within the constituencies.

The dramatic rise in the proportion of women (from 13% to 32%) entering parliament at the parliamentary elections in 2011 was most likely the result of a number of factors. In addition to the legislated quota of 35% for each gender, it was no doubt partly a result of the specific political situation, which manifested itself first and foremost in a climate very much opposed to the established political parties. All of this encouraged the formation of new political parties that favoured the inclusion of women and their standing for office. Furthermore, the new political parties on the Slovenian political map could not yet reliably identify those constituencies in which the possibility of their candidates being elected was either high or low. It is therefore possible to conclude that a period of political or economic crisis, a period of searching for new solutions or a transition period may well be a period of opportunities for representatives of new social groups or bearers of new ideas to enter the political scene. The answer to the question of how political changes can accelerate the upward trend in the proportion of women in politics has, in part, been outlined by the political events of 2011, just as the period 1978–1982 indicated how certain political events have a negative effect on women's eligibility and their decision to stand for office. The latter period was a time marked by the death of President Tito, whose authority had to be replaced by the transfer of at least part of decision-making powers to the Federal Assembly, the Government and the Presidency

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members of Local District organs was 15.3% (Vida Tomšič, *Ženske v razvoju socialistične samoupravne Jugoslavije* [Women in the Development of the Socialist Self-Managed Yugoslavia], Ljubljana, Delavska enotnost/Naša žena, 1980, p. 208), while in 1978 it was 17.2% (Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia 1978, 59), in 1982 it was 19.6% (Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, 1984, 59), and in 1986 it was 17.9% (Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, 1987, 60). In 1990, 10% of members elected to the Local District Assembly were women. Between 1945 and 1952, the function of the local authority was carried out by the Local People's Committee (LPC). In the following period, between 1952 and 1955, LPCs were abolished and replaced by Municipal People's Committees. From 1963, the constitution of the SFRY abolished Municipal People's Committees as organs of local self-management and foresaw the establishment of local districts.

of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These institutions, however, were not ready for the new role, having not yet formed the rules of political operation (cf. Repe, 2001, 7). In the context of the topic treated here, it is significant that the endeavours to reshape the political system in the wake of the political crisis were accompanied by a deep economic crisis and acute social criticism of the system: the authorities and politics had lost legitimacy (cf. ibid., 18). Accordingly, the economic and political crisis had the power to influence women's participation in politics. Rener also sought reasons for the political passivisation of women in this period in the interventions in the policy of women's employment, which were characterised by attempts to set limits to women's work by proposing part-time work and demanding the return of women to their mothering role (cf. Rener, 1983b, 12).

It is worth adding that the political crisis of the period was compounded by a crisis of the political culture that had been dominant up to that point, which resulted in reduced membership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) for the first time (see Statistical Yearbook 1987, 64) and in the public expression of doubts about the LCY safeguarding the interests and fulfilling the needs of the people. Slovenian Public Opinion data, for example, show that, in 1983, only 19% of the population believed that the policies of the LCY met the needs of the people while 47.8% thought these needs were partly met, whereas in 1980 the results were 49.3% and 22.7%, respectively (Toš, 1997, 292, 424).

The stated findings lead us to conclude that political culture and the attitude towards politics significantly affect the probability of women entering politics and, indirectly, their representation. These factors also have a strong impact on socialisation norms and values that determine women as primary carers for others and for the narrow community (family), also leading to a higher degree of self-criticism, modesty in ambition, lower self-confidence in personal engagement, and most likely shaping their individual readiness to enter the field of political action. At the same time, the participation of women in politics is highly influenced by political events or the political and socioeconomic circumstances, which either promote or limit women's opportunities to take leading positions, as was exemplified by the case of economic and political crises in Slovenia. In stable political conditions, on the other hand, certain institutional and structural changes can have a notable effect on women's participation in politics, without necessarily leading to changes in the value orientations of society. It also ensues from the research that certain values are persistent and that, in order for more radical changes to take place, a generation shift as well as long-term processes of modernisation are required.

7.3 Mapping the changing values associated with gender equality in Slovenia

Investigating cultural factors can contribute significantly to the explanation and elucidation of why women in Scandinavia participate in decision-making processes to a much higher extent and why women in the Muslim world are so much worse off in this regard (if we only consider the two extremes of the continuum). Comparative studies have mainly dealt with the role of religion, attitudes towards feminism and the issue of gender equality, and the distribution of leisure time between men and women (Rule, 1987/1996; Norris and Inglehart, 2001).

Norris and Inglehart carried out several international comparative studies that represent important points of reference for future research in the field. Amongst other things, several of their studies measured the correlation between the proportion of women in parliament and the level of concurrence with the statement "Men are better political leaders than women" (Norris and Inglehart, 2001; Inglehart, Norris and Welzel, 2002; Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Their findings confirm a close link between the proportion of women in parliament and concurrence with the value of gender equality as measured by the above statement. According to one of their studies, Slovenia is positioned somewhere between Catholic and Eastern European countries, representing the golden mean of the European scale (cf. Inglehart, Norris and Welzel, 2002, 35).

In another referential and frequently cited study, Hofstede determines that some societies are more inclined towards favouring gender equality and to minimising gender differences, whereas others prefer to accentuate these differences (Hofstede 1998, 6). This feature of society is characterised by Hofstede as *masculinity/femininity* and is related to the dimension of masculine and feminine value orientations in society. Accordingly, men are presumably more personal-goal driven (ego), engaging in activities that boost their ego, while women are socially oriented and more inclusive in their dealings with others. Given society can thus ascribe higher importance to either masculine values (self-confidence, determination, career, role distribution) or feminine values (relationship orientation, inclusion). Based on Hofstede's calculations, Slovenia scores 19 on the masculinity/femininity dimension (in the 1970s), which positions it in the lower part of the scale, amongst the more "feminine" societies, surprisingly close to Denmark, the Netherlands, Latvia, Norway and Sweden (Hofstede,

Hofstede and Minkov, 2010, 143).[95] At the very top of the scale are the Czech Republic, Greece, Argentina and Hong Kong, scoring 57 on the index scale, thus indicating that they are masculine value oriented.

In addition to the dimension of masculinity/femininity, some other researchers have adopted alternative dimensions to determine factors influencing gender equality in society and women's presence in politics. De Mooij combined the dimensions *power distance* and *uncertainty avoidance*, which indicate the individual country's desire for security. In societies with low power distance and a weak desire to avoid uncertainty, women are thought to have more freedom, which is also tolerated and supported by men (De Mooij, 1998, 67). As well as a feminine society, Hofstede identified a low need for uncertainty avoidance as a further reason for more favourable conditions for the higher participation of women in politics (Hofstede, 1998, 91-92). According to this, Slovenia in this period is amongst the countries with a greater demand for avoiding uncertainty, as well as being ranked amongst feminine-oriented societies, while power distance in Slovenian society is growing, being quite high compared to other countries. Particularly according to De Mooij, Slovenian society is not very well disposed to women entering politics.

Similarly, Bullough, Kroeck, Newburry, Kundu and Lowe (2012) conclude in their study on women in leading positions that cultural factors play an important role in ensuring the rights of women and improving their position. They claim that national cultures elucidate the differences in the political participation of women better, i.e., have a greater weight, than the sum total of all other factors. According to this study, the orientations believed to stimulate political participation in society are the performance orientation, in-group collectivism, and power distance. An open environment assesses women and their ascent to positions of political leadership on the basis of their results, merits and individual achievements rather than on the basis of their gender, their study found. Performance-oriented societies place a high value on training and development, emphasise results, reward good performance and achievements, respect competitive behaviour and self-confidence, and are motivated by success. The results of the study showed that a society in which individuals are assessed and rewarded according to their achievement and not on the basis of their gender is important for women asserting themselves in positions of political power. Equally important is power

[95] Hofstede carried out this study for Slovenian society, as for the others, in the 1970s. According to Kirbiš, he first merged the data and then represented them as national data for Yugoslavia, but following the disintegration of Yugoslavia he analysed them as three separate units: Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia (Kirbiš 2011, 100).

distance, which restricts the mobility of people, and consequently the mobility of women, whereas a society placing a high value on communitarianism – understood by the researchers within the context of the family, in the sense of being proud of and loyal to the family unit but also dependent on it – has a negative effect on the participation of women in politics. The family is thus very important, while, at the same time, its significance is contradictory. Women's strong attachment to the family can deprive them of the incentive to stand for office, but it can also be an important factor of encouragement.

The results of yet another study (Koopman, Hartog and Konrad) from 1999 (cf. Svetlik, 2004, 329) indicate that Slovenia is characterised in terms of values by a low score in achievement orientation (51) and a very high score in family collectivism (31). While both indicators place Slovenia at the very top of the European scale, the score on power distance (23)[96] places it amongst countries with a lower orientation towards power differences (i.e., arguing in favour of differences between people in terms of power and influence). In line with the results on value orientations, it is possible, on the basis of the hypothesis provided by Bullough, Kroeck, Newburry, Kundu and Lowe (2012), to identify reasons for the relatively persistent low representation of women in Slovenian politics. Svetlik (2004) claims that family networks are imbued with the idea of the family, unselfishness or solidarity; in addition to positive effects, however, this also has negative consequences, especially on the incentive of individuals to set themselves goals outside the family, which is further blocked by a low achievement orientation in Slovenia. The burden of "the silent majority of women" thus gains a new image, being much more than the double workload at work and in the family putting women under time pressure: it is about the power of socialisation and prescribed norms that hardly allow any deviations, as well as the results of the gender and class habitus at work. It is also evident that people in Slovenia do not aspire to outstanding achievements, nor do they value these aspirations in other people, viewing them rather as a curiosity. The economic and political crisis has, most likely, further strengthened this situation.

Before undertaking a detailed analysis of some values for Slovenia, let us examine the conceptions of gender equality that can be identified in the country. In the time of socialism, it was widely accepted that we are all equal, in the sense that we all belong to the working class. Men and women were equal both by law and according to the constitution, and the realisation

[96] While Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) establish high power distance (71) in the 1970s, Svetlik (2004, 329) points out that, in the 1990s, the index of power distance for Slovenia was low (23), which represents a significant change.

of this equality was the responsibility of the leading political force, i.e., the Communist League. The problem of equality between men and women was therefore not particularly prominent and thematised, as is clear from the above studies. It also follows from these studies that the first critical analyses began to appear at the onset of the crisis of the political system at the end of the 1970s and at the beginning of the following decade. With the socialist period drawing to a close, certain segments of the previously uniform socialist working class (peasants, young people, women) began to voice their existence and highlight their unequal position more vigorously. Scrutinising the public discourse on gender equality of the transition period, we can identify several typical (mis)conceptions: gender equality as the forced emancipation of women in the time of socialism; gender equality as something unnatural, something not arising from Slovenia itself but emerging as a product of radical feminism imported from the West; gender equality as gender sameness; and, in one part, genuine equality as equal opportunity for women and men (see also Antić Gaber, 2006).

The attitude of the Slovenian population towards the place of women and men in society, gender equality and equal opportunity for each individual is also revealed by data from public opinion surveys conducted in Slovenia since the end of the 1960s. Although the questions related to equality and gender equality have undergone certain changes over time, it is possible to identify, on the basis of the answers given, some changes and/or trends indicating the general attitude of the population towards this issue. The opinion polls have been based mainly on the following type of statement: "A woman should be primarily a mother and a housewife, while socio-political work should be undertaken by men" (1975/1976); "Men are better political leaders than women" (1995); "On the whole, men are better political leaders than women" (2005, 2011); "To what extent is the person described below similar to you? For this person, it is important that everyone in the world is treated equally; s/he believes that everyone has to have the same opportunities in life" (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012), and "We will list several words and notions. Without too much deliberation, please assess your attitude towards them with either 'very positive', 'positive', 'negative' or 'very negative': *Gender Equality*" (1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011).

The data with which we operate below were taken from Slovenian Public Opinion (SPO) surveys and research conducted within the framework of the international comparative studies World Value Survey (WVS) and the European Social Survey (ESS).

7.3.1 Male and female roles

The shift away from the traditional, gender-specific roles that bind women to their home, family and domestic work, while men are seen as those who are active in the public sphere, certainly provides better opportunities for women to engage politically, as some of the aforementioned studies have shown (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010; Bullough, Kroeck, Newburry, Kundu and Lowe, 2012; Ule, 1979). Since 1991, there has been a recurrent statement in SPO studies: "The duty of the husband in marriage is to provide for the family and the duty of the wife is to keep house and care for the family (home and family)." An overview of the dynamics of agreement and disagreement with this statement indicates the changing opinion regarding gender roles.[97]

Table 24: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "The duty of the husband in marriage is to provide for the family and the duty of the wife is to keep house and care for the family (home and family)".

	Strongly agree	Agree
1991	15.6	24.7
1993	10.8	29
1998	10.6	19.2
2003	8.5	20.3
2012	2.7	17.9

Source: Toš 1999; Toš 2004, Toš 2013b 293, 57.

Table 24 clearly shows that the number of those who agree with the statement is constantly falling. The most drastic decrease from one survey to the next can be observed between 1993 and 1998, which demonstrates a rather rapid change in attitude compared to only a slight decrease in the periods 1991/1993 and 1998/2003.

[97] Jogan used SPO data in her articles to measure gender inequality and concluded that, in time, the ideology of a single breadwinner had been clearly rejected by both sexes, albeit somewhat more by women than by men (2004, 273).

Whereas, in 1991, 40.3% of the respondents agreed (strongly agreed and agreed combined) and 15.6% strongly agreed with this statement, in 2012, only 2.7% strongly agreed and the total share of those who agreed and strongly agreed was 20.6%. It is once again evident that the 1990s – the transition years of great economic and political turmoil, instability and uncertainty – were years in which reflections were revived regarding whether it might not be better for men and women to abide by the classic division of roles and work by gender. In the last decade, however, the viewpoint of the population has changed considerably, at least on the declarative level, and shifted away from traditional gender roles according to which women are expected to be engaged in the private sphere and men in the public sphere. This may have had a favourable effect on voters' choices in the 2011 election, when a record number of women were voted into parliament.

7.3.2 Equal opportunities and (gender) equality

How do people accept differences and what value do they place on equality and equal opportunities? At least in part, the answer to this question reveals the attitude towards women and their opportunities to engage in public affairs and politics. Until 1991, agreement with equality was best reflected in the following question: "Of the 24 concepts, choose 3 that express your long-term interests in the most concise manner". While 27.9% of those surveyed chose equality in 1978 (only freedom, peace and honesty were chosen by more people), as few as 14.3% of respondents chose equality in 1984 (freedom, peace and honesty were again more highly valued, also joined by work and family) (Toš, 1997, 247, 474).

According to the available data, therefore, a downward trend in favouring this value became established in the first half of the 1980s (Toš, 1997, 274). This was a time when, much more than in previous periods, differences between people were emphasised. Critical discussions of some of the dominant ideas of the time about all people being equal entered the public space, with various (also political) actors coming into existence that built on differences and the recognition of these differences (political, religious, generational, gender-related). This evoked intolerance towards and rejection of representatives of some of these groups amongst one part of the population. At the same time, this was a moment when new possibilities for the advancement of Slovenian society were being explored and debated, foregrounding alternative values, such as freedom of the individual and the freedom of choice, competitiveness between various options, a goods and services market, etc. (cf. also Repe

2001). Furthermore, Toš found that a turnaround in the hierarchy of values concerning the dilemma of equality and efficiency had taken place, emphasising that the respondents in the survey were, on the one hand, increasingly in favour of the market system and private ownership, but, on the other, still not highly disposed towards great social differences and a reduced role of the welfare state (Toš, 1997, xxiii). This was also a period when, as we have seen, a downward trend in the proportion of politically engaged women was observed.

Given that, in the 1990s, the aforementioned question was not asked in the SPO survey, we must verify the attitude towards equality with the question regarding whether it is important to the respondent that everyone in the world is treated equally and whether s/he believes that every person has to have the same opportunities in life.

Table 25: To what extent is the person described below similar to you? For this person, it is important that everyone in the world is treated equally; s/he believes that everyone has to have the same opportunities in life.

	Very similar	Similar	Slightly similar	Only very slightly similar	Not similar	Not at all similar	I do not know	No answer
SPO02/2	28.3	50.4	11.9	3.6	2.6	0.9		2.3
SPO04/2	27.1	50.9	12.2	4.6	2.5	0.7		1.9
SPO06/1	28.5	54.4	10.0	2.8	3.0	0.7		0.7
SPO08/2	29.9	51.4	11.1	2.6	2.8	0.3	0.9	0.9
SPO10/1	35.4	51.4	7.1	2.1	1.1	0.4	1.2	1.2
SPO12/1	48.0	42.3	5.3	1.8	1.2	0.5	0.6	0.4

Source: European Social Survey, ESS 2012, in the framework of the SPO 2012/2 Project. February 2013.

Table 25 shows that “equal treatment” and “equal opportunities” attract high support amongst the population of Slovenia. In the past decade, the proportion of those supporting this principle has grown consistently, with the highest rise recorded in 2012, when support exceeded 90% of all respondents. It would seem that, in a time of increasing social inequities

(especially economic), resulting in diminishing "equal opportunities", equal treatment in fields such as employment, promotion at work, healthcare, etc. has become a value with growing significance for the respondents. Furthermore, this means that the negative attitude towards pronounced social differences that was observed in the mid 1980s is still present amongst the population.

Given that we are particularly interested in the attitude towards gender equality in Slovenia, let us examine how the response to this question has changed in the past decade, the period in which it has formed part of SPO surveys. The respondents were asked whether they were positively or negatively inclined towards the issue of gender equality. Although the table below shows that the vast majority of respondents have a positive or very positive attitude, it is also significant that the proportion of those who were negatively inclined towards this value was 1.3% in 1994, reaching 7.9% in 2005, declining to 5.8% in 2009, and falling again to 3.2% in 2011. At the same time, the proportion of those who expressed a positive or very positive attitude towards gender equality reached an all time high (87.8%) in 2011, while the proportion of those who expressed a very positive attitude towards gender equality reached 50.8% in 1994, a result that has never been matched since. After falling to a low of 34% in 1998, it gradually began to rise, but still only reached 37% in 2011. Data also show that this is a value in relation to which people hold ever stronger opinions, as only 5.2% of the respondents were neutral on the subject in 2011, compared to 15% in 1998.

Table 26: We will list several words and concepts. Without too much deliberation, please assess your attitude towards them with either 'very positive', 'positive', 'negative' or 'very negative'. *Gender Equality.*

	Very negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Very positive	I do not know	Positive and very positive – total
$SPO94_2$	0.4	0.9	9.6	33.2	50.8	5.2	84
$SPO96_1$	0.6	2.2	14.0	45.2	37.6	0.4	82.8
$SPO98_2$	0.7	1.8	15.3	47.5	34.7	-	82.2

SPO00$_1$	0.7	2.2	11.3	44.8	38.9	2.2	83.7
SPO02$_1$	0.7	3.4	12.6	45.3	34.6	3.4	79.9
SPO03$_{3+4}$	1.9	4.4	11.2	46.5	34.0	1.9	80.5
SPO05$_1$	3.0	4.9	12.8	45.8	29.9	3.6	75.7
SPO07$_2$	2.6	3.7	13.1	51.7	24.2	4.9	75.9
SPO09$_2$	1.6	4.2	12.8	46.4	31.3	3.7	77.7
SPO011$_2$	0.7	2.5	5.2	50.8	37.0	3.0	87.8

Source: SPO 2011/2, World Value Survey, The Mirror of Public Opinion, Overview and Comparison of the Results, Working Document of the Research Group, June 2011

From the data presented, one can conclude that the value of gender equality in Slovenian society has gained strength and, at least on the declarative level, has taken root in Slovenia. However, a tendency to reassess the value of equality is detectable, although it is not possible to affirm with any certainty that the attitude towards gender equality has a direct effect on people's judgment in their voting choices: seemingly, women are still not recognised as those who symbolically correspond to the idea of the bearer of political power.

7.3.3 Are men better political leaders than women?

Based on Hofstede's conclusions that women in a masculine culture are not understood as capable of assuming certain roles, simply because they are not, symbolically, recognised as such or because they fail to match the true image of the bearer of power (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010, 45), we can obtain the most direct answer to the question as to how people in Slovenia view the possibilities of women's engagement in politics from responses to the statement "Men are better political leaders than women".

Table 27: Men and women as political leaders

	Disagree

“A woman should primarily be a mother and a housewife, while socio-political work should be undertaken by men” (1975/1976)	58.4
“Men are better political leaders than women” (1995)	51.4
“On the whole, men are better political leaders than women” (2005)	65.8
“On the whole, men are better political leaders than women” (2011)	72.8

Source: Toš, 1997; Toš 2013a 76.

Table 27 clearly show that disagreement with the statement that men are better political leaders has risen consistently, except in 1995, when the proportion of those disagreeing was 8 percentage points higher than in 1975/76. The reasons for this are largely attributable to the transition period, which has been thoroughly treated in the context of gender inequality by Jogan, who linked the process of democratisation to attempts to reintroduce patriarchal values into Slovenian society (Jogan, 2001; Jogan, 2000; Jogan, 2011). As in the other countries of the former socialist block from Central and Eastern Europe, demands for women to return to the family and withdraw from public life became stronger in Slovenia. Here, aspirations to redomesticate women were also associated with the tendency to recatholicise women, and with demands for the moral renovation of society and the restoration of women’s dignity. Initiatives related to this were manifested in proposals for a different understanding of the reproductive rights of women (the abolishment of abortion right), greater social benefits for women with more children, etc. At the same time, social inequality grew during the transition period, women with the lowest level of education were most affected by unemployment, less secure forms of employment emerged, and there was an increase in uncertainty and fear regarding the future (Jogan, 2011), all of which had a negative effect on women’s opportunities to engage in the field of politics. It is not surprising, therefore, that it was precisely in the 1990s that the proportion of women in politics, both at the local and national level, remained exceptionally low, failing to exceed 13.3% in parliament, for example.

If we are to believe the findings of Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzl in the study *Modernisation, Cultural Change and Democracy* (2005), claiming that a larger proportion of women are voted into the national parliament in those countries where the public reject the belief that men are better leaders, and that cultural norms and values are more important

indicators of the share of women in parliament than democratic institutions (2005, 176), then the situation in Slovenia is either that expressing opinion on this issue merely involves giving expected answers or principled statements, or that it is only a matter of time until the change is reflected in statistics on women in parliament.

7.4 Between certain strong constants, slight shifts and expected changes in value orientations

Let us return to our original questions: Where should one seek the reasons for the low proportion of women in politics? What role does the wider cultural context – the prevailing norms, values, convictions, myths, stereotypes and established practices associated with gender relations that can be identified in Slovenia – play in this? Has this cultural context changed in the past few decades, and, if so, how? Who do people regard as more suitable for occupying political posts?

Whereas the 1980s were a time of political and general social pluralisation, when great hope was placed in the change of the political and economic system, the free market, individual freedom, greater plurality and the possibility of choice in all areas, the 1990s brought a need to reconcile high expectations and the limits of the real possibilities, while the first decade of the third millennium (or at least the first half of this decade) represented the greatest detachment from traditional values, with a turn to secular values. It is in this latter period that we also observe a shift from a predominantly materialist society (survival values) to one that values self-realisation (self-expression values). Although we could say that Slovenian society has been modernised, it again shifted back towards the traditional pole of the scale of traditional values in 2006.[98]

Examining, in this light, the possible influences of these constants and shifts on the opportunities and decisions of women to engage in the field of politics, it should come as no surprise that, in a time of increased uncertainty in all areas of life, the family and security have been consistently highly valued (Svetlik, 2004). Taking into account the low index for uncertainty avoidance, as well as the tendency to protect certain gains that have been won

[98] See: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54

with great difficulty, strong family ties – so-called family collectivism – can halt the positive effects on the progress of women in their endeavours to engage in politics, effects produced by the relatively constant (with a few oscillations in the past decade) high value placed (at least declaratively) on gender equality, the rejection of the ideology of a single breadwinner in the family and the placement of women exclusively in the realm of home and family, and the decrease in the number of those who agree that men are better political leaders.

The transition years of the 1990s – years of great changes, instability and uncertainty – were also the years of attempts to retraditionalise gender roles and domesticate women. It is therefore not surprising that, despite the simultaneous expansion of the political field (both institutional and civil society), the proportion of women in politics both at the local and national level has remained very low, failing to exceed 13.3% in parliament, for example.

Despite there being no shortage of educated, competent and publicly visible women (as elaborated on by other authors in the present book), as well as relatively high and ever stronger disagreement with the claim that men are better political leaders than women, this has not resulted in a greater demand for female candidates for political positions and for a larger body of female candidates for whom voters could vote. This leads us to believe that, despite agreeing, in principle, on gender equality and equal opportunities for everyone (women included), there is a prevalent conviction in society, when dealing with concrete decisions, that politics is primarily a field of male engagement. Although women are not prevented from entering this field, they are not particularly desired.

On the other hand, it is easy to understand the rationality of educated, competent and successful women who, experiencing all kinds of uncertainty, prefer to preserve their past achievements (in education and their profession, as well as in private, family life). It is simply a case of the logical and rational reflection of those who have achieved their status and success with a great deal of effort and personal sacrifice. The reserved – if not averse – attitude of successful women considering entry into politics is not surprising taking into account that the reputation of political parties, institutions and politicians is currently extremely low, that many women stay in politics for relatively short periods of time (with very few female MPs or ministers completing more than one mandate), that crossing from professional field to the field of politics and back can be risky and sometimes fraught with difficulty, and that, ultimately, the political engagement of a woman takes a toll on her family life, partnership and privacy.

Drawing on Inglehart and Welzl, who assert that wide support for gender equality is the most important explanatory factor in increasing the proportion of women in politics (Inglehart and Welzl, 2005, 177), in Slovenia – which is in the process of gradually upgrading and improving the institutions of the political system that are designed in part to provide women with better opportunities for the public expression of their interests and needs, focusing on the demand for change and the expansion of their rights, and which has a strong orientation towards the knowledge society and, particularly on the part of women, a large investment in education – we expect shifts towards the greater presence of women in politics. It is the new, younger generations of women, brought up in the circumstances described above, who can be expected to make more obvious inroads into the field of politics in Slovenia.

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Appendices

Table 1: Constitutional changes 1989 (Source: Toš 1999, VR II, p. 718)

I will read you some statements from the Draft Law of Constitutional Amendments and from the debate surrounding the draft; please state your agreement or disagreement.					
	Absolutely agrees 1	Mainly agrees 2	Undecided, does not know 3	Mainly disagrees 4	Absolutely disagrees 5
AN 1 a) The right of the Slovenian nation to self-determination, including the right to secession and unification, needs to be specifically written in the Constitution.	64.5	17.2	13.0	3.1	2.3
AN 2 b) The Slovenian Constitution should preserve the provision regarding the leading role of the League of Communists of Slovenia.	15.4	19.2	22.0	19.8	23.6
AN3 c)It is necessary to abolish all restrictions on the ownership of farming land/agrarian maximum.	57.9	18.3	11.8	5.9	6.1
AN4 d) Farmers/forest owners should be allowed to manage forests and sell wood autonomously.	46.7	21.5	12.6	13.1	6.1
AN5 e) The constitutional amendments should determine that the Socialist Republic of Slovenia is an economically sovereign state and that it contributes to the Federation and underdeveloped regions itself, according to the assessment of its ability to do so.	69.7	17.8	9.7	2.0	0.9
AN6 f) In addition to the suggested amendments to the Slovenian Constitution, activities should commence immediately on the preparation of a new Constitution that will	63.5	18.8	15.3	1.7	0.6

fully express the will and interests of the Slovenian nation.					
AN7 g) Zdravljica (A Toast) should be constitutionally stipulated as the national anthem of Slovenia.	56.6	18.6	19.1	2.8	2.8
AN8 h) Social, private and cooperative property should be made constitutionally equal in every respect.	61.8	20.7	13.7	2.1	1.7
AN9 i) It is necessary to remove all restrictions on the size of a private company and the number of employees.	62.0	21.9	11.9	2.5	1.7
AN10 j) Direct elections are required at all levels of the electoral system.	75.6	15.0	8.0	0.7	0.7
AN11 k) Self-Managing Communities of Interest in the fields of culture, health, etc. should be more rationally organised on the level of the Republic of Slovenia.	64.8	18.6	14.1	1.6	0.9
AN12 l) Self-Managing Communities should be abolished, and their tasks taken over by the appropriate state organs.	30.5	19.0	31.3	10.9	8.3
AN13 m) The Constitution should allow the establishment of political parties.	46.5	20.8	21.0	6.6	5.1
AN14 n) The national minorities of Slovenia (Italian, Hungarian) should be guaranteed greater constitution protection than they have at present.	64.5	17.2	13.0	3.1	2.3

Table 2: Freedom of the media (Source: Toš 1999 - VR II, p. 702)

C10	In your opinion, is there freedom of the press and of expression in Slovenia or not?	
1.	Yes, without restrictions	22.1
2.	Yes, partly	50.8
3.	No	10.1
4.	Undecided	17

Table 3: Registered unemployment rate by level of education, 2006 (Source: ESRS and SORS)

Level of education	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
I	32,995	32,723	31,553	30,856	29,806	28,926	28,587	28,261	27,661	27,301	26,877	26,957
II	5,140	5,082	4,853	4,669	4,454	4,240	4,177	4,079	3,944	3,831	3,750	3,822
III	1,029	1,016	996	965	922	896	874	850	820	773	748	768
IV	22,331	22,203	21,553	21,067	20,345	19,708	19,738	19,311	18,828	18,580	17,882	17,637
V	26,038	25,588	25,070	25,033	24,180	23,502	23,884	22,926	21,506	23,238	22,223	21,728
VI	2,345	2,322	2,273	2,315	2,313	2,306	2,380	2,284	2,248	2,233	2,158	2,161
VII + VIII	5,326	5,198	5,065	5,102	5,091	5,297	5,972	5,345	5,217	5,346	5,204	5,230
Total	95,204	94,132	91,363	90,007	87,111	85,612	85,612	83,056	80,224	81,302	78,842	78,303

Table 4: Registered unemployment rate by level of education, 2013 (Source: SORS)

Level of education	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug
I	36,664	36,816	35,912	35,103	34,008	33,223	32,891	32,713
II	5,976	6,030	5,908	5,793	5,582	5,446	5,372	5,324
III	951	958	950	948	918	909	892	904
IV	30,401	30,407	30,060	29,467	28,695	28,184	27,876	27,580
V	32,491	32,312	32,207	32,185	31,555	30,911	31,269	31,121
VI	4,993	4,925	4,937	4,942	4,942	4,913	4,990	5,031
VII + VII	11,653	11,495	11,513	11,730	11,579	11,799	12,555	12,615
No education	1,119	1,123	1,143	1,164	1,197	1,218	1,298	1,312
Total	124,258	124,066	122,630	121,332	118,576	116,603	117,143	116,600

Table 5: Registered unemployment rates, 2007–2011 (Source: SORS)

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Registered unemployed persons (on 31 December)	68,411	66,239	96,672	110,021	112,754
Average number of unemployed persons	71,336	63,216	86,354	100,504	110,692
Average rate of unemployed persons	7.7	6.7	9.1	10.7	11.8

Table 6: Youth unemployment rates – EU in comparison (Source: Eurostat)

	Unemployment rate	Unemployment ratio
	2012	2012
EU-28	23.0	9.7
EA-17	23.1	9.6
Belgium	19.8	6.2
Bulgaria	28.1	8.5
Czech Republic	19.5	6.1
Denmark	14.1	9.1
Germany	8.1	4.1
Estonia	20.9	8.7
Ireland	30.4	12.3
Greece	55.3	16.1
Spain	53.2	20.6
France	24.6	9.0
Croatia	43.0	12.7
Italy	35.3	10.1
Cyprus	27.8	10.8
Latvia	28.4	11.4
Lithuania	26.4	7.7
Luxembourg	18.0	5.0
Hungary	28.1	7.3
Malta	14.2	7.2
Netherlands	9.5	6.6
Austria	8.7	5.2
Poland	26.5	8.9
Portugal	37.7	14.3
Romania	22.7	7.0
Slovenia	20.6	7.1
Slovakia	34.0	10.4
Finland	19.0	9.8
Sweden	23.7	12.4
United Kingdom	21.0	12.4
Iceland	13.6	10.2
Norway	8.6	4.8
Turkey	15.7	5.9

The answer to the issue of intergenerational shifts today, at least with regard to the generation up to 30 years of age, would not be the same as that of the 1990s.

Table 7: Financial status of children and parents (Source: Toš 1999, p. 66)

If you were to compare your financial situation with that of your parents when they were your age, would you say you are better or worse off?

1 - better off - 63.8
2 - the same - 13.1
3 - worse off - 19.0
9 - do not know, no answer - 4.1

Table 8: Citizens' rights prior to independence (Source: Toš 1997, p. 711)

A typical answer showing the desire for personal freedom. I: 723 and 724. B25 clearly indicates the desire for freedom of organisation, association, religious belief, etc., whereas B26 reveals one of the more painful aspects of socialism – the protection of the privacy of citizens.

B25		WHAT IS YOUR PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOLLOWING CITIZENS', POLITICAL AND COLLECTIVE RIGHTS FOR YOU?					
		no significance 1	minor significance 2	medium significance 3	great significance 4	very great significance 5	no answer 6
AK1 a) Right and freedom of association		6.6	14.2	31.0	32.3	15.1	0.8
AK2 b) Freedom of assembly		7.6	15.0	35.0	29.6	11.9	0.9
AK3 c) Freedom of petition		9.8	13.9	34.4	27.8	12.6	1.5
AK4 d) Freedom of religion		8.8	11.0	28.7	32.3	18.5	0.7
AK5 e) Right to ideological or political views		6.0	9.0	27.9	34.6	21.6	0.9
AK6 f) Right to strike		11.4	11.1	28.7	31.2	16.8	0.8
AK7 g) National rights		4.0	6.3	21.4	32.8	34.4	1.0
AK8 h) Right to national self-determination, including secession		6.7	6.6	21.4	29.9	34.3	1.2
AK9 i) Rights of national minorities and ethnic groups		5.8	8.0	27.3	34.9	22.8	1.1
AK10 j) Right to participation in political and economic decision-making		5.0	9.3	25.0	33.7	26.0	1.1
AK11 k) Right to self-management		8.4	9.8	26.0	32.3	22.5	1.0

Table 9: Human rights prior to independence (Source: Toš 1997, p. 712)

B26	The part of the constitution regarding the human rights to respect for the home and to privacy of correspondence should be supplemented

	with a provision stating that the infringement of these rights is possible only on the basis of a court decision and not at the discretion of other law enforcement authorities. Would you personally support this change or not?	
1-	yes, I would support it	*76.7*
2 -	no, I would not support it	*5.7*
3 -	I do not know, I cannot decide	*17.6*

Table 10: Levels of public trust in the institutions of the Republic of Slovenia (Source: Toš 2013, p. 84)

In 1991, which marked the beginning of the new state and of representative democracy, Slovenia recorded an adequate level of trust in parliament (28% of the respondents evaluated the parliament as successful or very successful, whereas 18.4% judged that the parliament was unsuccessful or very unsuccessful). The government received similar evaluations. The President of the State was evaluated as particularly worthy of trust, with his work being assessed as successful or even very successful by 77.4% of the respondents.

1.08	Taking into account the political, military, economic and social events of the past year, as well as the living conditions in Slovenia during this period, how would you rate the efficiency of the political and state organs listed below? As very successful or as unsuccessful?					
	Very successful 1	Successful 2	Partly successful 3	Unsuccessful 4	Very unsuccessful 5	I do not know 6
a) The Slovenian Assembly with F. Bučar as President	2.3	25.7	41.0	15.3	3.1	12.7
b) The Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia with M. Kučan as President	27.3	50.1	14.5	2.1	0.5	5.5
c) The Government of the Republic of Slovenia with L. Peterle as Prime Minister	4.5	23.7	35.4	21.6	6.0	8.7
d) Ministries of Economic Affairs	0.7	10.3	32.1	31.9	9.0	15.9
e) Ministry of Foreign Affairs	9.7	43.6	26.2	4.8	1.6	14.1
f) Ministry of Health	1.1	9.6	25.0	34.3	14.9	15.2
g) The ruling DEMOS coalition	0.9	10.9	28.1	30.3	9.9	20.0
h) Opposition parties	0.6	13.0	38.5	17.1	4.0	26.8
i) Trade Unions	1.1	10.5	27.8	26.5	11.6	22.5

Table 11: The level of trust in political parties, parliament and government over time (Source: Toš, 2012, VI, p. 89)

In 2011, a significantly lower level of trust is observed both in the government and the parliament. The table also indicates internal swings in the period from independence to 2011. The lower level of trust in politics was accompanied with a lower level of interest in politics.

V89		Below is a list of a number of Slovenian institutions and organisations. Please state your level of trust in each one of them. Is your level of trust high, reasonably high, low, or do you have no trust in them at all? Note: In the EVS-SJM 2008 study, the answer scale for the same question was changed: "Do you: trust them completely (1), trust them (2), not trust them (3), not trust them at all (4)?" This clarifies notable deviations of the results in SJM08 from the results of the preceding and current measurement.					
		high	reasonably high	low	no trust at all	do not know	no answer
V115 Government	SPO95	7.5	32.0	43.6	14.2	2.7	-
	SPO05	2.2	20.7	54.5	18.3	3.2	1.1
	SPO08	1.7	37.6	43.5	12.7	3.7	0.8
	SPO11	0.9	6.8	50.5	39.0	2.1	0.7
V116 Political parties	SPO95	2.1	11.0	48.8	34.0	4.1	-
	SPO05	0.8	7.6	55.1	30.2	4.7	1.6
	SPO08	0.5	21.4	60.5	12.5	4.3	0.8
	SPO11	0.3	3.1	44.8	48.9	2.5	0,4
V117 General Assembly	SPO92	6.6	29.0	48.0	15.9	-	-
	SPO95	3.1	20.5	49.6	22.2	4.7	-
	SPO99	4.9	19.4	50.8	21.0	3.4	0.6
	SPO05	1.6	13.8	54.4	24.0	4.8	1.4
	SPO08	2.1	41.9	42.5	8.0	4.9	0.6
	SPO11	0.7	5.3	51.7	39.9	2.2	0.2

Table 12: The level of interest in politics 1992–2011 (Source: Toš, 2012, VII, p. 84)

V84	To what extent does politics interest you?					
	SPO92	*SPO95*	*SPO99*	*SPO05*	*SPO08*	*SPO11*
1- It interests me very much	10.4	4.8	5.1	5.1	5.7	5.8
2- It interests me to a certain extent	46.8	39.0	37.0	37.0	38.4	33.4
3- I have very little interest in it	24.9	33.4	33.4	33.4	31.9	32.1

4- I have no interest in it	17.4	22.7	24.5	24.5	23.7	28.6
5- I do not know	0.5	0.2	-	-	0.1	0.0
6- no answer	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1

Table 13: Students of institutions of (first-cycle and second-cycle) higher education by gender and faculty (Source: SORS, Statistical Yearbooks, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010)

	1939/40			1959/60			1969/70			1979/80			1989/90			1999/00			2009/10		
	Total	**Men**	**Women**	**Total**	**Men**	**Women**	**Total**	**Men**	**Women**	**Total**	**Men**	**Women**	**Total**	**Men**	**Women**	**Total**	**Men**	**Women**	**Total**	**Men**	**Women**
Schools Total	1,971	1,575	396	9,252	2,878	2,878	20,441	11,827	8,614	29,825	15,655	14,170	34,228	15,488	18,739	80,056	34,951	45,105	114,873	48,428	66,445
Faculties Total	1,931	1,554	377	7,145	6,374	1,944	10,643	6,277	4,366	14,801	7,832	6,969	26,504	12,472	14,032	66,587	29,664	36,923	98,279	39,804	58,475
Faculty of Arts	/	/	/	/	/	/	2,212	609	1,603	2,207	545	1,662	2,410	443	1,967	6,257	1,323	4,934			
Faculty of Economics, University of Ljubljana	/	/	/	/	/	/	1,351	699	652	2,327	834	1,493	2,866	683	2,183	8,661	3,346	5,315			
Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Maribor	/	/	/	/	/	/				/	/	/	3,121	843	2,278	6,596	2,351	4,245			
Faculty of Law	/	/	/	/	/	/	885	476	409	1,155	513	642	1,013	292	721	2,045	693	1,352			
Faculty of Sociology, Political Sciences and Journalism* / Faculty of Social Sciences	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	1,121	579	542	870	263	607	3,387	990	2,397			

Faculty of Physical Education	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	363	208	155	901	609	292			
Faculty of Education, University of Maribor	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	1,508	237	1,271	4,399	702	3,697			
Faculty of Mechanical Engineering	/	/	/	/	/	/	1,076	1,065	11	1,575	1,562	13	1,713	1,623	90	1,770	1,708	62			
Faculty of Electrical Engineering	/	/	/	/	/	/	840	821	19	1,138	1,077	61	2,611	2,293	318	1,784	1,718	66			
Faculty of Architecture, Civic and Geodetic Engineering	/	/	/	/	/	/	753	551	202	931	655	276	1,155	611	544	/	/	/			
Faculty of Architecture	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	766	355	411			
Faculty of Civic and Geodetic Engineering	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	1,342	978	364			
Faculty of Science and Technology	/	/	/	/	/	/	1,852	1,172	653	1,786	830	956	2,707	1,098	1,609	1,840	747	1,093			
Faculty of Technology, University of Maribor	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	3,275	2,591	684	/	/	/			
Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	1,725	1,639	86			
Biotechnical Faculty	/	/	/	/	/	/	848	481	367	1,475	842	633	1,787	892	895	3,220	1,606	1,614			
Faculty of Medicine	/	/	/	/	/	/	853	403	450	1,086	395	691	1,015	395	710	1,368	517	851			

Table 14: Tertiary education graduates by gender and faculty (Source:SORS, Statistical Yearbooks, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010)

	1939/40	1969	1979			1989	1999			2009		
	Total	Total	Total	Men	Women	Total	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
Total	244	2,238	5,958	3,000	2,958	5,679	10,536	4,541	5,995	18,103	6,911	11,192
Faculties	243	973	2,853****	1,562	1,291	2,107	7,969	3,416	4,553	14,933	5,329	9,604
Faculty of Arts	82**	117	352*****	74	278	231	534	79	455	/	/	/
Faculty of Economics, University of Ljubljana	/	76	797	327	470	161	1,426	475	951	/	/	/
Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Maribor	/		/	/	/	185	699	212	487	/	/	/
Faculty of Law	104	74	243	113	130	172	236	84	152	/	/	/
Faculty of Sociology, Political Sciences and Journalism* / Faculty of Social Sciences	/	/	97	46	51	90	308	75	233	/	/	/
Faculty of Physical Education	/	/	/	/	/	47	82	48	34	/	/	/
Faculty of Education, University of Maribor	/	/	/	/	/	5	485	49	436	/	/	/
Faculty of Mechanical Engineering	57***	100	318	314	4	97	417	404	13	/	/	/
Faculty of Electrical Engineering	/	70	199	192	7	171	209	203	6	/	/	/
Faculty of Architecture, Civic and Geodetic Engineering	/	111	201	132	69	111	/	/	/	/	/	/
Faculty of Architecture	/	/	/	/	/	/	99	49	50	/	/	/
Faculty of Civic and Geodetic Engineering	/	/	/	/	/	/	92	63	29	/	/	/
Faculty of Science and Technology	/	171	278********	162	116	281	/	/	/	/	/	/
Faculty of Natural Sciences	/	/	/	/	/	/	86	28	58	/	/	/
Faculty of Technology, University of Maribor	/	/	/	/	/	155	/	/	/	/	/	/
Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science	/	/	/	/	/	/	232	226	6	/	/	/
Biotechnical Faculty	/	100	194	115	79	265	331	168	163	/	/	/
Faculty of Medicine	/	154	174	87	87	136	152	48	104	/	/	/

Table 15: Leadership and leading personnel for 1970 (Source: Census Books from the 1971 census, SORS. Accessed at: http://www.stat.si/publikacije/popisi/1971/1971_1-18.pdf)

Leadership and leading personnel		Women	Proportion of women
TOTAL	22,836	3,032	13.3%
MEMBERS OF REPRESENTATIVE BODIES WITH ONGOING RESPONSIBILITIES	129	13	10.1%
ELECTED OFFICIALS WITH ONGOING RESPONSIBILITIES	141	20	14.2
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OFFICIALS	94	12	12.3%
OTHER OFFICIALS WITH ONGOING RESPONSIBILITIES	523	114	27.9%
MEMBERS OF REPRESENTATIVE BODIES AND OFFICIALS	887	159	17.9%
EXECUTIVE MANAGERS AND OTHER MANAGERS OF PRIVATE ORGANISATIONS	9,290	1,002	10.8%
LEADERSHIP PERSONNEL IN EDUCATION	113	40	**35.4%**
DIRECTORS OF CULTURAL AND RELATED INSTITUTIONS	161	43	26.7%
DIRECTORS OF HEALTH INSTITUTIONS	159	48	**30.2%**
DIRECTORS OF SCIENTIFIC AND RELATED ORGANISATIONS	194	62	**31.9%**
DIRECTORS OF HOMES, BOARDING SCHOOLS, AND SIMILAR	154	56	**36.4%**
DIRECTORS OF OTHER LABOUR ORGANISATIONS	128	12	9.4%
PRODUCTION MANAGERS IN LABOUR ORGANISATIONS	10,199	1,263	12.4%
OFFICIALS AND MANAGEMENT STAFF IN CHAMBERS AND SIMILAR	55	28	50%
OFFICIALS AND MANAGEMENT STAFF IN PUBLIC AND POLITICAL BODIES	216	42	19.4%
OFFICIALS AND MANAGEMENT STAFF IN PROFESSIONAL BODIES AND SIMILAR	61	24	39.3%

LEADING PERSONNEL IN CHAMBERS, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS AND SIMILAR	332	94	28.3%

Table 16: Leadership and leading personnel for 1980 (Source: Statistical data: SRS Census of the population, households and housing, 31 March 1981)

Leadership and leading personnel	Total	Women	Proportion of women
Total	20,106	4,095	20.4%
Members of assemblies and socio-political associations, officials of executive and administrative bodies with ongoing duties	1,387	346	24.9%
Leaders and managers in organisations of associated labour and other self-management organisations and associations	17,773	3,498	19.7%
Managers in chambers, general associations, self-management special-interest organisations, socio-political and other social organisations with ongoing duties	946	251	26.6%

Table 17: Leadership and leading personnel for 1990 (Source: SORS, Persons employed in companies and other organisations in selected groups of occupations (UCO), Slovenia, 31 December 1990)

General position	Specific position	Gender - total	Women	Proportion of women
TOTAL		18,702	3,864	20.7%

MANAGERS-(EXECUTIVE) ADMINISTRATORS IN ECONOMIC ORGANISATIONS OF ASSOCIATED LABOUR (OAL)		17,742	3,439	19.4%
	DIRECTORS-PRESIDENTS OF BUSINESS TEAMS	3,939	469	11.9%
	PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT MANAGERS-ADMINISTRATORS	4,643	432	9.3%
	RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, PLANNING DEPARTMENT MANAGERS-ADMINISTRATORS	1,611	362	22.5%
	FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING DEPARTMENT MANAGERS-ADMINISTRATORS	1,350	756	**56.0**%
	TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT MANAGERS-ADMINISTRATORS AND SIMILAR	296	31	10.5%
	COMMERCIAL DEPARTMENT MANAGERS-ADMINISTRATORS	2,965	667	22.5%
	HUMAN RESOURCES DEPARTMENT MANAGERS-ADMINISTRATORS	1,254	487	38.8%
	MANAGERS-ADMINISTRATORS IN ECONOMIC ORGANISATIONS OF ASSOCIATED LABOUR	1,684	235	14.0%
LEADERS/MANAGERS IN ORGANISATIONS OF ASSOCIATED LABOUR		960	425	44.3%

DEDICATED TO SOCIAL ACTIVITIES:				
	LEADERS/MANAGERS IN EDUCATION	206	123	**59.7**%
	LEADERS/MANAGERS IN CULTURE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES	112	39	34.8%
	LEADERS/MANAGERS IN SCIENTIFIC AND RESEARCH ORGANISATIONS	114	36	31.6%
	HEALTH ORGANISATION LEADERS/MANAGERS AND SIMILAR	252	116	**46.0**%
	SPECIAL HOME, BOARDING HOUSE LEADERS/MANAGERS AND SIMILAR	95	43	**45.3**%
	LEADERS/MANAGERS OF SELF-MANAGING ORGANISATIONS/ASSOCIATIONS DEDICATED TO SOCIAL ACTIVITIES	181	68	37.6%

Table 18: Leadership and leading personnel for 2000 (Source: SORS, Active labour force by selected groups of occupations (SCO-V2) and by gender, Slovenia, 31 December 2000)

General position	Specific position	Gender - total	Women	Proportion of women
TOTAL		32,081	9,142	28.5 %
LEGISLATORS, SENIOR OFFICIALS		1,771	725	40.9 %
	LEGISLATORS	385	89	23.1 %
	SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	1,056	509	**48.2 %**
	SENIOR OFFICIALS OF SPECIAL-INTEREST ORGANISATIONS	330	127	38.5 %
DIRECTORS/MANAGERS OF COMPANIES		26,614	7,489	28.1 %
	DIRECTORS AND MEMBERS OF MANAGEMENT BOARDS	11,913	2,695	22.6 %
	PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT MANAGERS	7,363	1,881	25.5 %
	OTHER DEPARTMENT MANAGERS	7,338	2,913	**39.7 %**
MANAGERS OF SMALL-SIZE COMPANIES		3,696	928	25.1 %

Table 19: Leadership and leading personnel for 2010 (Source: SORS, Active labour force by selected groups of occupations (SCO-V2) and by gender, Slovenia, 31 December 2010)

LEGISLATORS, SENIOR OFFICIALS - General position	Specific position	Gender - total	Women	Proportion of women
TOTAL		45,870	14,778	32.2%
LEGISLATORS, SENIOR OFFICIALS		1,614	772	47.8%
	LEGISLATORS	296	49	16.6%
	SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	962	539	56.0%
	SENIOR OFFICIALS OF SPECIAL-INTEREST ORGANISATIONS	356	184	**51.7 %**
DIRECTORS/MANAGERS OF COMPANIES		34,783	11,564	33.2%
	DIRECTORS AND MEMBERS OF MANAGEMENT BOARDS	18,617	4,977	26.7%
	PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT MANAGERS	6,744	2,157	32.0%
	OTHER DEPARTMENT MANAGERS	9,422	4,430	**47.0 %**
MANAGERS OF SMALL-SIZE COMPANIES		9,473	2,442	25.8%

Table 20: Leadership and leading personnel for 2012 (Source: SORS, Active labour force by selected groups of occupations (SCO-V2) and by gender, Slovenia, 31 December 2012)

	Total	Women	Proportion of women
1120 General directors/managers and members of management boards	1,983	511	25.8%
12 General managers in business services and commerce	14,277	6,086	42.6%
13 Production managers and managers in specialised professional and technical services	16,695	4,455	26.7%
14 General managers in restaurants, whole sail and retail trade, and other services	8,387	2,566	30.6%
Managers total	39,359	13,107	33.3%

Table 21: Courts and judges on 31 December 1970 (Source: Statistical Yearbook of the SRS. Administration of Justice. 1971.)

Type of Court	Judges total	Women	Proportion of women
Courts of General Jurisdiction – TOTAL:	**335**	**72**	21.5%
Supreme Court of the SRS	21	1	4.8%
Regional Courts	100	12	12%
District Courts	214	59	27.6%
Economic Courts – TOTAL:	32	1	3.1%
High Economic Court of the SRS	7	/	0
Regional Economic Court	**25**	**1**	4%
Total	**367**	**73**	**19.9%**

Table 22: Courts and judges in 1980 and 1990 (Source: Statistical Yearbook of the SRS. Administration of Justice. 1981; The Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. 1991)

Type of Court	1980			1990		
	Judges total	Women	Proportion of women	Judges total	Women	Proportion of women
Supreme Court	20	2	10%	17	5	29.4%
Higher Courts	62	15	24.2%	68	21	30.9%
Basic Courts	393	200	50.9%	424	236	55.7%
Courts of Associated Labour	/	/	/	42	22	50%
Total	**475**	**217**	**45.7%**	**551**	**284**	**51.5%**

Table 23: The structure of judges by gender for 2001, 2010 and 2012 (Source: Judicial Statistics. 2002, 1-9 2010, 1-9 2012)

Type of court	2001			2010			2012		
	Judges total	Women	Proportion of women	Judges total	Women	Proportion of women	Judges total	Women	Proportion of women
Supreme Court	35	12	34.3%	38	16	42.1%	35	13	37.1%
Higher Courts	99	54	54.5%	149	108	72.5%	143	104	72.7%
Regional Courts	225	143	63.6%	261	197	75.5%	265	204	77%
District Courts	290	221	76.2%	500	415	83%	468	392	83.8%
Administrative Court of the RS	28	21	75%	35	29	82.9%	33	27	81.8%
Higher Labour Court and Social Court	17	8	47.1%	15	8	53.3%	14	6	42.9%
Labour Courts	51	38	74.5	47	38	80.9%	43	33	76.7%
Total	**745**	**497**	**66.7%**	**1,045**	**811**	**77.6%**	**1,001**	**779**	**77.8%**

Table 24: The proportion of women at the Constitutional Court (Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Slovenia. Administration of Justice. 1971. 1981. 1991; The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, data for 2000, 2010, 2014) http://www.us-rs.si/o-sodiscu/sodniki/vsi-sodniki/.

Constitutional Court	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	1 March 2014
Judges total	9	9	9	9	9	9
Women	1	2	1	4	4	5
The proportion of women	11.1%	22.2%	11.1%	44.4%	44.4%	55.6%

Appendix 2

Figure 1: The poverty line – Slovenia in comparison, 2009 (Source: Eurostat)



3.1. “In 2009, 16.3% of the EU population was estimated to be at risk of poverty. This proportion calculated as a weighted average of national results masks considerable variation between Member States. In four EU Member States, namely Latvia (25.7%), Romania (22.4%), Bulgaria (21.8%) and Lithuania (20.6%), more than a fifth of the population was at risk of poverty. At the other extreme, the share of the population at risk of poverty was the lowest in the Czech Republic (8.6%), Slovakia (11.0%), The Netherlands (11.1%) and Slovenia (11.3%)” (Eurostat September 2011).

3.2. **Inequality of income distribution** – (Eurostat September 2011):
“In 2009, as a population-weighted average of EU-27 Member States’ national figures, the top 20% (highest equivalised disposable income) of a Member State’s population received 4.9 times as much income as the bottom 20% (lowest equivalised disposable income) of the Member State’s population. This ratio varied considerably across the EU-27 Member States, from 3.2 in Slovenia and 3.5 in the Czech Republic and Hungary, to 5.8 in Greece, 5.9 in Bulgaria, 6.0 in Spain and Portugal, 6.3 in Lithuania, 6.7 in Romania, peaking at 7.3 in Latvia”.

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